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2705274	无图 <p><p>MENDOZA, Enviada Especial.- En las dos jornadas de la 45° Convención del IAEF en Mendoza, hubo un tema que se coló por encima del "trending topic" y que fue tratado de responder por los distintos funcionarios del Gobierno que desfilaron ante los hombres y mujeres de finanzas: "cuándo se sale del cepo cambiario".</p><p>Este jueves, en un panel compartido con el presidente del Banco Central de Perú, Julio Velarde, el titular del BCRA , Santiago Bausili, aseguró que esta decisión se demoró para "evitar una crisis terminal".</p><p>Ambos banqueros centrales compararon sus experiencias: desde 2006, Velarde está al frente de la autoridad monetaria de Perú, donde desde la década del 90 rige el bimonetarismo y el dólar convive con el sol peruano. Velarde, destacó que este proceso se dio "naturalmente".</p><p>A su turno, Santiago Bausili afirmó: "En el caso de Argentina también sucede naturalmentee. Lo que nosotros estamos trabajando es permitir que la sociedad pueda expresarse, pueda ahorrar. Estamos trabajando para que los carriles operativos funcionen", dijo y remarcó: "En Argentina también ya ocurrió la dolarización: el peso en Argentina es una moneda transaccional. La gente ahorra en dólares, piensa y fija expectativas en dólares. El reflejo de todo esto es nuestro sistema bancario, que es totalmente transaccional. El crédito en Argentina no existe: ni en pesos ni en dólares".</p><p>En ese punto, Bausili remarcó que el nivel de crédito bancario en el país, uno de los más bajos de la región, "es el resultado de las condiciones macroeconómicas, pero también de las distintas capas de regulaciones financieras que fueron poniendo fricciones. Entonces, lo que nosotros estamos haciendo es permitir que los carriles estén disponibles para que la sociedad pueda elegir". Así, el titular del Central aludió al trabajo que el organismo está haciendo para poner en marcha las cuentas bimonetarias, que permitirán pagar indistintamente en pesos o dólares en los comercios del país.</p><p>Bausili reconoció que la demora en la salida del actual régimen cambiario tuvo que ver con una decisión del Gobierno de evitar un mayor costo social de las medidas. "En Perú, la liberación se hizo después de una crisis terminal. Nosotros creíamos que podíamos evitar una crisis terminal", dijo el banquero central, que reconoció: "Los primeros seis meses del programa fueron muy duros".</p><p>El economista añadió que el "Rodrigazo" en la década del 70 "fue el intento de Argentina de hacer lo que hizo Perú. Pero después fracasó. Nosotros teníamos la oportunidad de evitar ese costo: la desregulación de la economía quizás lleva un poco más de tiempo. Es el trade off, es un poco menos costoso", dijo sobre el rumbo que eligió el Gobierno desde el 10 de diciembre</p><p>Consultado sobre los próximos pasos del plan económico, luego de haber realizado buena parte del ajuste, y del rol del FMI en medio de las dilatadas negociaciones, Bausili afirmó: "Un socio que no pone plata es un auditor". Sin embargo, aseguró que el organismo que preside Kristalina Georgieva "Ve mucho de lo que hacemos con buenos ojos”.</p><p>En este punto, dijo: "Al final de este camino el Fondo va a ser un buen socio. Nuestros programas, pueden ser más o menos creativos, pero en el fondo son ortodoxos".</p><p>Luego, al ser interrogado sobre los posibles shocks externos al programa económico, sobre todo por la baja del precio internacional de la soja, Bausili afirmó que el país tiene que buscar ser menos "sojadependiente" y además hacer foco en diversificar su matriz energética. </p><p>"No nos confundamos: Argentina está estancado en términos de PBI, pero si es un país que genera riquezas", dijo el banquero central que aseguró: "Tenemos que encontrar formas de canalizar el ahorro doméstico" </p></p> El presidente del Banco Central: "La competencia de monedas es un proceso natural en la Argentina"	查看 3794	克拉林集团	2024-09-07 07:32:22 2024-09-07 07:31:39	word
2705273	有图 <p><p>Dos personas parecían dispuestas a dar un paso más en su relación sentimental, que llevaba 12 años de vigencia. Sin embargo, cuando faltaba poco para la confirmación de su amor frente al altar, el vínculo se rompió. Y todo debido a una infidelidad. A raíz de esta situación, uno de ellos optó por hacer un anuncio sorpresivo.</p><p>Una mujer de Reino Unido se enteró, días antes de casarse, de que su novio la había engañado. Ante la circunstancia, ella tuvo una iniciativa inesperada con respecto a su fiesta de boda. </p><p>La joven Lindsay, de 31 años, declaró a los medios locales que durante más de una década estuvo en pareja con un hombre de ahora 36 años―no se difundió su identidad―. A pesar de que sufrieron muchas idas y vueltas con su vínculo, siguieron juntos en ese tiempo y ambos planearon contraer matrimonio, de acuerdo a su relato. </p><p>Una confesión a último momento</p><p>Los dos se comprometieron en 2020, según explicó Lindsay a la agencia británica de noticias SWNS, y decidieron ponerle fecha a su casamiento: el 17 de agosto de este año. Los novios estaban "entusiasmados" con la boda, pero una revelación a último momento obligó a que los planes se modificaran.</p><p>A mediados de agosto, a pocos días de la gran celebración, la joven descubrió que su novio había mantenido relaciones con otra mujer. Lindsay dijo que él se lo había confesado durante una charla en la casa en la cual convivían, en Inglaterra. </p><p>La inesperada iniciativa de la joven</p><p>Al principio, tras develar la infidelidad, pensaron en hacer la boda de todas maneras. Aunque luego Lindsay "entró en razones", reflexionando en profundidad acerca del tema, y por eso desistió de casarse. A partir de ahí, se separaron y el hombre se mudó a otra casa.</p><p>A continuación, la joven ―angustiada y devastada por el engaño― debía llamar por teléfono al salón de la fiesta para cancelarla. Pero, después de analizar y pensar por un tiempo, cambió de opinión. Pronto se le ocurrió una idea diferente.</p><p><source srcset="https://www.clarin.com/img/2024/09/06/ih1ubr-y0_720x0__1.jpg"><img src="https://www.clarin.com/img/2024/09/06/ih1ubr-y0_720x0__1.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer">La británica se enteró de la infidelidad de su novio durante una charla. Foto: captura/@beth2841.</p><p>Lindsay, en vez de haber cancelado el festejo, tomó la determinación de llevar a cabo la celebración: haría una fiesta casi idéntica al casamiento, aunque en esta oportunidad sin la presencia de su expareja.</p><p>Por lo tanto, la británica modificó el concepto de la "boda" y la "rebautizó" como una "ceremonia de libertad", que contaría con la participación de la familia y amigos de ella.</p><p>Para concretar esta iniciativa, contactó por privado a todos los invitados y además publicó un anuncio de la "ceremonia de libertad" a través de sus redes. Terminó recibiendo apoyo por parte de sus seres queridos y también de miles de usuarios, quienes se hicieron eco de su historia.</p><p><source srcset="https://www.clarin.com/img/2024/09/06/uM85df5r1_720x0__1.jpg"><img src="https://www.clarin.com/img/2024/09/06/uM85df5r1_720x0__1.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer">La ceremonia diferente que llevó a cabo la joven junto a sus seres queridos.</p><p>"Yo no sabía cómo iba a salir adelante, estaba angustiada. Pero a su vez, en mi cabeza rondaba el pensamiento de "Soy libre": es el comienzo de una etapa mejor. Decidí disfrutar de la fiesta con amigos íntimos y familiares, en lugar de quedarme en casa llorando", manifestó la joven en conversación con SWNS.</p><p>La "ceremonia de la libertad" y una luna de miel </p><p>El 17 de agosto, Lindsay entró al salón de fiestas con su vestido de boda puesto y todos los invitados ―más de 60 personas― la aplaudieron. En la velada hubo un importante banquete, con comida y tragos, y también bailaron al ritmo de un DJ. </p><p>"Mi hermana Beth (quien la contuvo en esta difícil etapa) fue la dama de honor. Ella puso un cartel que decía: "Y (Lindsay) vivió feliz para siempre...". Mi tío preparó una torta de chocolate y todos bailamos sin parar", recordó. </p><p><source srcset="https://www.clarin.com/img/2024/09/06/Ni_FeE_rQ_720x0__1.jpg"><img src="https://www.clarin.com/img/2024/09/06/Ni_FeE_rQ_720x0__1.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer">Así fue la fiesta de Lindsay junto a su familia y amigos. Foto: captura/@beth2841.</p><p>Por otro lado, Lindsay aclaró que se emocionó y disfrutó del día. "Leí un discurso frente a todos que me había dedicado mi hermana, se trató de algo conmovedor. Di las gracias a mi familia y amigos por estar ahí. Les avisé que no sabía cómo iba a lograr superar el mal momento (haber sido engañada por su ex). Sin embargo, al ver todo el apoyo que me dieron, me sentí un poco mejor", indicó.</p><p>El 20 de agosto, la joven viajó de "luna de miel" a la isla de Creta, en Grecia, sin su ex. Por el contrario, a ella la acompañó una amiga de toda la vida, llamada Melissa. En videos, difundidos en TikTok, se puede ver que ambas amigas se divirtieron y descansaron en el destino del Mediterráneo. </p><p><source srcset="https://www.clarin.com/img/2024/09/06/i20Cb4VVT_720x0__1.jpg"><img src="https://www.clarin.com/img/2024/09/06/i20Cb4VVT_720x0__1.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer">La joven se emocionó y pasó un buen momento. Foto: captura/@beth2841.</p><p>Por otra parte, Lindsay aseveró que su "ceremonia de libertad" la hizo sentir "fuerte y empoderada". "Me sorprendió mucho el apoyo que me dio todo el mundo. Estaba rodeada de tanto amor", expresó. </p></p> Descubrió días antes de casarse que su novio la había engañado y sorprendió a todos con una idea: "Lo disfruté"	查看 5522	克拉林集团	2024-09-07 07:40:57 2024-09-07 07:31:39	word
2705272	无图 <p><p>Brasil y Ecuador se enfrentan en el Estadio Couto Pereira, en la ciudad de Curitiba, por la séptima fecha de las Eliminatorias Sudamericanas de la Copa del Mundo 2026. El partido se transmite para la TV por TyC Sports con el arbitraje del argentino Facundo Tello.</p></p> Brasil vs Ecuador, por la fecha 7 de las Eliminatorias Sudamericanas: minuto a minuto, en directo	查看 277	克拉林集团	2024-09-07 08:01:47 2024-09-07 07:31:39	word
2705271	有图 <p><p>A Milei se le empiezan a notar los errores. Tuvo un par de malas semanas en el Congreso después de haber conseguido (y no es para nada poco mérito) la ley Bases, que es por el momento más que nada una promesa, pero promesa importante de hacer.</p><p>A nueve meses de gobierno, por algo no baja o apenas baja en las encuestas. Y eso a pesar de disparates y metidas de pata en cantidad. Está dando una pelea eludida por décadas contra las tres brujas de la decadencia del país: inflación, corrupción y el Estado como súper agencia de empleos truchos a cambio de votos. Y pensar que tanto se ha hablado del crecimiento a tasas chinas, la igualdad, y la década ganada. Sanatas gigantes. Ahora, que la inflación baja, está bajando. Que, si baja con artimañas contables, pagadioses, etcétera, importa al grueso de la gente mucho menos que el hecho concreto y simple: baja.</p><p>Con la corrupción también hay dimes y diretes, pero ahí tenemos los seguros Fernández, de los que estaba tan seguro que nunca se sabría nada. O los chanchullos en desarmado de las numerosas gerencias K de la pobreza. Por eso molesta tanto la insistencia de Milei en arremeter contra la Corte, a la que el kirchnerismo intentó voltear con un juicio político. Y molesta que diga, pareciendo que no sabe qué otra cosa decir, que Lijo es el único juez que entiende de Justicia y, además, de cibernética, algo que ni el mismo Lijo se lo cree.</p><p><source srcset="https://www.clarin.com/img/2024/09/06/j74J5ZX62_1256x620__2.jpg#1725666331661"><img src="https://www.clarin.com/img/2024/09/06/j74J5ZX62_1256x620__2.jpg#1725666331661" rel="noopener noreferrer">Federico Sturzenegger avanza con el achicamiento y la desregulación del Estado.</p><p>Con el achicamiento del Estado hay bastantes cosas hechas, aunque poco comentadas por el propio gobierno, más dispuesto a insultar a cualquiera que diga No, bwana y no Sí, bwana. Y, de pronto, otra novedad como la de Lijo cibernético: Aerolíneas, la de eternos déficits crónicos y multimillonarios, que de la noche a la mañana produjo ganancias sin que nadie se diera cuenta. Los gremios aeronáuticos lo saben pero no les importa: usan a los pasajeros para extorsionar al gobierno.</p><p>Es decir, ajuste hay, por más que los jubilados sean, de lejos, los campeones. Milei copia a los K y considera que los fallos de la Justicia son de aplicación a piacere de la Anses, total los jubilados tienen tiempo de sobra. Hace muchos años que no cumple o cumple a medias, lo cual no impide que se sanatee con la institucionalidad, la división de poderes, de la democracia y demás, ¿Por qué llamaría entonces a sorpresa que el gobierno, kirchnerizándose otra vez, cercena el derecho de acceso a la información pública? Los gobiernos son de la gente, no propiedad de los políticos de turno… aunque a muchos, militantes en estado de fanatismo, les parezca raro.</p><p>De golpe, le salta un Abdala, senador por San Luis, ex Pro y exministro de Rodríguez Saa, que entró al mileísmo por escasez de libertarios propios. Los senadores tienen carta libre para poner asesores y muchos lo hacen al por mayor. Abdala, 20-asesores-20, se prepara para ir por la gobernación, necesita equipo y decidió que ese equipo lo pague el contribuyente. Bien de la casta.</p><p><source srcset="https://www.clarin.com/img/2024/09/06/VxYR98zMO_720x0__1.jpg"><img src="https://www.clarin.com/img/2024/09/06/VxYR98zMO_720x0__1.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer">El senador Abdala admitió tener 20 asesores pagados por el Estado. Y después se fue encapuchado a ver Argentina-Chile al Monumental.</p><p>Otro sincericidio: el del exministro Guzmán. Creímos o se creyó que la cuarentena eterna era buena y necesaria pero fue una ingenuidad. A la cuarentena del gobierno de científicos la estiraron los políticos porque era lo que más les convenía. A ellos, claro, no a la gente: sus 234 días la convirtieron en una de las más crueles y largas, y sus 130.841 muertos en la segunda peor de la región. Cristina, recordemos, andaba por Cuba, y Fernández se había creído que todo el rancho era propio. Tanto se la creyó que nos payaseó, mientras subía la cuenta de muertos y las tragedias familiares.</p><p>Y no será tema de primera plana o de consumo masivo, pero ahí está esa otra ayuda para tapar los tiros en el pie del gobierno y estirar los plazos de aguante: por obra de los chats de Fabiola o los olvidos telefónicos de Fernández, José Glinski, chubutense jefe de la Aeroportuaria y novio de la filmada enamorada presidencial Tamara Pettinato, se quedó con una mansión de narcos con la excusa de usarla como escuela de policías, pero en realidad la dedicó a festicholas. También puso una especie de agencia de préstamo de autos secuestrados, a disposición de amigos. El estado K.</p><p>Tironeada por La Cámpora, lo investiga una fiscal kirchnerista: Cecilia Incardona. Más noticias raras, para este boletín, pero antes un repaso de la escasez de funcionarios, como Dios manda o mandaría. Hay que renovar autoridades en el Consejo Federal de Inversiones, caja tradicional del peronismo que hoy maneja no tan indirectamente Wado de Pedro. 100 mil o 170 mil millones (diferencias según el momento inflacionario) y los gobernadores peronistas buscan retenerla. Lo curioso es que el gobernador chubutense del Pro, Nacho Torres, propone a Gastón Douek, el que le hizo en el Barsa la campaña sucia a Messi.</p><p>Douek no tiene ninguna credencial salvo la de organizar escraches por las redes. Denunciado por lavado de dinero, dispone de bases de datos oficiales, como la de la AFIP. No sorprende tanto que tenga esa información reservada como que lo contraten funcionarios como Torres o el fueguino Melella. ¿Qué tendrá Douek?</p><p><source srcset="https://www.clarin.com/img/2023/10/18/OASKhg2JS_720x0__1.jpg"><img src="https://www.clarin.com/img/2023/10/18/OASKhg2JS_720x0__1.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer">Gastón Douek, propuesto por Nacho Torres del Pro para el manejo del Consejo Federal de Inversiones. Foto Twitter</p><p>Insistimos: ya con esto sería suficiente como para pasar por alto las metidas de pata del gobierno, menos lo nuevo y positivo con la inflación, la corrupción y la limpieza del estado. Pero éramos pocos y parió la abuela: el jefe montonero Firmenich dando clases de moral, política y lo que venga. Hace 50 años Firmenich metía miedo. Hoy mete bronca sin fin. Hasta, si no fuera por sus crímenes, podría provocar lástima por decrepitud y soberbia. Si algo quedaría por explicar, es cómo tuvo tanta influencia sobre decenas de miles de jóvenes, a muchos de los cuales mandó a la muerte.</p><p>Milei, agradecido, aunque seguirá insultando. Es su estilo, pero debe sonreír cuando también, de pronto, aparece la exitosa abogada-profesora de lo que se quiera hablar, Cristina Kirchner, ahora economista mundial, para dictarle cátedra a él y a Harvard con un argumento, según ella, irrebatible: es la economía bimonetaria, estúpido. Y, sí. Hace 50 años, por no decir más, que seguimos dándole vuelta a la misma fracasada política circular: viva el Estado, muera el Estado, viva la inflación, muera la inflación, viva el dólar…</p><p>Y el pescado (sigue) sin vender.</p></p> Milei mete la pata pero otros lo superan y hasta Cristina y Firmenich llegan para ayudarlo	查看 7164	克拉林集团	2024-09-07 08:02:27 2024-09-07 07:31:39	word
2705270	有图 <svg><symbol> </symbol><symbol> </symbol><symbol> </symbol><symbol> </symbol><symbol> </symbol><symbol> </symbol><symbol> </symbol><symbol> </symbol><symbol> </symbol><symbol> </symbol><symbol> </symbol><symbol> </symbol><symbol> </symbol><symbol> </symbol><symbol> </symbol><symbol> </symbol><symbol> </symbol></svg> <p> Direkt zum Seiteninhalt springen </p> <p> <p> <svg> <title>Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik</title> <desc>Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik Logo</desc> <clipPath><rect></rect></clipPath> <title>swp_rebrush_logo</title> <g> </g><rect></rect><rect></rect> </svg> </p> Navigation auf- und zuklappen </p> <p> <nav> <p> <form> <label> Suche </label> <i></i> Suche abschicken </form> </p> Kontakt Karriere Presse DE EN </nav> <p> <p> <p> <form> <label> Suche </label> <i></i> Suche abschicken </form> </p> </p> <nav> <p> Themen Themen <i></i> </p> <p> <p> <i></i> Navigation zuklappen <p> Zur Übersicht: Themen <p> Forschungsgebiete Forschungsgebiete <i></i> </p> Afrika südlich der Sahara Asien Digitalisierung, Cyber, Technologie Energie, Klima, Umwelt EU, Europa Lateinamerika und die Karibik Migration, EZ Nichtstaatliche Gewalt Nordafrika und Mittlerer Osten Russland, Osteuropa, Zentralasien Sicherheits- & Verteidigungspolitik Türkei UNO, globales Regieren, Völkerrecht USA, Kanada Wirtschaft, Handel, Ressourcen <p> Themenlinien Themenlinien <i></i> </p> Kooperation im Kontext systemischer Rivalität Neugestaltung der europäischen Sicherheitsordnung Autokratisierung als Herausforderung für die deutsche und europäische Politik Wirtschaftliche und technologische Transformationen <p> Dossiers Dossiers <i></i> </p> Cybersicherheit und Digitalpolitik: Die Rolle des Digitalen in der internationalen Politik Die USA und die transatlantischen Beziehungen Energiepolitik Europawahlen 2024 und die nächste strategische Agenda der EU Flucht und Migration Foresight: Vorausschau auf mögliche Überraschungen Globale Nachhaltigkeitspolitik Jihadismus Klimapolitik Konfliktkomplex Nordkorea Russlands Krieg gegen die Ukraine und seine Folgen <p> Fokusthemen Fokusthemen <i></i> </p> Krieg in Nahost US-Präsidentschaftswahlen 2024 </p> </p> </p> Publikationen Wissenschaftler:innen <p> Die SWP Die SWP <i></i> </p> <p> <p> <i></i> Navigation zuklappen <p> Zur Übersicht: Die SWP <p> Über uns Über uns <i></i> </p> Team A-Z Organisation Grundlegendes Freunde und Förderer <p> Forschung Forschung <i></i> </p> Forschungsgruppen Themenlinien Centrum für angewandte Türkeistudien (CATS) »Megatrends Afrika«-Projekt Forschungsprojekte Forschungscluster Forschungsrahmen </p> </p> </p> <p> Service Service <i></i> </p> <p> <p> <i></i> Navigation zuklappen <p> Zur Übersicht: Service <p> Unser Beratungsangebot </p> <p> Newsletter </p> <p> SWP-Podcasts </p> <p> SWP-WebMonitore </p> <p> Literaturdatenbank </p> <p> Soziale Medien </p> <p> Newsfeed </p> </p> </p> </p> </nav> <p> Kontakt Karriere Presse DE EN </p> </p> </p> <nav> Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik <meta> Publikationen <meta> Turkey’s Strategic Autonomy in the Black Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean <meta> </nav> <p> Daria Isachenko Erol Kaymak Turkey’s Strategic Autonomy in the Black Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean SWP Comment 2024/C 39, 06.09.2024, 7 Seiten <p>doi:10.18449/2024C39</p> Forschungsgebiete Türkei </p> <p> <p> <i></i> PDF \| 352 KB <i></i> EPUB \| 1,2 MB <i></i> MOBI \| 3,1 MB </p> </p> <p> <p> <p> <p>In the Black Sea, Turkey has been able to engage in resource exploration and joint security arrangements with its neighbours. Ankara’s approach to the Black Sea demonstrates that with the right diplomatic efforts and mutual recognition of interests, regional cooperation is possible even in complex geopolitical environments. Thecontrast in Ankara’s positioning in the Black Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean highlights the potential for Turkey to participate in cooperative frameworks in the latter case, provided its concerns and interests are adequately addressed.</p> <p> <p>In the Black Sea, Turkey has managed to establish a functioning modus operandi with all the riparian states. Ankara’s strategy emphasises regional ownership, multilateral cooperation, and a balancing act to prevent domination by any single power. Although Turkey did not join the Western-led sanctions regime against Russia, Ankara’s steps in the Black Sea region, such as its application of the Montreux Convention, itsinitial mediation efforts between Russia and Ukraine, the Black Sea Grain Deal, as well as the trilateral Black Sea Mine Countermeasures Task Force with Romania and Bulgaria, have been welcomed by the West.</p> <p>In the Eastern Mediterranean, however, the balance between Turkey being a partner or a challenger to its Western allies is rather different. Following Ankara’s controversial drilling activities in 2020, Josep Borrell, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the European Commission, stated that “the three old Empires: Russia, China and Turkey … come as threats or Global rivals” for Europe. It is also in the context of the Eastern Mediterranean that Turkey’s policy is often described as expansionist and revisionist.</p> <p>Comparing and contrasting Turkey’s Black Sea and Eastern Mediterranean policies, we can observe that one of Ankara’s key problems in the latter case is its sense of exclusion from having a say in regional discussions. The Eastern Mediterranean nexus of conflicts also shows that one of the dominant approaches in Ankara’s foreign policy is to assert its interests “both on the ground and at the table” <i>(hem sahada, hem de masada)</i>. A driving logic behind this is that in order to sit at the table, one must be present on the ground. The desire to be at the table stems from Ankara’s sense of entitlement to regional ownership. While Ankara has been able to achieve this in the Black Sea, it is still struggling to negotiate its share in the regional dynamics of the Eastern Mediterranean.</p> <p> Asserting interests: “Both on the ground and at the table” <p>Turkey’s foreign policy in recent years has been characterised by striving for strategic autonomy, which has been analysed by experts through various lenses. First, it has been applied in the context of Turkey-West relations and its balancing act, implying Ankara’s aim to diminish Turkey’s dependence on the West, especially in the security sphere. Second, Ankara’s quest for strategic autonomy has also been viewed as a defence-oriented maritime strategy to protect national interests and extend the concept of homeland to maritime zones. Yet others have interpreted Ankara’s strategic autonomy based on a neo-Ottoman foreign policy to enhance Turkey’s influence as a regional power.</p> <p>What is common to these perspectives isthe idea of Ankara asserting its agency while aiming to secure its interests and shape regional developments. It does so through a combination of military presence and diplomatic engagement. By projecting military power, forging strategic partnerships, and challenging existing arrangements, Turkey seeks to demonstrate its capacity to be a decisive actor in regional affairs. This assertive approach reflects Ankara’s refusal to be excluded from regional decision-making processes. Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s statement, “We are now a country with a fundamental place both on the ground and at the table,” underscores Turkey’s ambition to be a central player in regional politics and in the international arena.</p> <p>Turkey’s actions in the Eastern Mediterranean are a clear demonstration of its “onthe ground” strategy, including naval exercises, deploying drilling ships in contested waters, and signing a maritime boundary agreement with Libya in 2019. Ankara’s aim has been to secure its claims to maritime resources and to counter perceived encroachments by Greece and Cyprus, supported by the European Union (EU) and the United States (US). Furthermore, Turkey’s exclusion from regional initiatives, such as the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum, exemplifies the challenges it faces in being recognised as a legitimate stakeholder at the table. This fuels Turkey’s assertive approach, based on its perception of being deliberately sidelined. As Erdoğan stated back in 2020, “Turkey, much like acentury ago and half a century ago, is facing attempts to be excluded from the re‑establishment of the world order.”</p> <p>Unlike the Eastern Mediterranean, the Black Sea regional order gives Turkey a keyrole in shaping it as well as acting as aregional stabiliser. Ankara’s diplomatic efforts focus on maintaining regional stability and preventing external interference, primarily through the strategic implementation of the Montreux Convention. By leveraging the Montreux Convention, Turkey has limited the influence of non-riparian states and maintains a balanced power dynamic, preventing any single actor from dominating the region. This has allowed Turkey to play an influential role in the Black Sea’s security architecture, balancing its relationships with both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Russia to maximise its strategic autonomy and regional influence.</p> </p> <p> Regional ownership in the Black Sea <p>One of the key elements of Turkey’s Black Sea policy has been the idea of regional ownership. It has been applied in different ways. First, it has meant multilateral institutionalised cooperative frameworks involving all riparian states, such as the Organization of Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) as well as maritime missions like the Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group (BlackSeaFor) and the Black Sea Harmony. Second, the notion of regional ownership has increasingly aligned with a Turkish-Russian ‘condominium’, reflecting Turkey’s careful approach to avoid antagonising Russia, alongside Moscow’s reliance on Ankara’s objective to restrict the involvement of non-regional actors.</p> <p>After February 24, 2022, the idea of regional ownership has been seriously questioned in the West, given the impossibility of a formal multilateral framework that simultaneously engages all riparian states in the Black Sea and given Ankara’s own unease with Russia’s territorial expansion. Such a perspective assumes that for regional ownership to function, it must be formal and institutionalised or be exclusively about the Turkey-Russia partnership.</p> <p>To understand Ankara’s approach in neighbouring regions, it is useful to look at one of the key assumptions behind regional ownership, namely ‘regional responsibility’, which forms the basis of Ankara’s sense of entitlement to shape regional affairs. This isalso reflected in the “regional solutions toregional problems” approach that Turkey has promoted elsewhere, from the South Caucasus to Africa.</p> <p>Broadly conceived, the idea of regional ownership comprises two fundamental elements that guide Ankara’s positioning. First, countries of the region should be included in regional affairs. Second, countries of the region should have a greater say than non-regional players. Thus, while Ankara has been able to exercise its regional responsibility in the Black Sea, the denial ofregional ownership has been a driving factor behind Turkey’s policies in the case of the Eastern Mediterranean.</p> </p> <p> Challenges of regional ownership in the Eastern Mediterranean <p>The Eastern Mediterranean has become a focal point of geopolitical tensions, legal disputes, and economic opportunities, particularly following the discovery of significant natural gas reserves. The region’s complex dynamics are influenced by historical legacies, strategic interests, and the necessity of balancing regional and international relations. The multifaceted challenges of regional ownership in the Eastern Mediterranean have prompted a focus on the actions and foreign policy of Turkey and the contrasting perspectives surrounding these issues.</p> <p>Many policy perspectives from Western institutions view Turkey’s actions in the Eastern Mediterranean as increasingly assertive. Critics argue that Turkey’s maritime claims, military presence, and energy exploration activities in disputed waters contribute to regional tensions and undermine international law. These concerns are often framed within the context of Turkey’s strained relations with its NATO allies and the EU.</p> <p>From this perspective, Turkey’s exclusion from regional cooperation frameworks like the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum is viewed as stemming from its aggressive behaviour and unwillingness to compromise. Western policy analysts often emphasise the importance of upholding international law, particularly the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and call for Turkey to align its claims and actions with international norms. They argue that Turkey’s actions violate both the spirit and the letter of UNCLOS, which seeks to provide a fair and equitable framework for maritime boundary delimitation for all parties involved. This perceived disregard for international norms and agreements heightens fears of further instability in a region already fraught with historical rivalries and territorial disputes.</p> <p>Policy recommendations from this viewpoint typically involve a combination of diplomatic pressure, economic sanctions, and support for regional cooperation initiatives that exclude or marginalise Turkey. The goal is to compel Turkey to modify its behaviour and accept a more limited role in the Eastern Mediterranean, in line with the preferences of the EU, the US, and regional allies like Greece, Cyprus, and Israel. By leveraging economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation, Western policymakers aim to incentivise Turkey to adhere to international legal frameworks and to participate in multilateral negotiations that uphold the rule of law and respect for sovereign boundaries.</p> </p> <p> Ankara’s view of the Eastern Mediterranean order and its search for riparian allies <p> <p><i>Map</i></p> <p><img src="https://www.swp-berlin.org/publications/assets/Comment/2024C39/images/2024C39_TurkeysStrategicAutonomy_001.png" rel="noopener noreferrer"></p> <p>Source: Sinem Adar et al., <i>Visualizing Turkey’s Foreign Policy Activism</i> (Berlin: Centre for Applied Turkey Studies [CATS], CATS Network, 20 August 2021), Figure 5, https://www.cats-network.eu/topics/visualizing-turkeys-foreign-policy-activism</p> </p> <p>Turkey’s assertiveness is driven by a combination of factors, including its long-standing maritime disputes with Greece and Cyprus, its desire to secure a share of the region’s energy resources, and its concerns over the formation of alliances that, in Ankara’s view, could isolate or contain Turkey. These strategic concerns are compounded by the legacy of historical treaties, such as the Lausanne Treaty, which have left unresolved tensions and competing claims over maritime boundaries and sovereignty.</p> <p>In particular, Greece’s militarisation ofislands initially demilitarised by the Lausanne Treaty is seen by Turkey as a violation of historical agreements, exacerbating fears of encirclement and strategic vulnerability. Greece has established military installations on several Aegean islands, including Lesbos, Chios, Samos, Ikaria, and the Dodecanese group (such as Rhodes, Kos, Leros, and Kalymnos), which Turkey contends violates the demilitarisation clauses of the Treaties of Lausanne (1923) and Paris (1947). These installations typically consist of army barracks, radar stations, coastal artillery, and defensive fortifications designed for monitoring and defence against potential threats. While Greece justifies this militarisation as necessary for self-defence, citing Article 51 of the United Nations Charter and the proximity of these islands to the Turkish coast, Turkey views it as a breach ofinternational agreements and a security threat. The presence of these military facilities remains a significant point of diplomatic contention between the two countries.</p> <p>In this context, Turkey’s signing of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Libya in November 2019 is particularly significant. Given Turkey’s lack of partners inthe Eastern Mediterranean, it has been Ankara’s strategic move to turn Libya into a “riparian” ally to counter regional isolation and assert its maritime claims. By establishing a maritime boundary with Libya, Turkey aims to challenge efforts by Greece and Cyprus to unilaterally delimit their maritime zones and to establish a foothold in the region’s energy dynamics. This is not merely about immediate territorial gains, but is also a bid to reshape the regional order in a way that acknowledges Turkey’s strategic importance and historical grievances. The MoU serves as both a defensive measure to protect Turkey’s interests and an offensive strategy to project its power and influence in the Eastern Mediterranean.</p> <p>By forming an alliance with Libya, Turkey also sought to counterbalance the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum, which includes Cyprus, Egypt, France, Greece, Israel, Italy, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority. The MoU strategically positions Turkey as a key player in the region’s energy politics, potentially disrupting plans to transport Eastern Mediterranean gas to European markets via routes that bypass Turkey. Additionally, the MoU underscores Turkey’s broader strategy of using bilateral agreements to assert its claims and also challenges what it perceives as an exclusionary regional order. This move has drawn criticism and increased tensions, butalso highlights Turkey’s determination to defend its interests through proactive and sometimes controversial measures, particularly against the backdrop of unilateral actions by Greece and Cyprus to delimit their maritime zones without considering Turkish and Turkish Cypriot rights.</p> </p> <p> Continuities in Turkish foreign policy <p>Domestically, President Erdoğan’s rapprochement with military and nationalist elements following the 2016 coup attempt has reinforced a confrontational and nationalistic foreign policy. The “survival ofthe state” coalition emphasises a strong state capable of defending its sovereignty and interests against perceived external threats. This coalition supports the Blue Homeland doctrine <i>(Mavi Vatan)</i>, which advocates for extensive Turkish claims in the Eastern Mediterranean.</p> <p>Former Chief of Staff of the Turkish Navy Rear Admiral Cihat Yaycı, a key proponent of the Blue Homeland doctrine, argues for an assertive stance to protect Turkey’s maritime rights. He emphasises the importance of securing Turkey’s access to natural resources and countering Greek claims. Yaycı’s views reflect a broader consensus among Turkish nationalists that Turkey must robustly defend its maritime boundaries and resource rights to ensure national security and economic prosperity. Admiral Cem Gürdeniz, another prominent figure, also supports a strong naval presence to safeguard Turkey’s interests. Both figures have played crucial roles in shaping Turkey’s maritime strategy, advocating for a proactive and sometimes confrontational approach to maritime disputes.</p> <p>Turkey’s approach towards the Black Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean is not solely driven by current leadership. It is rooted in long-standing strategic considerations. In the Black Sea, Turkey’s balancing act between its NATO commitments and its desire to maintain stable relations with Russia has been one of the defining features of its regional strategy.</p> <p> <p>Blue Homeland Doctrine</p> <p>The Blue Homeland (<i>Mavi Vatan</i>) is Turkey’s maritime strategy to expand and secure its sovereign rights in the Eastern Mediterranean, Aegean Sea, and Black Sea. Developed by Turkish naval officers, particularly Admiral Cem Gürdeniz. The doctrine has gained prominence under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s administration as part of Turkey’s broader strategic autonomy and assertive foreign policy.</p> <p>Context and Evolution</p> <p><i>Cold War Legacy:</i> Rooted in Turkey’s Cold War-era naval strategy, which prioritised controlling sea routes and safeguarding maritime borders.</p> <p><i>Post-2016 Shift:</i> Following the 2016 coup attempt, there was a notable shift towards a more nationalist and assertive foreign policy, with the Blue Homeland doctrine becoming central to Turkey’s maritime strategy.</p> <p><i>Geopolitical Dynamics:</i> The discovery of energy resources in the Eastern Mediterranean and the evolving security environment in the Black Sea have further propelled the doctrine’s importance in Turkish policy.</p> <p>Key Objectives</p> <p><i>Maritime Sovereignty:</i> Protect maritime claims and resources.</p> <p><i>Strategic Autonomy:</i> Enhance naval capabilities and reduce reliance on Western alliances.</p> <p><i>Regional Influence:</i> Establish Turkey as a dominant maritime power.</p> <p>Key Components</p> <p><i>Expansion of Claims:</i> Extending Turkey’s maritime boundaries.</p> <p><i>Naval Presence:</i> Deploying forces and conducting exercises.</p> <p><i>Strategic Partnerships:</i> Agreements like the 2019 maritime boundary treaty with Libya.</p> <p>Impact</p> <p>The doctrine has increased regional tensions, particularly with Greece and Cyprus, and strained relations with NATO and the EU.</p> <p>For more information see: Serhat Süha Çubukçuoğlu, <i>Turkey’s Naval Activism: Maritime Geopolitics and the Blue Homeland Concept</i>, Palgrave Studies in Maritime Politics and Security (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2023).</p> </p> <p>The Eastern Mediterranean is likely to hold greater strategic significance for Turkey compared to the Black Sea. It is no coincidence that the Blue Homeland doctrine has emerged and been promoted in the official discourse in the Eastern Mediterranean context. The region’s energy resources, maritime disputes, and Turkey’s ambition to establish itself as a regional power make it a lasting top priority for Ankara.</p> <p>The Blue Homeland doctrine and the “onthe ground and at the table” approach are thus extensions of Turkey’s traditional foreign policy objectives, which prioritise the protection of its sovereignty, the assertion of its regional influence, and the pursuit of its economic interests. Future Turkish governments are likely to maintain a similar stance in these regions, albeit with potential adjustments based on a changing geopolitical environment.</p> </p> <p> Outlook and recommendations <p>Turkey’s actions in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea will have implications for its relationships with the US, the EU, and NATO. By pursuing a balanced and constructive approach, Turkey could leverage its regional influence to enhance its global standing and advance its strategic objectives. However, if Turkey’s security and economic interests remain unaddressed, it may resort to more assertive actions on the ground rather than at the table. An escalation of tensions could strain Turkey’s relationships with regional partners and Western allies, potentially leading to diplomatic and economic consequences. To mitigate these risks, Turkey should balance its assertive posture with diplomatic efforts to find mutually acceptable solutions to regional disputes.</p> <p>Given the geostrategic interconnectedness between the Black Sea and Eastern Mediterranean, it is also essential for Ankara’s Western allies to try to engage constructively with Turkey to address its concerns and find common ground. In particular, this may involve revisiting existingagreements and frameworks, such as theEastern Mediterranean Gas Forum, to ensure that such initiatives are representative, inclusive, and responsive to the needs of all regional stakeholders.</p> <p>Despite Turkey’s geostrategic location and its potential to diversify energy routes to Europe, political tensions and concerns over Turkey’s assertive foreign policy have hindered closer cooperation with the EU. This has led Turkey to seek alternative alliances and secure its energy interests by adopting confrontational policies. These dynamics underscore the interplay between energy security, geopolitical competition, and regional stability, highlighting the need for a more integrated and cooperative approach to energy politics.</p> </p> </p> <p> <p><i>Dr Daria Isachenko is Associate at the Centre for Applied Turkey Studies (CATS). Dr Erol Kaymak is a Fellow at the Centre for Applied Turkey Studies (CATS).</i></p> </p> <p> <p>The Centre for Applied Turkey Studies (CATS) is funded by StiftungMercatorandtheGermanFederalForeign Office.</p> <img src="https://www.swp-berlin.org/publications/assets/Comment/2024C39/images/2024C39_TurkeysStrategicAutonomy_002.png" rel="noopener noreferrer"></p> <p> <p>This work is licensed underCC BY 4.0<img src="https://www.swp-berlin.org/publications/assets/Comment/2024C39/images/2024C39_TurkeysStrategicAutonomy_003.png" rel="noopener noreferrer"></p> <p>This Comment reflects theauthors’ views.</p> <p>SWP Comments are subject tointernal peer review, fact-checking and copy-editing. Forfurther information on our quality control procedures, please visit the SWP website: https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/about-swp/ quality-management-for-swp-publications/</p> <p>SWP</p> <p>Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik</p> <p>German Institute for International and SecurityAffairs</p> <p>Ludwigkirchplatz 3–4</p><p>10719 Berlin</p><p>Telephone +49 30 880 07-0</p><p>Fax +49 30 880 07-100</p><p>www.swp-berlin.org</p><p>swp@swp-berlin.org</p> <p>ISSN (Print) 1861-1761</p> <p>ISSN (Online) 2747-5107</p> <p>DOI: 10.18449/2024C39</p> </p> </p> </p> </p> <footer> <p> Zum Anfang der Seite springen<i></i> </p> <p> <p> <i></i> <i></i> <i></i> Zu unserer Youtube-Seite </p> </p> <p> <p> <nav> Datenschutz Impressum Newsletter Netiquette </nav> </p> <p><small>©2024 Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik</small></p> </p> </footer> Turkey’s Strategic Autonomy in the Black Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean - Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik	查看 236582	德国国际和安全事务研究所	2024-09-06 08:00:00 2024-09-07 07:17:44	word
2705269	有图 <svg><symbol> </symbol><symbol> </symbol><symbol> </symbol><symbol> </symbol><symbol> </symbol><symbol> </symbol><symbol> </symbol><symbol> </symbol><symbol> </symbol><symbol> </symbol><symbol> </symbol><symbol> </symbol><symbol> </symbol><symbol> </symbol><symbol> </symbol><symbol> </symbol><symbol> </symbol></svg> <p> Direkt zum Seiteninhalt springen </p> <p> <p> <svg> <title>Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik</title> <desc>Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik Logo</desc> <clipPath><rect></rect></clipPath> <title>swp_rebrush_logo</title> <g> </g><rect></rect><rect></rect> </svg> </p> Navigation auf- und zuklappen </p> <p> <nav> <p> <form> <label> Suche </label> <i></i> Suche abschicken </form> </p> Kontakt Karriere Presse DE EN </nav> <p> <p> <p> <form> <label> Suche </label> <i></i> Suche abschicken </form> </p> </p> <nav> <p> Themen Themen <i></i> </p> <p> <p> <i></i> Navigation zuklappen <p> Zur Übersicht: Themen <p> Forschungsgebiete Forschungsgebiete <i></i> </p> Afrika südlich der Sahara Asien Digitalisierung, Cyber, Technologie Energie, Klima, Umwelt EU, Europa Lateinamerika und die Karibik Migration, EZ Nichtstaatliche Gewalt Nordafrika und Mittlerer Osten Russland, Osteuropa, Zentralasien Sicherheits- & Verteidigungspolitik Türkei UNO, globales Regieren, Völkerrecht USA, Kanada Wirtschaft, Handel, Ressourcen <p> Themenlinien Themenlinien <i></i> </p> Kooperation im Kontext systemischer Rivalität Neugestaltung der europäischen Sicherheitsordnung Autokratisierung als Herausforderung für die deutsche und europäische Politik Wirtschaftliche und technologische Transformationen <p> Dossiers Dossiers <i></i> </p> Cybersicherheit und Digitalpolitik: Die Rolle des Digitalen in der internationalen Politik Die USA und die transatlantischen Beziehungen Energiepolitik Europawahlen 2024 und die nächste strategische Agenda der EU Flucht und Migration Foresight: Vorausschau auf mögliche Überraschungen Globale Nachhaltigkeitspolitik Jihadismus Klimapolitik Konfliktkomplex Nordkorea Russlands Krieg gegen die Ukraine und seine Folgen <p> Fokusthemen Fokusthemen <i></i> </p> Krieg in Nahost US-Präsidentschaftswahlen 2024 </p> </p> </p> Publikationen Wissenschaftler:innen <p> Die SWP Die SWP <i></i> </p> <p> <p> <i></i> Navigation zuklappen <p> Zur Übersicht: Die SWP <p> Über uns Über uns <i></i> </p> Team A-Z Organisation Grundlegendes Freunde und Förderer <p> Forschung Forschung <i></i> </p> Forschungsgruppen Themenlinien Centrum für angewandte Türkeistudien (CATS) »Megatrends Afrika«-Projekt Forschungsprojekte Forschungscluster Forschungsrahmen </p> </p> </p> <p> Service Service <i></i> </p> <p> <p> <i></i> Navigation zuklappen <p> Zur Übersicht: Service <p> Unser Beratungsangebot </p> <p> Newsletter </p> <p> SWP-Podcasts </p> <p> SWP-WebMonitore </p> <p> Literaturdatenbank </p> <p> Soziale Medien </p> <p> Newsfeed </p> </p> </p> </p> </nav> <p> Kontakt Karriere Presse DE EN </p> </p> </p> <nav> Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik <meta> Publikationen <meta> EU-Turkey Economic Relations in the Era of Geo-economic Fragmentation <meta> </nav> <p> Kadri Tastan EU-Turkey Economic Relations in the Era of Geo-economic Fragmentation SWP Comment 2024/C 40, 06.09.2024, 6 Seiten <p>doi:10.18449/2024C40</p> Forschungsgebiete EU, Europa Türkei Wirtschaft, Handel, Ressourcen </p> <p> <p> <i></i> PDF \| 206 KB <i></i> EPUB \| 654 KB <i></i> MOBI \| 963 KB </p> </p> <p> <p> <p> <p>The foundation of the European Union-Turkey economic and trade relations lies in the Customs Union and more broadly in the bilateral preferential trade framework, established in December 1995. For over nearly three decades, this partnership has played a pivotal role in integrating Turkish industries into European supply chains, significantly multiplying bilateral trade volumes. However, as the global economic and geopolitical environment has changed and concerns about trade resilience and national security have increased, new trends such as protectionism, offshoring, or friend-shoring are increasingly being discussed. These global developments present new challenges but also opportunities for EU-Turkey relations.</p> <p> <p>The (geo)political context in which the Customs Union was created was vastly different from today. The end of the Cold War and the triumph of liberal economies over Soviet communism fuelled Western self-confidence in economic and political terms. The United States dominated world trade and signed numerous trade agreements (e.g. the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and US-Chile FTA). In Europe, the 1990s saw the launch of the single market (1993), the creation of the European Economic Area (1994), and the introduction of the euro (1999). This period also saw an intensification of EU trade agreements with Central and Eastern Europe and Mediterranean countries. Against this backdrop, Turkey signed a Customs Union with the EU in 1995. Additionally, China’s accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001 marked a high point in trade globalisation.</p> <p>However, the positive climate surrounding global trade started to gradually change with the global financial crisis in 2008. Since then, the political and economic landscape has changed radically. The 2008 financial crisis is seen as the beginning of the end of accelerated globalisation, with a decline in the growth of global value chains and world trade. The period following the 2008 financial crisis has seen much less trade liberalisation. On the contrary, there have been rising barriers to trade. Today, the geo-economic order is being reshaped by geopolitical turbulence, regionalisation trends, and decarbonisation processes. Some even speak of a new phase of deglobalisation defined by pandemic-induced supply chain disruptions, the economic decoupling of the US and China, shocks from the Russian war against Ukraine, and economic shifts from decarbonisation efforts aimed at mitigating climate change.</p> <p>Analysts suggest that a more regionalised world is challenging globalisation, where politics will have a greater impact on economic outcomes than in the past half-century. Geopolitical shifts are leading to major geo-economic shifts, with regionalisation accelerating relocation efforts, shortening supply chains, and reducing dependence on distant suppliers. The concepts of‘re-shoring’ or ‘friend-shoring’, which emphasise strengthening regional trade agreements and investments with geographically closer or more “reliable” partners, are becoming more pronounced.</p> <p>The return of geopolitical concerns in world trade is evident and an emerging bloc logic could divide the globe into two or three blocs, pushing countries to follow approaches that combine foreign economic and security policy. Geopolitical considerations now play a significant role in determining global trade flows, with escalating geopolitical risks leading to increased tariffs, export restrictions, and internal measures indirectly influencing trade flows. Trade-restrictive measures have surged, with approximately 3,000 implemented in 2022 – nearly three times the number in2019.</p> <p>While the global geopolitical and geo-economic environment is changing rapidly, Turkey’s relations with the EU and the West have also undergone significant changes with a decoupling of threat perceptions, the understanding of global politics, and an erosion of trust on both sides. Despite this, from NATO membership to the Customs Union with the EU, Turkey still maintains strong institutional links with the West – in political, economic, and military terms. How both sides navigate the evolving global order, approach the great power competition between the West and China as well aswith Russia, and address security, political, and economic implications of this new era – along with the trust deficit in relations – will significantly impact the future of the relationship between Turkey and the EU. Indeed, the structural changes in the global system and both sides’ response to these changes are likely to be the primary shaper of the relations going forward. On a side note, we refer to the West as a uniform block. It is yet to be seen to what extent the US and the EU or different European states will see eye to eye on the great power rivalry, particularly when it involves China. Needless to say, whether there is more unity or fragmentation within the transatlantic alliance will inform Turkey’s reading of global politics, including its positioning. Returning to the core subject, this geo-economic shift will be underpinned by two main transformative concepts: economic security and decarbonisation. Therefore, thepolicies that both sides will develop to adapt to these two paradigm shifts and the political relationship between them will also shape their economic relations in the new process.</p> <p> Economic security <p>Recent geopolitical developments and technological shifts have significant implications for the international economic order and the EU’s approach to global cooperation. Asgeopolitical competition intensifies, economic and security interests are increasingly intertwined.</p> <p>In the heyday of globalisation, economic prosperity was seen as dependent on free trade and economic interdependence as a guarantee of peace and economic benefits. This paradigm has shifted, with governments and the private sector now forced tointegrate new geopolitical realities into economic choices and assess security risks.</p> <p>Reorganising and diversifying global supply chains to reduce dependence on single sources is key to enhancing economic security. This shift is driven by the strategic rivalry between China and the US, which poses challenges to Europe’s economy and security. The ongoing US-China economic and trade war may escalate further, especially if Donald Trump is re-elected.</p> <p>The EU is developing its own economic security strategy in response to this rivalry and broader geopolitical competition. The Covid-19 pandemic underscored the need to diversify supply chains, leading the EU to focus on ‘strategic autonomy’. The war in Ukraine has further highlighted the dangers of an over-reliance on Russian energy, especially for Germany.</p> <p>In this context, resilience, renewed industrial strategy, and de-risking (reducing the EU’s economic dependencies) are relevant. The EU aims to strengthen its position in key economic sectors amid global competition, particularly from China and the US. To counter this, the EU has introduced measures like the ‘economic security package’, the European Chips Act, and the Critical Raw Materials Act to reduce strategic dependencies and enhance economic security.</p> <p>The normalisation of non-cooperation in a fragmented geo-economic order would definitely place the EU and also Turkey in a precarious situation. They could eventually be forced to choose sides if different economic blocs close their markets to one other. In this context, it remains to be seen how long the EU and Turkey can maintain an open trade policy. Moreover, where economic security is becoming a major issue, political relations between Turkey and the EU are also at a low ebb. In recent years, divergences between security and foreign policy priorities of the two sides have been evident in many areas, from Syria to the Eastern Mediterranean. </p> <p>Recent developments have led to increased competition rather than cooperation, particularly in the context of regional conflicts. Or, as in the case of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, although their interests and perspectives are aligned, their policies differ. Therefore, Turkey has been the subject of measured or veiled criticism from the West on the issue of sanctions against Russia. As the EU has been critical of aspects of Turkey’s policy towards Russia, Ankara has been highly critical of the EU’s handling of the Gaza War, which has once again brought to fore broader strategic and normative decoupling between the two sides. According to the European Commission, the level of foreign policy convergence between Turkey and the EU is only 10 per cent.</p> <p>At a time when economic relations will be increasingly influenced by geopolitics, improving political relations and addressing the mutual trust deficit seem essential for the future of EU-Turkey economic relations.</p> </p> <p> Decarbonisation and return of industrial policy <p>Decarbonisation is radically transforming the global economic system. It is creating new areas of competition and dependencies, altering energy flows, and leading to new transmissions of goods. This transformation means that the technological evolution required by decarbonisation increases the intensity of geopolitics and complicates the intersection of economic and security interests. Unless trade, environmental, and industrial policies are not carefully managed, there is the risk that they will pursue conflicting objectives. These policies intersect and are used by different countries to address not only climate change but also geopolitical rivalries, the re-orientation of supply chains, and profound technological changes.</p> <p>In addition, heightened geopolitical tensions and the climate crisis have raised concerns about the resilience of supply chains and economic and national security, leading to a resurgence in industrial policy. While some developing countries continue to use industrial policy through targeted state interventions, most developed countries in the West have not employed it for many years.</p> <p>Enormous financial resources, both public and private, are needed to finance the decarbonisation of the economy. Consequently, the global race for clean technologies and critical minerals essential for decarbonisation, is intensifying worldwide. For instance, European countries are facing unprecedented dependence on China for solar energy panels, which could extend to electric cars as China increasingly dominates battery manufacturing.</p> <p>Subsidisation is a growing trend. The increasing adoption of subsidy-based approaches risks igniting an arms race in industrial policy. Recent industrial policies include provisions to encourage domestic producers, particularly in technologically advanced sectors, potentially at the expense of foreign producers.</p> <p>The US Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) is a good example of the return of industrial policy. This flagship green legislation is a monumental energy transition plan designed to encourage the production and development of clean energy in the US through tax credits for businesses and households. It also aims to re-industrialise the country and exclude China-linked companies from the US supply chain. Many view the IRA as a protectionist effort to attract the fast-growing green industry to the US at the expense of other competitors, particularly China and Europe. The IRA is also perceived as violating the rules of the WTO, for which the US has historically been the most powerful sponsor.</p> <p>The EU’s Green Deal industrial plan and the Net Zero Industry Act can be understood as responses to the IRA, aimed at preventing clean energy companies from leaving the EU for the US or other markets. The EU aims to provide a more supportive environment for scaling up its manufacturing capacity and is increasingly integrating climate factors into its external economic relations and trade policy, which will change the way it trades with its partners. With measures such as the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), the EU is committed to protecting its domestic industries. Europe’s significant market size provides it with substantial normative power, which it is preparing to use to advance the climate ambitions of its trade partners.</p> <p>The EU has adopted several measures in recent years, such as an investment screening mechanism, an anti-subsidy policy, and an anti-coercion instrument, to ensure a level playing field for European businesses versus non-EU external actors. These measures and decisions raise concerns about their impact on international trade, indicating that climate action and related subsidies will potentially lead to further geo-economic fragmentation. For instance, the EU has recently launched several trade investigations into Chinese companies, accusing cleantech groups of benefiting from overly generous subsidies.</p> <p>As trade and decarbonisation become increasingly intertwined, the EU-Turkey economic relationship will evolve based on whether they use decarbonisation processes to strengthen their cooperation or use it as an area of competition in trade and investment relations. However, one thing is clear: CBAM-like measures will affect Turkey’s trade relations with the EU because they will have a significant impact on goods and services and all carbon-intensive production. The decarbonisation process will also have substantial consequences for Turkish and European value chains largely integrated through the Customs Union. Turkey needs to accelerate its decarbonisation process to maintain its current trade with the EU and take advantage of new opportunities. While closer harmonisation of legislation, environmental regulations, and standards on decarbonisation between the EU and Turkey could encourage cooperation, the gap in these areas will hinder many joint initiatives.</p> </p> <p> Implications for EU-Turkey economic ties <p>Both the EU and Turkey’s economic models significantly depend on foreign trade. They heavily rely on external demand for their products and imports in strategically crucial sectors, such as energy, critical materials, minerals, and semiconductors. Turkey’s trade openness (i.e., trade as a percentage of GDP) is 67 per cent and the EU’s is 97 per cent, compared with the world average of 63 per cent. In contrast, trade openness is only 27 for the US and 37 per cent for China. While trade openness has sharply declined in China since the mid-2000s and slightly declined in the US over the last decade, it has continued to rise in the EU.</p> <p>The EU’s strategy for now is to remain open while embracing greater strategic autonomy. In several key strategic sectors, such as semiconductors, electric vehicles and batteries, renewable energy technologies, and digital technologies, Europe is at disadvantage in terms of production and price compared to China or the US. Therefore, diversifying Europe’s supply chains is necessary and establishing stronger trade links with different countries would make sense.</p> <p>How the EU and Turkey navigate these changes will determine Turkey’s future within the European economic structure. Therefore, a new approach is required, based on the radically different (geo)political, (geo)economic, and environmental parameters emerging. Both sides must adapt to these processes, affecting their bilateral economic relations. Moreover, the basis of their trade relations, namely the Customs Union, is not fully adapted to today’s economic and political realities with its limited scope. Given the fading of amembership prospect for Turkey in EU, economic and trade relations will become the most important focus for the foreseeable future between Ankara and Brussels.</p> <p>Turkey’s heavy dependence on foreign trade and investment underscores the importance of global players (the EU, US, and China) in shaping the country’s economic development. However, there is no doubt that Turkey will be most affected by the EU’s changing economic and trade policies. The strong economic ties between Turkey and the EU, embodied in trade and investment, are evident. The EU is by far Turkey’s top trading partner. It is the main destination for Turkish exports, the most important source of imports, and the primary source of investment. Data shows that 41.3per cent of Turkey’s exports are absorbed by the EU. It is also important to note that the EU is more open in terms of inward and outward foreign direct investment (FDI) than other regions and its FDI is significantly higher than that of China and the US. Thus, Turkey’s interests as a country benefiting from trade and open economic relations, align with those of the EU.</p> <p>From an economic perspective, Turkey is also important for the EU as it is a large market and production base with 85 million inhabitants and the EU’s 5th largest trading partner (trade in goods). Therefore, it is in the interest of both sides to preserve and further develop these relations. Turkey indeed holds significant potential to contribute to the EU’s strategic autonomy, particularly in the context of developing alternative supply chains in neighbouring geographies.</p> <p>Turkey’s geographical proximity and strategic location are significant advantages. The EU’s economic and financial decoupling from Russia strengthens Turkey’s rising position in the global supply chain as a link between Central and East Asia and Europe. Connectivity is an important factor in global trade and Turkey could play a crucial role. Additionally, thanks to the Customs Union, Turkey’s industrial sector iswell integrated into EU value chains. Turkey is also in a good position globally in terms of export diversification. While the number of countries Turkey exports extensively to was 69 in 2003, it reached 108 in 2022. Over the same period, the number of products exported competitively increased significantly, from 1,331 products in 2002 to 1,718 in 2022. This shows the potential for Turkey to specialise in genuinely new, sophisticated products. Moreover, the Customs Union has also directly and indirectly increased Turkey’s alignment with the EU acquis, rules, production norms, and standards.</p> <p>Energy interconnections, mature infrastructure, and significant industrial capacity (industry remains a significant part of GDP) are other strengths of Turkey. Discussions and calls for re-industrialisation are multiplying in Europe, but the EU cannot produce everything it needs and will have to source many products from neighbouring countries. Turkey’s exports to the EU are already relatively sophisticated, focusing on manufactured goods, machinery, transport equipment, and miscellaneous manufactured items. If Turkey can upgrade and utilise its energy connections and industrial capacity to align with decarbonisation, its attractiveness as an investment destination and market for the EU will increase. However, macroeconomic uncertainties and shortcomings in the rule of law will need to be addressed to fully leverage and strengthen Turkey’s strong potential with the EU. These factors play acrucial role in trade-related decisions through supply chains and long-term investments.</p> </p> <p> Outlook and Recommendations <p>The reconfiguration of global value chains is increasingly debated as an economic policy tool to secure the supply of critical products and establish strategic autonomy at the EU level. The EU’s position within international production networks is likely to undergo restructuring to ensure strategic autonomy. Turkey, as a neighbouring country and part of the Customs Union, is already largely integrated into European industrial supply chains. Strengthening the economic relationship between the EU and Turkey is possible and beneficial for both sides.</p> <p>In light of the shifting dynamics, new tools are emerging for the EU to reformulate and develop its economic cooperation with Turkey. These include extending the Customs Union, further integrating Turkey into its supply chains shaped by the search for strategic economic autonomy, including Turkey in decarbonisation and energy transformation efforts, and cooperation through investments and other channels. These collaborations will have important economic, strategic, and ecological implications for both, while also significantly affecting their future relations in general. Turkey’s untapped renewable energy potential highlights the importance of trade in electricity and future hydrogen production as key opportunities for enhancing cooperation on the energy transition.</p> <p>However, the question of a trust deficit in their relations needs to be addressed. In this new era, economic relations will be increasingly shaped by geopolitical considerations. According to the IMF, the EU’s outward FDI has become more sensitive to geopolitical distance since 2017, with the EU’s FDI increasingly driven by geopolitical alignment rather than geographic distance or other economic considerations.</p> <p>Years of political crises have fuelled mistrust between Turkey and the EU. Therefore, serious mechanisms must be established to encourage dialogue in preparation for the new geopolitical and geo-economic era, which promises to be challenging for both sides. The EU and Turkey will need to find ways to protect themselves from geopolitical economic tensions. They will need each other to navigate these challenges successfully.</p> </p> </p> <p> <p><i>Kadri Tastan was a CATS Fellow at the Centre for Applied Turkish Studies (CATS).</i></p> </p> <p> <p>The Centre for Applied Turkey Studies (CATS) is funded by StiftungMercatorandtheGermanFederalForeign Office.</p> <img src="https://www.swp-berlin.org/publications/assets/Comment/2024C40/images/2024C40_EU-TurkeyEconomicRelations_001.png" rel="noopener noreferrer"></p> <p> <p>This work is licensed underCC BY 4.0<img src="https://www.swp-berlin.org/publications/assets/Comment/2024C40/images/2024C40_EU-TurkeyEconomicRelations_002.png" rel="noopener noreferrer"></p> <p>This Comment reflects theauthor’s views.</p> <p>SWP Comments are subject to internal peer review, fact-checking and copy-editing. For further information on our quality control procedures, please visit the SWP website: https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/about-swp/ quality-management-for-swp-publications/</p> <p>SWP</p> <p>Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik</p> <p>German Institute for International and SecurityAffairs</p> <p>Ludwigkirchplatz 3–4</p><p>10719 Berlin</p><p>Telephone +49 30 880 07-0</p><p>Fax +49 30 880 07-100</p><p>www.swp-berlin.org</p><p>swp@swp-berlin.org</p> <p>ISSN (Print) 1861-1761</p> <p>ISSN (Online) 2747-5107</p> <p>DOI: 10.18449/2024C40</p> </p> </p> </p> </p> <footer> <p> Zum Anfang der Seite springen<i></i> </p> <p> <p> <i></i> <i></i> <i></i> Zu unserer Youtube-Seite </p> </p> <p> <p> <nav> Datenschutz Impressum Newsletter Netiquette </nav> </p> <p><small>©2024 Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik</small></p> </p> </footer> EU-Turkey Economic Relations in the Era of Geo-economic Fragmentation - Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik	查看 213654	德国国际和安全事务研究所	2024-09-06 08:00:00 2024-09-07 07:17:43	word
2705268	无图 <p>中央气象台预计，“摩羯”将向西偏北方向移动，强度逐渐增强，将于今日（6日）下午以强台风级或超强台风级在海南万宁到广东电白一带沿海登陆，中心附近最大风速在48-55米／秒，将是近十年影响或登陆海南最强的台风。广东雷州半岛也是“摩羯”的潜在登陆地，如果“摩羯”登陆地点锁定为广东，就可能成为历史上9月登陆广东的最强台风。</p><p>“摩羯”来势汹汹，广东省于昨日启动水利防汛防台风Ⅰ级应急响应，多地实行临时交通管制。昨日下午3时许，港珠澳大桥应急救援指挥部办公室发出紧急通知，表示为确保交通安全，经三地会商，港珠澳大桥主桥于9月5日晚上九时起临时封闭，解封时间另行公告。已购买停运班次车票的旅客，可通过微信公众号（港珠澳大桥穿梭巴士）或官方网站（hzmbus.com）免费办理退票手续。</p><p>陆上交通方面，广铁部分列车调整运行区段或停运，包括6至7日湛江西开往香港西九龙、北京西、成都东等方向的始发和终到列车，计划调整到广州南站终到和始发等；水上交通方面，5至6日，中山港往返香港中港城、香港国际机场的航班全部停航。部分华南地区的飞机航班也陆续取消，南航、东航、海南航空等发布相关退改签政策。另外，深中通道自5日21时起实行减速同行，限速70公里／小时及以下。</p><p>目前，广东全省滨海景区、跨海航线已全部关闭，省内8万多艘渔船已在港避风，万馀名海上养殖人员上岸，广东海事局已部署海巡船、救助船、救助直升机等力量，广东消防救援总队已调集多个支队及总队全勤指挥部、通信保障分队等力量赴粤西地区开展前置任务。</p><p>将面临台风正面登陆的湛江市，已分批启动“停课、停工、停运、停航、停园、停业”措施，在湛徐高速雷州收费站进行临时交通管制，限制车辆南下，并在麻章、遂溪、雷州、徐闻国省道沿途设置临时分流点，劝返前往海南的车辆。</p> 近十年最强台风港珠澳大桥临时关闭 _大公网	查看 775	《大公报》	2024-09-06 08:00:00 2024-09-07 07:41:14	word
2705267	有图 <img src="https://img.takungpao.com/2024/0906/2024090605021124419.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer"><p>图：台北地方法院5日裁定柯文哲羁押禁见。图为柯文哲被移送台北看守所。\中通社</p><p>据中新社报道：台湾民众党主席、台北市前市长柯文哲涉嫌卷入京华城案，5日被台北地方法院裁定羁押禁见，移送至台北看守所羁押。台北市京华城容积率在柯文哲任市长期间大增，被质疑有官员护航相关业者。台北地检署侦办该案时，认为柯文哲和台北市前副市长彭振声涉犯违背职务收贿及图利等罪。</p><p>8月30日，台北地检署搜查了柯文哲位于台北市的住家、办公室，以及民众党中央党部等场所，并以被告身份约谈柯文哲、彭振声；8月31日凌晨，柯文哲拒绝夜间侦讯欲离开台北地检署，遭检方当庭逮捕。检方认为柯文哲犯罪嫌疑重大，有灭证、勾串之虞，向法院声请羁押禁见。</p><p>台北地方法院9月2日召开羁押庭时，认为检方就羁押要件中“犯罪嫌疑重大”的部分阐释尚有不足，因此裁定柯文哲无保请回。检方提起抗告后，台湾高等法院4日发回更裁。</p><p>法院：柯文哲涉贪嫌疑重大</p><p>台北地方法院5日再度召开羁押庭后指出，柯文哲明知增加超过560%的容积给京华城“违背法令”，仍执意为之，并使共犯威京集团主席沈庆京获得不法利益200余亿元新台币，因此柯涉犯“贪污治罪条例”规定的图利罪嫌疑重大，裁定羁押禁见。</p> 柯文哲涉京华城案遭羁押禁见移送看守所 _大公网	查看 640	《大公报》	2024-09-06 08:00:00 2024-09-07 07:41:14	word
2705266	有图 <img src="https://img.takungpao.com/2024/0906/2024090605022618892.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer"><p>图：枪击案发生后，阿巴拉契高中学生在校门口等待家长。/法新社</p><p>综合报道：美国佐治亚州巴罗县阿巴拉契高中4日发生枪击案，该校一名14岁男学生格雷开枪打死2名学生与2名教师，另有9人受伤送院。佐治亚州执法官员表示，枪手已经被捕，他将被控谋杀，并以成年人身份接受审判。美媒披露，格雷去年5月曾在网上发帖威胁实施校园枪击，联邦调查局（FBI）和警方对其进行约谈，但未有采取进一步行动。</p><p>这起枪击案4日上午发生在巴罗县温德市阿巴拉契高中，距佐治亚州首府亚特兰约72公里。该校约有1932名学生，于8月1日开学。案发后阿巴拉契高中被封锁。巴罗县所有学校本周余下时间将关闭。</p><p>当局已确认4名死者身份，分别为两名14岁的学生、一名39岁的数学老师兼助理足球教练，以及一名53岁的数学老师。</p><p>枪手将以成年人身份受审</p><p>佐治亚州调查局局长霍西在当天下午的新闻发布会上表示，枪手是阿巴拉契高中的14岁学生科尔特．格雷。当地警方在4日上午10点20分接到有枪手出没的报告，执法人员很快到达现场。枪手与一名校警对峙时，突然趴在地上投降。</p><p>格雷随后被捕，他将被指控犯有谋杀罪，并将被视作成年人接受审讯。警方称，枪手使用一把AR-15半自动步枪行凶。当局正在对其作案动机进行调查。</p><p>坐在格雷邻座的同班同学萨亚拉特表示，格雷在上午9点45分上代数课时突然离开教室，等他回到教室门外时，发现门已锁上。班上一名女同学准备去帮格雷开门，但可能是看到他拿着一把枪，因此往后退了一步。</p><p>萨亚拉特称：“我猜他（格雷）认为我们不让他进教室，而隔壁班的教室门是开的，所以他开始朝那间教室开枪。”随后就传来一阵阵枪声，萨亚拉特和其他同学马上趴在地上，连滚带爬地挤到桌子后面躲藏。</p><p>当局接匿名来电预告施袭</p><p>另一个班的学生加西亚和利科纳表示，听见外面传来好几声枪响时，班上的电视出现封锁警报，所有人急忙按照流程躲到教室后方。此时，一名同学发现教室门没关，马上冲上前将门关好并上锁。加西亚称，这名同学救了大家一命。利科纳称，撤离学校时看到走廊上有用来清理血迹的白色粉末。</p><p>萨亚拉特形容格雷“安静且害羞”，平时话不多，即便开口也大多只说一个字。除此之外，格雷经常逃课，平日行为举止与一般对于枪手的描述脗合，因此她对格雷犯案“不意外”。</p><p>根据FBI亚特兰大分局发布的新闻稿，格雷去年5月曾在网上发帖威胁发动校园枪击，并附上多张枪械照片。当时13岁的格雷和他的父亲接受警局问话。</p><p>格雷的父亲说，家里有多把猎枪，但格雷不会在无人监督的情况下使用这些武器。格雷也否认曾在网上发出威胁。新闻稿称，当时警方没有足够的逮捕理由或进一步执法行动。</p><p>执法官员称，案发当日早上，当局曾收到恐吓电话，称会对5间学校发动枪击，阿巴拉契高中是第一个目标。目前还不知道是何人打的电话。佐治亚州调查部门称，无证据显示其他学校会受袭。</p><p>美国今年逾1.1万人死于枪击</p><p>据美国枪支暴力档案网站数据，美国今年已发生385起造成至少4人死伤的大规模枪击事件，逾1.1万人因涉枪事件死亡。阿巴拉契高中4日的枪击案是今年第45宗校园枪击案，也是最严重的一起。</p><p>美国总统拜登当天发表声明，呼吁立法禁止攻击性武器和高容量弹匣，并促请两党合作通过“符合常识的枪支安全法”。民主党总统候选人哈里斯称这次枪击案是“毫无意义的悲剧”，“必须终结枪支暴力氾滥”。</p><p>共和党总统候选人特朗普称：“这些受到疼爱的孩子过早地被一个病态、疯狂的怪物夺走了生命。”有网友认为，佐治亚州是关键摇摆州之一，两党总统候选人不会放过这一“政治炒作”机会。</p> 美国佐治亚州14岁枪手血洗高中导致4死9伤 _大公网	查看 1670	《大公报》	2024-09-06 08:00:00 2024-09-07 07:41:14	word
2705265	有图 <img src="https://img.takungpao.com/2024/0906/2024090605023145836.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer"><p>图：加拿大新民主党党魁辛格（右）不再支持特鲁多领导的自由党。\资料图片</p><p>据加拿大广播公司报道：加拿大联邦众议院第三大反对党新民主党4日宣布终止与总理特鲁多领导的自由党签署的支援与信任协议。此举意味着特鲁多政府可能被不信任投票推翻，加拿大或将提前举行大选。</p><p>新民主党党魁辛格批评自由党“太软弱、太自私、太受制于企业利益，无法为中产阶级而战”。他声称，新民主党已为选举作好准备，会在针对特鲁多政府的不信任投票中考虑投下支持票。特鲁多回应称，希望新民主党继续专注于为加拿大人提供服务。最大反对党保守党则批评辛格的声明是“炒作”。加媒分析认为，自由党将继续与新民主党谈判，或争取第二大反对党魁北克集团的支持。</p><p>自由党在2021年加拿大大选中获胜，但只获得众议院338个议席中的154个。为确保得到169个议席的多数支持，自由党于2022年3月与拥有24个议席的新民主党达成支援与信任协议，后者同意支持自由党执政至2025年6月议会休会时，换取自由党对新民主党提出议题的支持。</p><p>如今新民主党“毁约”，为加拿大政局增加不确定性。加拿大原定于2025年10月举行大选，但如果多数议员不支持特鲁多政府，或特鲁多向加拿大总督提出要求，那么将提前举行大选。最新民调显示，保守党支持率远超自由党，若现在大选有望赢得约210席。</p> 特鲁多失盟友支持加拿大或提前大选 _大公网	查看 680	《大公报》	2024-09-06 08:00:00 2024-09-07 07:41:14	word
2705264	无图据中央气象台网站消息，中央气象台9月6日06时继续发布台风红色预警：<p>今年第11号台风“摩羯”(超强台风级)的中心今天(6日)早晨5点钟位于海南省文昌市偏东方大约205公里的南海西北部海面上，就是北纬19.2度、东经112.7度，中心附近最大风力有17级以上(68米/秒)，中心最低气压为905百帕，七级风圈半径300-350公里，十级风圈半径120公里，十二级风圈半径60公里。</p><p>预计，“摩羯”将以每小时10-15公里的速度向西偏北方向移动，强度变化不大，将于今天下午至傍晚在海南琼海到广东湛江一带沿海登陆(超强台风级，17级或17级以上，60-65米/秒)，最大可能在海南文昌到广东雷州沿海登陆，然后移入北部湾海面，并于7日下午在广西防城港到越南北部一带沿海再次登陆(台风级或强台风级，13-14级，40-45米/秒)，之后强度快速减弱。</p><p>大风预报：9月6日08时至7日08时，南海大部、广东西南部及广东沿海、海南岛及其沿海、广西南部及其沿海将有6-8级大风，南海北部和中部的部分海域、北部湾、琼州海峡、广东西部沿海、海南岛北部和东部沿海将有9-12级大风，“摩羯”中心经过的附近海域或地区风力可达13-17级以上。</p><p>降水预报：9月6日08时至7日08时，广西东南部、广东西南部和海南岛等地有大到暴雨，其中部分地区有大暴雨，广东西南部沿海、海南岛中西部和北部局地特大暴雨(250～500毫米)。</p><p>防御指南：</p><p>1.政府及相关部门按照职责做好防台风抢险应急工作。</p><p>2.相关水域水上作业和过往船舶应当回港避风，加固港口设施，防止船舶走锚、搁浅和碰撞。</p><p>3.停止室内外大型集会和高空等户外危险作业。</p><p>4.加固或者拆除易被风吹动的搭建物,人员切勿随意外出，应尽可能待在防风安全的地方，确保老人小孩留在家中最安全的地方，危房人员及时转移。当台风中心经过时风力会减小或者静止一段时间，切记强风将会突然吹袭，应当继续留在安全处避风，危房人员及时转移。</p><p>5. 相关地区应当注意防范强降水可能引发的山洪、地质灾害。</p> 中央气象台继续发布台风红色预警 _大公网	查看 909	《大公报》	2024-09-06 08:00:00 2024-09-07 07:41:14	word
2705263	无图北京时间9月6日2时30分，我国在太原卫星发射中心使用长征六号运载火箭，成功将吉利星座03组卫星发射升空，10颗卫星顺利进入预定轨道，发射任务获得圆满成功。<p>这次任务是长征系列运载火箭的第534次飞行。</p> 一箭10星！我国成功发射吉利星座03组卫星 _大公网	查看 107	《大公报》	2024-09-06 08:00:00 2024-09-07 07:41:14	word
2705262	无图当地时间9月5日，美国总统拜登之子亨特·拜登就其联邦税务案的9项指控罪名认罪。<p>此前，亨特·拜登于去年12月被指控犯有9项联邦税务罪，其中包括没有申报和缴纳税款、逃税以及提交虚假或欺诈性纳税申报单，9项罪名中有3项重罪和6项轻罪。起诉书称，亨特·拜登在2016年至2019年的四年内未能缴纳至少140万美元的联邦税，并通过在2020年2月左右提交虚假申报表来逃避2018税年的税收评估。</p> 美总统之子亨特·拜登就9项税务指控罪名认罪 _大公网	查看 199	《大公报》	2024-09-06 08:00:00 2024-09-07 07:41:14	word
2705261	无图我国在酒泉卫星发射中心成功发射的可重复使用试验航天器，在轨飞行268天后，于9月6日成功返回预定着陆场。此次试验的圆满成功，标志着我国可重复使用航天器技术渐趋成熟，后续可为和平利用太空提供更加便捷、廉价的往返方式。我国可重复使用试验航天器成功着陆 _大公网	查看 107	《大公报》	2024-09-06 08:00:00 2024-09-07 07:41:14	word
2705260	无图今天(9月6日)16时20分前后，今年第11号台风“摩羯”以超强台风级登陆海南文昌，成为今年以来登陆我国的最强台风，也是继2014年第9号台风“威马逊”之后登陆我国的最强台风。预计“摩羯”登陆后还将保持较好的螺旋结构，给海南、广东、广西等地带来极端强风雨，影响至少持续两到三天。<p>据中央气象台消息，今年第11号台风“摩羯”的中心已于今天16时20分前后在海南文昌登陆，登陆时中心附近最大风力62米/秒，强度为超强台风级，中心最低气压915百帕。</p><p>此次台风“摩羯”以超强台风级登陆，成为史上登陆我国最强秋台风，也是继2014年第9号台风“威马逊”之后登陆我国的最强台风。</p><p>“摩羯”是一个潜在影响巨大、破坏性极强的台风。回顾台风“摩羯”的生命发展史，生成初期，它以热带风暴的强度穿行菲律宾;进入南海后，“摩羯”不断发展壮大，在短短15个小时内完成“台风-强台风-超强台风”三连跳，于9月4日夜间23时变身超强台风，这在台风观测史上也实属少见。</p><p>台风“摩羯”为何如此之强?据中国天气网首席气象分析师信欣介绍，“摩羯”进入南海后，前进方向海温高、环境垂直风切变小，有利于台风暖心结构维持，并与西南季风紧密结合，为其发展提供持续的能量来源。此外，今年8月台风路径相对偏东，南海上没有台风生成，导致海上积攒的能量非常多，也为台风“摩羯”提供了巨大潜力的发展空间。</p><p>预计“摩羯”登陆后还将保持较好的螺旋结构，未来会继续穿过北部湾，给广东、海南、广西、云南等地带来强风暴雨。值得注意的是，“摩羯”带来的风雨影响都具有明显极端性，尤其是登陆地点附近的海南岛中北部、雷州半岛一带需严阵以待，防御极端强风和极端暴雨，广东沿海和海南岛不排除出现龙卷天气的可能性，需重点防御。</p><p>中央气象台预计，6日至7日，南海北部、北部湾等海域及海南岛中北部、广东西南部、广西南部有大风灾害高风险。6日至8日，广东南部、广西中南部、海南岛和云南等地有暴雨到大暴雨，广东西南部、广西南部沿海、海南岛北部和西部、云南东南部部分地区有特大暴雨，局地累计雨量可达600毫米以上，其中广东西南部、海南岛、广西南部、云南东南部部分站点可能突破9月历史同期雨量极值。</p><p>台风“摩羯”来势凶猛，为应对台风正面袭击，海南、广东多地已于近日采取停课、停工、停运等“五停”措施，海南关停所有旅游景区。</p><p>中国天气网提醒，超强台风“摩羯”强度强，风雨影响有明显极端性，致灾风险高，广东、海南、广西、云南等地需防范强风雨天气对城市运行、交通运输、渔业和近海养殖业等的不利影响，并做好山洪和地质灾害、中小河流洪水、城乡积涝的防御和防风加固工作，涉海、涉岛旅游加强安全管理。</p> 超强台风“摩羯”登陆海南文昌成为史上登陆我国最强秋台风 _大公网	查看 1147	《大公报》	2024-09-06 08:00:00 2024-09-07 07:41:14	word
2705259	无图 <p>This share prices have a15 minute delay and are shown in the local time of the market in which the quote is displayed.</p> Santander appoints Ignacio Juliá as new CEO of Santander Spain	查看 125	桑坦德银行	2024-09-06 08:00:00 2024-09-07 07:07:27	word
2705258	无图 <p> Surabaya: Presiden Joko Widodo (Jokowi) memantau sejumlah harga bahan pangan di Pasar Soponyono, Surabaya, Jumat, 6 September 2024. Dari hasil pantauannya, rata-rata harga pangan relatif turun.</p><p>Harga bawang merah, misalnya. Terpantau sudah turun menjadi Rp25 ribu per kilogram (kg), dari sebelumnya Rp40 per kg. Begitu juga dengan harga telur sudah turun menjadi Rp24 ribu per kg.</p> Baca: Nilai Tukar Petani Naik 0,20% di Agustus 2024 </p><p>"Sebagian ada yang turun, yang naik tidak ada, Inflasi inti kita, terutama pangan dalam kondisi baik," ujar Jokowi.</p><p>Menurut Jokowi, menurunnya harga pangan disebabkan pasokan yang cukup. Selain itu, proses distribusi juga berjalan baik.</p><p>"Saya cek di lapangan keadannya seperti itu," ucapnya.</p><p>Pada kesempatan itu, Jokowi juga membagikan paket sembako kepada warga setempat. Baik yang di dalam dan di luar pasar.</p><p> Jokowi Pantau Harga Pangan di Pasar Soponyono	查看 919	美都电视台	2024-09-06 00:00:00 2024-09-07 07:07:17	word
2705257	无图 <p> Jakarta: Psikolog Klinis Anak dan Remaja dari Lembaga Psikologi Terapan Universitas Indonesia Vera Itabiliana Hadiwidjojo, menyoroti mudahnya akses anak terhadap pornografi. Hal tersebut muncul karena lemahnya pengawasan.</p><p>"Kurang pengawasan dari orang tua terhadap pergaulan dan penggunaan gadget, serta kurang komunikasi keterbukaan antara anak dan orang tua juga menjadi penyebab yang harus ditinjau,” kata Vera kepada Media Indonesia, Jumat, 6 September 2024.</p><p>Hal ini merujuk padaperilaku kekerasan yang ditunjukkan anak-anak, seperti di Palembang, Sumatera Selatan. Menurutnya munculnya perilaku di luar batas kenakalan anak perlu ada penelusuran lebih lanjut khususnya terkait latar belakang keluarga.</p><p>“Anak kemungkinan juga pernah menjadi korban sehingga ia nekat melihatkan perubahan dengan menjadi pelaku," kata dia.</p> Baca:Psikolog Sebut Orang Tua Berperan Penting Cegah Kekerasan Terhadap Anak </p><p>Vera mengatakan anak yang tumbuh dalam keluarga yang penuh dengan kekerasan sangat mungkin melakukan yang sama di luar rumah. Apabila anak terbiasa menyaksikan atau mengalami kekerasan di dalam keluarganya, hal itu berpotensi bakal dianggap biasa.</p><p>“Apalagi penanaman nilai agama, susila dan edukasi seks minim diberikan. Ditambah kurangnya aktivitas positif yang dapat menjadi penyaluran energi anak juga bisa memengaruhi anak menjadi pelaku kekerasan,” tuturnya.</p><p>Menurut Vera, perilaku yang ditunjukkan pelaku yang masih dalam usia anak ini sangat di luar batas dan memprihatinkan. Dijelaskan bahwa faktor lain yang dapat memengaruhi seorang anak menjadi pelaku kekerasan seksual, salah satu yang tertinggi yaitu karena pengaruh situs dan website pornograf</p><p>“Perilaku ini bukanlah perilaku yang pantas dilakukan oleh siapapun apalagi oleh anak. Bisa saja anak tak diawasi sehingga mengkonsumsi tontonan yang mengandung seksualitas karena adanya pengaruh situs dan website pornograf yang dapat diakses dengan mudah melalui gawai, di mana anak mendapatkan pengetahuan yang salah tentang seksualitas,” ungkapnya.</p><p>Menanggapi kasus pembunuhan dan pemerkosaan yang melibatkan anak-anak di Sumatera Selatan, Komisi Perlindungan Anak Indonesia (KPAI) merasa prihatin dan memberi perhatian khusus atas kasus tersebut. Apalagi, baik korban maupun terduga pelaku dan saksi-saksi, semuanya anak-anak.</p><p>“Dalam kasus ini terduga pelaku masih dalam usia anak yang salah satunya ada yang merupakan teman sekolah korban. Karena itu perlu ada upaya-upaya khusus dalam berhadapan dengan anak berkonflik dengan hukum,” ujar Komisioner KPAI Dian Sasmita</p><p>Dian juga mengingatkan aparat penegak hukum agar penanganan kasusnya hukum dilakukan dengan kehati-hatian karena ada hak-hak anak yang perlu diperhatikan seperti saksi yang melihat kejadian ataupun anak yang menjadi pelaku terduga.</p><p>Dian Sasmita juga menyatakan sangat prihatin dengan adanya kasus tersebut dan mendorong agar kasus diusut menggunakan sistem peradilan anak, sebab pelaku masih di bawah umur.</p><p>“KPAI sangat prihatin dengan peristiwa ini. Anak perempuan menjadi korban kekerasan hingga meninggal dunia, tapi kita harus tarik ke belakang, anak yang melanggar itu tidak hukum tidak tiba-tiba terjadi, tetapi ada rentetan situasi yang membentuk karakter, mental, dan perilaku anak,” ungkapnya.</p><p>Situasi tersebut menurut Dian merupakan hal yang berpengaruh pada kehidupan anak seperti situasi yang terjadi di lingkungan keluarganya. Di luar itu ada lingkungan sosial, pendidikan, dan pergaulan.</p><p>Dian juga mengatakan upaya pencegahan dan pengendalian risiko anak menjadi korban dan pelaku kekerasan dibutuhkan kerjasama berbagai pihak mulai dari tingkat keluarga, satuan pendidikan hingga regulasi yang berpihak pada perlindungan anak sebab sebagian besar pelaku adalah orang terdekat.</p><p>“Karakteristik pelaku kekerasan seksual secara mayoritas adalah orang yang dekat dengan korban. Sehingga anak anak dapat lebih terlindungi dari segala bentuk kekerasan,” kata dia.</p><p>Dian pun mendorong agar kasus aparat penegak hukum dapat mengusut kasus ini dengan Undang-Undang Sistem Peradilan Pidana Anak (SPPA).</p><p>”Perlu penanganan yang khusus sesuai prosedur di UU Sistem Peradilan Pidana Anak. Kami mengapresiasi upaya cepat Polres Palembang mengungkap kasus ini,” kata dia. Mudahnya Akses Konten Pornografi Terhadap Anak Disorot	查看 4343	美都电视台	2024-09-06 00:00:00 2024-09-07 07:07:17	word
2705256	无图 <p> Jakarta: Pendiri Haidar Alwi Institute (HAI) R Haidar Alwi mengajak keluarga besar Korps Bhayangkara meneladani kesederhanaan Kapolri Jenderal Listyo Sigit Prabowo. Haidar mendapatkan informasi masih adanya anggota Polri dan keluarga yang diduga gemar bergaya hidup mewah (hedon) dan dipamerkan di media sosial (flexing).</p><p>"Seharusnya mereka meneladani kesederhanaan yang dicontohkan oleh Kapolri dan istri. Beliau tidak pernah bergaya hidup mewah apalagi memamerkannya di media sosial. Tidak pernah. Padahal beliau orang nomor satu di Polri. Yang hedon dan flexing harusnya malu," kata Haidar Alwi dalam keterangannya, Jumat, 6 September 2024.</p><p>Ironisnya, kata dia, oknum yang diduga hedon dan flexing tersebut berasal dari perwira tinggi (pati) Polri yang sebelumnya sudah pernah viral dan menjadi sorotan publik. Namun, bukannya berubah, malah seperti tidak pernah jera.</p><p>Ia mengatakan gara-gara ulah segelintir oknum, banyak anggota Polri lain yang ikut terdampak, padahal hidupnya pas-pasan. Terutama, mereka yang pangkat dan jabatannya masih tergolong rendah.</p><p>"Kalau efeknya hanya terbatas pada oknum yang bersangkutan, silakan saja. Ini satu institusi ikut terdampak karena timbul stigma dan dicap oleh masyarakat sebagai lembaga yang hedon dan flexing," ungkapnya.</p> Baca juga:Kapolri Ingin Pidato Paus Fransiskus Dijadikan Semangat Toleransi Beragama </p><p>Ia menyebut masih hangat kedatangan Paus Fransiskus ke Indonesia yang menunjukkan kesederhanaan luar biasa. Meskipun, menyandang status sebagai pemimpin umat katolik dunia. Mulai dari penolakan penggunaan pesawat komersil, penggunaan mobil biasa, menolak tidur di hotel berbintang, hingga jam tangan murah dan sepatu tua yang sudah lusuh.</p><p>"Kesederhanaan Paus seperti tamparan keras bagi para pejabat yang gemar hedon dan flexing. Tapi sayangnya, walaupun sudah ditampar sangat keras, masih banyak yang belum introspeksi diri," ungkapnya.</p><p>Haidar Alwi mengajak seluruh keluarga besar Korps Bhayangkara bersama-sama menjaga muruah institusinya. Jangan sampai saat sebagian besar sibuk membangun citra baik, sebagian lain malah meruntuhkannya.</p><p>"Bukan hanya anggota Polri tapi juga keluarganya, istri dan anak-anaknya harus bisa menjaga marwah Polri. Supaya apa yang sudah dibangun dengan susah payah tidak berakhir sia-sia," ujarnya. Jajaran Korps Bhayangkara Diminta Meneladani Kesederhanaan Kapolri	查看 2371	美都电视台	2024-09-06 00:00:00 2024-09-07 07:07:17	word
2705255	无图 <p> Jakarta: Masyarakat Anti Korupsi Indonesia (MAKI) tidak puas dengan sanksi etik yang diberikan Dewan Pengawas Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (Dewas KPK) terhadap Nurul Ghufron. Wakil Ketua KPK itu diberikan sanksi sedang berupa teguran tertulis dan pemotongan penghasilan sebesar 20 persen selama enam bulan.</p><p>"Prinsipnya kami tetap menghormati putusan Dewan Pengawas KPK meskipun putusannya tidak memuaskan," kata Koordinator MAKI Boyamin Saiman saat dihubungi, Jumat, 6 September 2024.</p><p>Menurut Boyamin, seharusnya pelanggaran ini masuk kategori pelanggaran etik berat. Sebab, Nurul Ghufron telah terbukti menyalahgunakan wewenangnya sebagai pimpinan KPK untuk kepentingan pribadi.</p><p>"Sanksi berat itu bisa berupa pemotongan gaji yang lebih banyak seperti 50 persen misalnya dan juga ditambah catatan bahwa yang bersangkutan tidak profesional, tidak menjalankan tugas pimpinan KPK dengan baik atau cacat," ujarnya.</p> Baca juga:Dewas KPK Sebut Ghufron Masih Bisa Direkomendasikan Dipecat </p><p>Boyamin mengatakan Dewan Pengawas KPK juga seharusnya memberikan catatan terhadap Nurul Ghufron bahwa dirinya tidak bisa atau tak layak mencalonkan sebagai pimpinan KPK periode berikutnya.</p><p>"Karena saya khawatir kalau hanya cuma teguran tertulis dan potongan gaji 20 persen, nanti oleh Pansel atau DPR masih memungkinkan untuk diloloskan, padahal versi MAKI sudah cacat ini sehingga tidak layak lagi," tuturnya.</p><p>Wakil Ketua KPK Nurul Ghufron divonis melanggar etik dalam kasus dugaan mengintervensi proses mutasi seorang aparatur sipil negara di lingkungan Kementerian Pertanian.</p><p>Ghufron diadukan ke Dewas KPK pada awal Desember 2023 terkait dugaan penyalahgunaan wewenang terkait komunikasi dengan Sekretaris Jenderal Kementerian Pertanian Kasdi Subagyono.</p><p>Komunikasi tersebut dilakukan untuk membantu mutasi aparatur sipil negara Kementerian Pertanian bernama Andi Dwi Mandasari dari Inspektorat Jenderal Kementerian Pertanian ke BPTP Kementerian Pertanian di Malang, Jawa Timur. Sanksi Dewas KPK terhadap Nurul Ghufron Dinilai Terlalu Ringan	查看 2048	美都电视台	2024-09-06 00:00:00 2024-09-07 07:07:17	word
2705254	无图 <p> Bekasi: Pengamat Energi dari APEI (Asosiasi Pengamat Energi Indonesia) Ali Ahmudi Achyak, mendesak pemerintah kota Bekasi segera melanjutkan proyek Pengolahan Sampah Menjadi Energi Listrik (PSEL) yang berlokasi di Sumur Batu, Bantargebang, Kota Bekasi.</p><p>Ali yang juga Direktur Eksekutif CESS (Center for Energy Security Studies) mengatakan hal tersebut agar persoalan sampah di kota berpenduduk padat dan sentra ekonomi utama di Jawa Barat segera teratasi.</p><p>"Kota Bekasi yang terus tumbuh itu sedang dalam darurat sampah, sama seperti Jakarta. Volume sampah terus meningkat bahkan termasuk tertinggi se-Jawa Barat," kata Ali dalam keterangan pers, Jumat, 6 September 2024.</p> Baca:Pj Gubernur Jakarta Diminta Lanjutkan Pembangunan ITF Sunter Sebelumnya pada 21 Juni 2024, pemerintah kota Bekasi mengumumkan pembatalan pemenang tender mitra pengolahan sampah yang sekaligus pelaksana Proyek Pengolahan Sampah Menjadi Energi Listrik (PSEL).</p><p>Pembatalan tersebut disebabkan proses tender yang telah dilakukan bertentangan dengan peraturan Menteri Dalam Negeri (Permendagri) Nomor 22 Tahun 2020 tentang Tata Cara Kerjasama Daerah dengan Daerah (KSDD) dan Kerjasama Daerah dengan Pihak Ketiga (KSDPK).</p><p>Skema Kerja Sama Daerah dengan Pihak Ketiga (KSDPK) yang digunakan oleh Pemkot Bekasi tidak memperhatikan Permendagri Nomor 22 tahun 2020. Dalam pasal 32, Kerjasama KSDPK itu paling lama 5 tahun dan dapat diperpanjang sesuai kesepakatan. Seharusnya kerjasama yang dilakukan menggunakan skema Kerjasama Pemerintah dengan Badan Usaha (KSBPU).</p><p>Ali mengatakan pemerintah Kota Bekasi harus segera melanjutkan proyek PSEL yang telah lama terkatung-katung tanpa kepastian. Pembatalan tender itu menurut Ali sebagai salah satu upaya Pemkot Bekasi memberikan kepastian hukum dan menerapkan tata kelola yang benar dalam proyek pengolahan sampah. Namun yang lebih penting adalah memastikan proyek PSEL Kota Bekasi ini tetap berjalan.</p><p>"Sudah lama Kota Bekasi membutuhkan proyek PSEL ini agar persoalan sampah di sini segera dapat solusinya. Semakin ditunda akan lebih rumit kedepannya," ungkap Ali.</p><p>Doktor dari Universitas Indonesia yang membidangi pengelolaan sampah untuk energi (waste to energy) ini menyampaikan dalam beberapa tahun terakhir, Kota Bekasi telah menjadi salah satu kota dengan produksi sampah tertinggi di Jawa Barat bahkan nasional, setelah Jakarta.</p><p>Kota itu butuh pengelolaan sampah yang efektif, efisien, ramah lingkungan, serta berdampak positif pada perekonomian.</p><p>Berdasarkan data SIPN Kementerian LHK, sampah di Kota Bekasi pada tahun 2023 dan 2022 merupakan tertinggi nomor dua se-provinsi Jawa Barat, setelah kabupaten Bekasi. Timbulan sampah Kota Bekasi tahun 2023 sebesar 638 ribu ton, dan pada 668.000 ribu ton pada 2022. Bahkan pada 2021, timbulan sampah di Kota Bekasi tertinggi se-Jawa Barat sebesar 867 ribu ton, lebih tinggi dari kota Bandung sebesar 581 ribu ton.</p><p>Proyek PSEL yang dirancang untuk mengubah sampah menjadi energi listrik, memiliki potensi besar untuk tidak hanya mengurangi volume sampah yang masuk ke TPA, tetapi juga memberikan sumber energi terbarukan bagi masyarakat Kota Bekasi.</p><p>"Dengan PSEL, kita tidak hanya mengatasi masalah sampah, tetapi juga menyediakan solusi energi yang ramah lingkungan. Ini adalah salah satu upaya keberlanjutan yang kita perlukan untuk mebndukung pencapaian ketahanan energi nasional," ungkap Ali. Darurat Sampah, Proyek PSEL di Kota Bekasi Dinilai Perlu Dilanjutkan	查看 3470	美都电视台	2024-09-06 00:00:00 2024-09-07 07:07:17	word
2705253	无图 <p> Jakarta: Bakal calon gubernur dan wakil gubernur Jakarta, Ridwan Kamil-Suswono disebut bakal melanjutkan program eks Gubernur Jakarta Anies Baswedan yang terangkum dalam slogan Maju Kotanya, Bahagia Warganya. RK-Suswono akan melakukan penyempurnaan agar cita-cita dalam slogan itu terwujud.</p><p>Khoirudin mengatakan, hal ini dilakukan demi menarik simpati para loyalis Anies dan memilih RK-Suswono. Menurutnya, mereka perlu diberi pemahaman RK-Suswono bakal mewujudkan cita-cita Anies.</p><p>"Insyaallah massa Pak Anies pun akan kita berikan pemahaman, perhatian bahwa apa yang dicita-citakan pak Anies membangun Jakarta Maju Kotanya Bahagia Warganya, slogannya itu bisa dilanjutkan oleh Pak Ridwan Kamil," ujar Ketua DPW PKS Jakarta Khoirudin saat dihubungi, Jumat, 6 September 2024.</p> Baca juga:Pramono akan Temui SBY hingga JK </p><p>Khoirudin mengaku optimistis bisa memenangkan Pilkada Jakarta 2024. Apalagi, tak seperti kontestasi sebelumnya, kali ini PKS berjuang bersama banyak partai dalam Koalisi Indonesia Maju (KIM) Plus.</p><p>"Kita sudah punya pengalaman pemilu, pilkada panjang. Dulu PKS sendirian (Pilkada) 2007. Kemarin 2017 lawan Pak Anies sangat berat dan dengan izin Allah SWT dimenangkan," ucap dia.</p><p>Dengan koalisi besar 91 kursi DPRD dinilai bisa menjadi modal awal yang cukup untuk memenangkan Pilkada Jakarta.</p><p>"Karena setiap dewan punya jaringan, punya relawan. Setiap partai punya mesin. Nanti semua kita gerakkan," ungkapnya. RK-Suswono Bakal Lanjutkan Cita-cita Anies Baswedan di Jakarta	查看 1501	美都电视台	2024-09-06 00:00:00 2024-09-07 07:07:17	word
2705252	无图 <p> Melalui kunjungan seorang tokoh keagamaan, kita mendapat keteladanan sikap kesederhanaan. Sayangnya kita sulit berharap sikap serupa dari para pejabat tinggi negara atau anak dan istrinya. Padahal, rakyat merindukan sosok pemimpin yang tampil bersahaja.</p><p>Flexing membuat banyak pejabat atau keluarga pejabat dihujat masyarakat. Namun, tetap saja ada yang tergoda melakukan aksi pamer harta. Termasuk keluarga penguasa yang dulu gemar tampil serba sederhana.</p><p>Dalam politik elektoral, kesederhanaan dapat menjadi modal sosial. Walau kesederhanaan yang ditampilkan mungkin hanya sekadar pencitraan.</p><p>Plato mengatakan, pemimpin harus memiliki pengendalian diri, keberanian, kearifan dan keadilan. Sebuah kajian Lembaga Management FEB UI menyoroti karakter para kepala daerah di Indonesia. Riset menunjukkan, kualitas rata-rata kepala daerah pascareformasi membaik.</p><p>Mayoritas kepala daerah berpendidikan tinggi dan berpengalaman di birokrasi. Apakah riwayat pendidikan dan pengalaman kerja berdampak pada kualitas kebijakan yang dihasilkannya?</p><p>Sebentar lagi Indonesia akan menggelar Pilkada. Menurut Kementerian Dalam Negeri, kualitas kepemimpinan kepala daerah menentukan kesejahteraan masyarakat. Selain intelektualitas dan kapabilitas, pemimpin ideal juga dituntut memiliki moralitas dan integritas. Apakah para calon kepala daerah sudah memiliki ciri-ciri pemimpin ideal? </p> Pilih dan Pilah, Jangan Pasrah	查看 1449	美都电视台	2024-09-06 00:00:00 2024-09-07 07:07:17	word
2705251	无图 <p> Jakarta: Penjabat (Pj) Gubernur Kalimantan Timur (Kaltim) Akmal Malik melakukan panen raya padi di lahan bekas tambang PT Kitadin Site Embalut (program pasca tambang), Jumat, 6 September 2024. Ia berharap transformasi lahan bekas tambang menjadi pertanian terus meluas.</p><p>"Jujur saya tidak pernah terpikirkan seperti ini, bagus sekali. Kalau langkah-langkah ini kita lakukan, maka tidak ada yang salah dengan pertambangan," kata Akmal dalam keterangannya, Jumat, 6 September 2024.</p><p>Menurut Akmal, ada sekitar 50.400 hektare lahan bekas tambang yang diserahkan ke pemerintah. Khusus wilayah eks tambang PT Kitadin, sekitar 72 hektare yang sudah dikelola untuk sektor pertanian, hortikultura, perkebunan, dan wisata. Ia menyebut masyarakat sekitar dilibatkan mengelola pertanian, artinya ada kebersamaan antara perusahaan dengan masyarakat.</p><p>"Praktik cerdasnya, Kaltim berhasil melakukan transformasi pascatambang ke pertanian. Ini bisa menjadi contoh bahwa kita di Kaltim tidak hanya bisa menggali saja, kita juga mampu bertransformasi dari tambang ke pertanian," ungkapnya.</p><p>Ia berharap pimpinan perangkat daerah bersama pihak terkait mendukung teman-teman pemegang izin usaha pertambangan (IUP) untuk melakukan transformasi serupa. "Agar bisa melakukan hal-hal baik ini lebih luas lagi," jelas Akmal.</p> Baca juga:Kementan Pecut Digitalisasi Sektor Pertanian </p><p>Pemprov Kaltim juga akan mengerahkan anak-anak sekolah jenjang SMK/SMA untuk melakukan penanaman pohon di lahan eks tambang maupun lahan potensial di seluruh kabupaten/kota se-Kaltim.</p><p>"Kolaborasi kabupaten/kota dengan provinsi untuk menggalakkan penanaman pohon di wilayah Kaltim, dengan melibatkan anak-anak SMA/SMK untuk menanam," ujarnya.</p><p>Setelah melakukan panen raya padi, Akmal Malik melakukan penanaman bibit pohon endemik Kaltim di lokasi lahan eks tambang. Di antaranya nangka madu, jeruk ponti dan jeruk pamelo.</p><p>PT Kitadin memiliki kewajiban pasca tambang seluas 1.600 hektare di wilayah empat desa, yaitu Desa Embalut, Desa Kerta Buana, Desa Separi dan Desa Bangun Rejo. Kegiatan yang dilakukan di antaranya penanaman padi sawah, tanaman pakan ternak, jagung, dan hortikultura lainnya. Menyulap Lahan Bekas Tambang Jadi Pertanian	查看 2234	美都电视台	2024-09-06 00:00:00 2024-09-07 07:07:17	word
2705250	无图 <p> Jakarta: Kasus pembunuhan pejuang hak asasi manusia (HAM) Munir Said Thalib, tak kunjung tuntas. Padahal, pada 7 September 2024 kasus itu berusia 2 dekade.</p><p>“Pembunuhan Munir bukan kejahatan biasa. Tapi kejahatan luar biasa yang terjadi secara sistematis dengan indikasi kuat keterlibatan petinggi negara, khususnya unsur intelijen yang menyalahgunakan wewenang mereka, termasuk melalui orang-orang tertentu di penerbangan milik pemerintah,” kata Direktur Eksekutif Amnesty International Indonesia, Usman Hamid, dalam keterangan tertulis, Jumat, 6 September 2024.</p><p>Menurut dia, kemampuan aparat penegak hukum Indonesia tidak perlu diragukan lagi. Sayangnya, ujar Usman, kemampuan itu terhalang oleh keengganan politik untuk mengambil langkah-langkah hukum dalam menuntaskan kasus ini.</p><p>"Padahal masih ada peluang hukum, yaitu investigasi kepolisian serta peninjauan kembali oleh kejaksaan,” lanjut Usman.</p> Baca:Putri Bungsu Munir: Berikan Keadilan Kepada Bapak Saya! </p><p>Usman menghormati penjelasan komisioner Komnas HAM Hari Kurniawan yang mengatakan kepada media bahwa saat ini proses penyelidikan projustisia kasus Munir di Komnas HAM masih berjalan dengan pengumpulan alat bukti dan permintaan keterangan saksi.</p><p>Komnas HAM dan sejumlah organisasi hak asasi manusia juga berkali-kali mengingatkan Jaksa Agung terkait hasil-hasil penyelidikan Komnas HAM, termasuk untuk membentuk pengadilan HAM ad hoc oleh Presiden dan DPR. Namun, kemauan politik itu memang belum terlihat. Seandainya pun Komnas HAM berhasil menuntaskan penyelidikan, hasilnya masih bergantung dari kemauan politik negara.</p><p>Pada 7 September 2004, Munir meregang nyawa akibat dosis mematikan senyawa arsenik dalam penerbangan Garuda rute Jakarta - Singapura - Amsterdam. Meski sempat ditangani lewat Tim Pencari Fakta, Polri, Kejaksaan, dan Pengadilan, kasus ini masih menyisakan tanda tanya setelah tidak berlanjut sejak akhir 2008.</p><p>Pembentukan TPF Kasus Meninggalnya Munir pada tahun 2004 lewat Keputusan Presiden No. 111 tahun 2004 (Keppres 111/2004) menjadi langkah penting dalam mengungkap kasus pembunuhan itu. Selain pelaku lapangan, laporan TPF menyebutkan nama-nama lain yang masih perlu ditelusuri peran dan pertanggungjawaban hukumnya.</p><p>Sayangnya, Pemerintah tidak pernah mengumumkan laporan TPF, meski Keppres 111/2004 memandatkannya. Komisi Informasi Publik (KIP) Pusat pada 10 Oktober 2016 sempat meminta Pemerintah segera mengumumkan laporan tersebut. Namun, dokumen penyelidikan TPF dinyatakan hilang.</p><p>Kementerian Sekretariat Negara pada 12 Oktober 2016 mengaku tidak dapat mengumumkan laporan akhir TPF karena tidak memiliki dokumen tersebut. Setelah ada desakan publik, Presiden Joko Widodo memerintahkan Jaksa Agung Muhammad Prasetyo untuk mencari dokumen TPF yang hilang, namun tidak membuahkan hasil.</p><p>Pada 28 Januari 2021, Ombudsman RI dari hasil pemeriksaannya mengungkapkan bahwa dokumen asli hasil penyelidikan TPF kematian Munir masih belum ditemukan.</p><p>“Peristiwa hilangnya dokumen TPF itu saja menandakan rendahnya kemauan politik negara untuk membuka kembali kasus Munir. Kejadian ini sungguh tidak dapat dipercaya dan sulit diterima oleh nalar,” kata Usman.</p><p>Selain hasil TPF, pemerintah juga belum lebih jauh menuntaskan hasil-hasil kepolisian, kejaksaan dan pengadilan. Padahal saat itu telah ada titik terang tentang siapa dalang utama pembunuhan ini. Sayang tidak tuntas.</p><p>Motif pembunuhan tidak dapat dipisahkan dari perjuangan Munir yang berani untuk mereformasi sistem keamanan dan kontrol sipil dalam demokrasi di Indonesia. Sebelum dibunuh, Munir aktif mengkritik Rancangan Undang-Undang Badan Inteijen Negara, RUU TNI Tahun 2004 dan RUU Komisi Kebenaran dan Rekonsiliasi Tahun 2004, serta kegiatan publik lainnya. Sayangnya, ada sekelompok orang yang tidak menginginkan perubahan dengan cara membunuhnya.</p><p>Dua puluh tahun telah berlalu, negara masih memiliki tanggung jawab hukum untuk menyelesaikan kasus-kasus pelanggaran berat HAM masa lalu, termasuk kasus Munir.</p><p>Pemerintahan Joko Widodo, yang pada awal masa jabatannya berjanji untuk menuntaskan kasus ini, hingga kini belum menunjukkan langkah nyata untuk memenuhi janji . Hal ini semakin mempertegas adanya keengganan negara untuk menegakkan keadilan bagi Munir dan keluarganya serta ribuan korban pelanggaran HAM lainnya.</p><p>“Kami terus mendesak negara untuk segera mengambil langkah hukum yang tegas dan transparan dalam mengusut tuntas kasus pembunuhan Munir,” kata Usman. </p><p>“Munir adalah simbol perlawanan terhadap ketidakadilan dan kesewenang-wenangan. Dua puluh tahun setelah kematiannya, kita masih menuntut hal yang sama, kebenaran dan keadilan. Negara harus bangun dari tidur panjangnya,” kata Usman. Pengungkapan Kasus Munir Butuh Political Will	查看 4797	美都电视台	2024-09-06 00:00:00 2024-09-07 07:07:17	word

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