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2706074	有图 <p><img src="https://www.utusan.com.my/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/WhatsApp-Image-2024-09-07-at-17.37.28_cfb2bae8.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer"></p><p><img src="https://www.utusan.com.my/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/WhatsApp-Image-2024-09-07-at-17.37.28_cfb2bae8.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer"></p><p>KLUANG: Pihak Berkuasa Kemajuan Pekebun Kecil Perusahaan Getah (RISDA) akan melancarkan Model Depo Lateks Berprestasi Tinggi sebagai usaha memperkukuh rantaian nilai industri getah untuk pekebun kecil pada tahun depan. Timbalan Perdana Menteri, Datuk Seri Dr Ahmad Zahid Hamidi berkata, insentif itu bakal menyediakan pusat pengumpulan dan pemprosesan lateks serta pemprosesan kepingan getah asap berbunga (RSS). ... Read more</p><p>The post Model Depo Lateks Berprestasi bantu tingkat pendapatan pekebun kecil appeared first on Utusan Malaysia.</p> Model Depo Lateks Berprestasi bantu tingkat pendapatan pekebun kecil	查看 848	马来西亚前锋报	2024-09-07 17:52:17 2024-09-07 19:15:54	word
2706073	有图 <p><img src="https://www.utusan.com.my/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/curi-.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer"></p><p><img src="https://www.utusan.com.my/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/curi-.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer"></p><p>SLEMAN: Seorang lelaki berusia 32 tahun ditahan polis gara-gara mencuri burung cucak hijau milik jirannya yang berharga 5 juta rupiah (RM1,400). Warga kampung Caturtunggal, Depok, Yogyakarta selama ini mengenali tabiat pemuda itu kerana mencuri. Pihak Polis menjelaskan suspek mencuri dengan cara mengambil burung yang berada di dalam sangkar menggunakan tangan kanan. “Pelaku mengambil burung tanpa ... Read more</p><p>The post Suka curi burung jiran, pemuda ditahan polis appeared first on Utusan Malaysia.</p> Suka curi burung jiran, pemuda ditahan polis	查看 735	马来西亚前锋报	2024-09-07 18:00:46 2024-09-07 19:15:54	word
2706072	有图 <p><img src="https://www.utusan.com.my/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/WhatsApp-Image-2024-09-07-at-17.52.12_03c2963d-1024x682.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer"></p><p><img src="https://www.utusan.com.my/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/WhatsApp-Image-2024-09-07-at-17.52.12_03c2963d.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer"></p><p>KUALA LUMPUR : Dianggarkan 150,000 peminat dijangka membanjiri Dataran Merdeka di sini bagi menyaksikan Festival Permainan Malaysia@Kuala Lumpur selama tiga bermula 13 hingga 15 September ini. Festival tersebut yang telah memasuki sembilan tahun penganjurannya berjaya mengangkat permainan tradisional supaya lebih diminati bukan sahaja oleh rakyat tempatan tetapi juga pelancong asing. Seramai 2,378 peserta terdiri daripada ... Read more</p><p>The post 150,000 dijangka banjiri Dataran Merdeka saksi Festival Permainan Tradisional appeared first on Utusan Malaysia.</p> 150,000 dijangka banjiri Dataran Merdeka saksi Festival Permainan Tradisional	查看 879	马来西亚前锋报	2024-09-07 18:06:00 2024-09-07 19:15:54	word
2706071	有图 <p><img src="https://www.utusan.com.my/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/WhatsApp-Image-2024-09-07-at-18.08.09_15e5c534.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer"></p><p><img src="https://www.utusan.com.my/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/WhatsApp-Image-2024-09-07-at-18.08.09_15e5c534.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer"></p><p>PETALING JAYA: Polis memohon bantuan orang ramai mengesan seorang kanak-kanak lelaki yang dilaporkan hilang di sebuah madrasah di Hulu Selangor sejak 6 Ogos lalu. Ketua Polis Daerah Hulu Selangor, Superintenden Ahmad Faizal Tahrim berkata, kanak-kanak berumur 10 tahun itu dikenali sebagai Mohammed Ahil Sekh Abdul Alim dilaporkan hilang kira-kira pada 8.20 malam. Beliau berkata, kanak-kanak ... Read more</p><p>The post Kanak-kanak lelaki hilang dari madrasah appeared first on Utusan Malaysia.</p> Kanak-kanak lelaki hilang dari madrasah	查看 799	马来西亚前锋报	2024-09-07 18:10:52 2024-09-07 19:15:54	word
2706070	有图 <p><img src="https://www.utusan.com.my/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/WhatsApp-Image-2024-09-07-at-5.53.04-PM.jpeg" rel="noopener noreferrer"></p><p><img src="https://www.utusan.com.my/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/WhatsApp-Image-2024-09-07-at-5.53.04-PM.jpeg" rel="noopener noreferrer"></p><p>KUALA KRAI: Kegembiraan seorang pelajar tingkatan tiga melihat tujuh rakannya mandi-manda di Sungai Kampung Lata Pauh, di sini hari ini berakhir dengan tragedi apabila dia tergelincir dari kawasan berbatu sebelum lemas di sungai tersebut. Mangsa, Mohamad Azri Aiman Rosli, 15, ditemukan oleh rakannya yang berusia 18 tahun selepas 15 minit disedari lemas di dasar sungai ... Read more</p><p>The post Pelajar lemas selepas tergelincir ke dalam sungai appeared first on Utusan Malaysia.</p> Pelajar lemas selepas tergelincir ke dalam sungai	查看 775	马来西亚前锋报	2024-09-07 18:13:18 2024-09-07 19:15:54	word
2706069	有图 <p><img src="https://www.utusan.com.my/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/ONLINE-jawi.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer"></p><p><img src="https://www.utusan.com.my/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/ONLINE-jawi.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer"></p><p>PUTRAJAYA: Jabatan Kemajuan Islam Malaysia (Jakim) diarahkan mengadakan pertemuan dengan pihak Global Ikhwan Sdn. Bhd. (GISB) susulan isu yang terkait dengan syarikat berkenaan berhubung eksploitasi kanak-kanak dan ajaran sesat. Menteri di Jabatan Perdana Menteri (Hal Ehwal Agama Islam), Datuk Dr. Mohd. Na’im Mokhtar berkata, pertemuan itu bagi mendapatkan maklum balas serta penjelasan daripada pihak terbabit. ... Read more</p><p>The post Jakim diarah bertemu GISB, sedia kerjasama polis appeared first on Utusan Malaysia.</p> Jakim diarah bertemu GISB, sedia kerjasama polis	查看 765	马来西亚前锋报	2024-09-07 18:28:04 2024-09-07 19:15:54	word
2706068	有图 <p><img src="https://www.utusan.com.my/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/ybr-1024x648.jpeg" rel="noopener noreferrer"></p><p><img src="https://www.utusan.com.my/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/ybr.jpeg" rel="noopener noreferrer"></p><p>LENGGONG: Yayasan Bank Rakyat (YBR) mengadakan Program Penghayatan Merdeka (Merdeka Ride) bagi memupuk semangat patriotisme dan kecintaan terhadap negara terutama pelajar dan komuniti sempena Bulan Kemerdekaan di sini hari ini. Program yang dianjurkan dengan kerjasama Kelab Sukan dan Rekreasi Komuniti Parlimen Lenggong (SRCC Lenggong) disertai oleh 350 penduduk sekitar Felda Lawin Selatan di sini yang ... Read more</p><p>The post YBR anjur program penghayatan kemerdekaan appeared first on Utusan Malaysia.</p> YBR anjur program penghayatan kemerdekaan	查看 738	马来西亚前锋报	2024-09-07 19:15:27 2024-09-07 19:15:54	word
2706067	有图 <p><img src="https://www.utusan.com.my/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/kalsom-lawat1-latest-1024x682.jpg?v=1725707890" rel="noopener noreferrer"></p><p><img src="https://www.utusan.com.my/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/kalsom-lawat1-latest.jpg?v=1725707890" rel="noopener noreferrer"></p><p>MELAKA: Kerajaan negeri akan menjalankan proses pemutihan taman asuhan kanak-kanak (taska) yang tumbuh bagai cendawan selepas hujan di seluruh negeri ini bagi memastikan hanya institusi berdaftar dibenarkan beroperasi. Pengerusi Jawatankuasa Hal Ehwal Wanita, Pembangunan Keluarga dan Kebajikan negeri, Datuk Kalsom Noordin berkata, terdapat 137 taska yang berdaftar dengan Jabatan Kebajikan Masyarakat (JKM) iaitu 101 di ... Read more</p><p>The post Hanya 137 taska berdaftar di Melaka, pemutihan perlu dilaksana appeared first on Utusan Malaysia.</p> Hanya 137 taska berdaftar di Melaka, pemutihan perlu dilaksana	查看 834	马来西亚前锋报	2024-09-07 19:21:39 2024-09-07 19:15:54	word
2706066	有图 <p><img src="https://www.utusan.com.my/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/syed-husin-1.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer"></p><p><img src="https://www.utusan.com.my/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/syed-husin-1.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer"></p><p>KLUANG: Ketua Pemuda UMNO Bahagian Kluang, Syed Hussien Syed Abdullah dicalonkan mewakili Barisan Nasional (BN) pada Pilihan Raya Kecil (PRK) Dewan Undangan Negeri (DUN) Mahkota, 28 September ini. Pengumuman itu dibuat Pengarah PRK DUN Mahkota yang juga Pengerusi Perhubungan UMNO Johor, Datuk Onn Hafiz Ghazi dalam satu majlis khas petang ini. Onn yang juga Menteri ... Read more</p><p>The post Syed Hussein wakili UMNO di PRK Mahkota appeared first on Utusan Malaysia.</p> Syed Hussein wakili UMNO di PRK Mahkota	查看 705	马来西亚前锋报	2024-09-07 19:24:25 2024-09-07 19:15:54	word
2706065	有图 <p><img src="https://www.utusan.com.my/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/WhatsApp-Image-2024-09-07-at-19.18.22-1024x571.jpeg" rel="noopener noreferrer"></p><p><img src="https://www.utusan.com.my/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/WhatsApp-Image-2024-09-07-at-19.18.22.jpeg" rel="noopener noreferrer"></p><p>GEORGE TOWN : Beberapa kawasan di Bayan Lepas, Bayan Baru, Farlim dan lain-lain lokasi di negeri ini termasuk di Seberang Perai dilanda banjir kilat susulan hujan lebat yang melanda lebih dua jam petang ini. Difahamkan, antara kawasan yang terjejas di Bayan Baru adalah di Jalan Mahsuri, Jalan Mayang Pasir dan kawasan berhampiran Pasaraya Sunshine Square. ... Read more</p><p>The post Pulau Pinang dilanda banjir kilat appeared first on Utusan Malaysia.</p> Pulau Pinang dilanda banjir kilat	查看 750	马来西亚前锋报	2024-09-07 19:28:53 2024-09-07 19:15:54	word
2706064	有图 <p> <p> <nav> News Trade </nav> <p> Europe gives China a taste of its own trade medicine <p> Europe is using the threat of tariffs to press Chinese electric car makers to set up in the EU and share know-how. </p> <p> <p> <svg></svg> Listen <source src="https://s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/audio-for-wordpress-50806314455206d9c54d80b373c3eabd992b999b/2024/06/amazon_polly_4916097.mp3?version=1718888226"> </p> <nav> <svg></svg> Share <p> <svg></svg> Share options <svg></svg> Copy Link <svg></svg> EMail <svg></svg> Twitter <svg></svg> WhatsApp <svg></svg> Linkedin </p> </nav> </p> <p> <svg></svg> Free article usually reserved for subscribers </p> <p> <img src="https://www.politico.eu/cdn-cgi/image/width=1160,height=773,quality=80,onerror=redirect,format=auto/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/18/GettyImages-2155373711-scaled.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer"> <p> The big idea is to use the tariff threat to force Chinese carmakers to come to Europe to form joint ventures and share technology. \| STR/AFP via Getty Images </p> </p> <p> <p> <p> June 18, 2024 4:23 pm CET </p> </p> <p> By Jakob Hanke Vela and Jordyn Dahl </p> </p> </p> <p> <p>BRUSSELS — The EU is having a radical rethink of how to cope with the trade threat from Beijing — and its response has a very Chinese flavor to it. </p><p>Over the past years, EU trade policy has traditionally focused on building protective fortress walls, and last week"s decision to impose punitive tariffs on Chinese electric cars initially looked like another example of the classic defensive playbook in Brussels. </p><p>In a remarkable turn of events, however, the EU is now considering a next step that invites China"s electric vehicle (EV) makers inside the walls. </p></p><p> Advertisement <p> <p> </p> </p><p> Advertisement <p> <p> </p> </p><p><p>The big idea is to use the tariff threat to force Chinese carmakers to come to Europe to form joint ventures and share technology with their EU counterparts, according to conversations with four diplomats and two senior officials.</p><p>There are signs the formula is already attractive with EU carmakers. Franco-American-Italian carmaker Stellantis has formed a joint venture with China"s Leapmotor to start Europe operations in September. Spain"s EBRO-EV has teamed up with Chery — China’s fifth-largest automotive company — to develop EVs in Barcelona. </p><p>Many, however, will detect a supreme irony in this switch in tactics from the Europeans. For years, the EU has been at the vanguard of western investors howling in protest at Beijing"s demands that foreign investors in China should form joint ventures and share know-how: It’s what the EU used to slam as forced technology transfer.</p><p>The world has now changed. The fear is no longer that the Chinese will steal European EV technology in a game of catch-up, but rather that Europe is falling behind. Realizing that its industry needs fresh investment and expertise to compete, the EU is now turning its eyes toward a negotiated solution with Beijing.</p><p>European industry insiders say carmakers are keen for such deals, which they argue make the most business sense for a sector that has fallen behind.</p><p>“Joint ventures make sense, as a way to make sure that the Chinese don’t only set up final assembly plants in Europe, but also more substantial parts of the supply chain. Of course, it can also be a way to ask the Chinese to share some technology,” said one senior diplomat, who was granted anonymity to discuss the sensitive matter. </p></p><p> Advertisement <p> <p> </p> </p><p> Advertisement <p> <p> </p> </p><p><p>The idea is to use the EU’s additional tariffs of up to 38 percent on EVs as an incentive for Chinese carmakers to move production to Europe. While the manufacturers could set up their own factories in the bloc to avoid the duties, joining forces with a local producer would reduce costs and give them quicker access to the single market.</p><p>“As China goes global, the rest of the world is discovering that these brands are not inferior,” said Bill Russo, an automotive expert based in Shanghai.</p><p>“If we’re finding ourselves at a competitive disadvantage where the power pieces and positions on the chessboard are occupied by Chinese car companies and Chinese battery companies, which it is, then we shouldn’t be fighting it. We should be collaborating with it. Do it in reverse.”</p><img src="https://www.politico.eu/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/18/GettyImages-1229636987-1024x683.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer">The idea is to use the EU’s additional tariffs of up to 38 percent on EVs as an incentive for Chinese carmakers to move production to Europe. \| STR/AFP via Getty Images<p>That’s astounding in two ways: First, it shows that the EU is gearing up to play the kind of more muscular, interventionist role in world trade that it used to accuse China of. But, more profoundly, it’s an admission China has not only caught up but already overtaken Europe in some sectors.</p><p>“This is a bit humbling for us, but we need to recognize that we are behind on certain technology,” said the first senior diplomat.</p><p>A second senior EU diplomat decried “the sheer arrogance” of many EU leaders in the past, “thinking we would always be better technologically and that China would never catch up.”</p></p><p> Advertisement <p> <p> </p> </p><p> Advertisement <p> <p> </p> </p><p>Falling behind<p>For decades, Europe clung firm to the conviction that technological superiority would always guarantee it could stay one step ahead of China — even as reality proved that belief wrong.</p><p>China caught up with European firms and then started surpassing them in terms of sales and technological prowess on everything from solar panels to consumer drones, and now EVs.</p><p>According to the German Chamber of Commerce in China, 69 percent of German automotive companies reckon their Chinese competitors already lead them in innovation or will do so within the next five years.</p><p>So, faced with the need to catch up, Europe’s tariff and joint venture plan is “an attempt to give China a taste of its own medicine,” said Hosuk Lee-Makiyama, director of the European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE), a think tank.</p><p>Beijing seems to have gotten the message and spotted an opportunity to further integrate its supply chains with Europe. In a directive sent to Chinese automotive companies at the start of this year, the Ministry of Commerce said firms should build an industrial supply chain system “jointly built and shared by all parties.” </p><p>While Chinese companies have largely relied on acquiring European assets, the missive is an order to “be ready to form joint ventures rather than a 100 percent Chinese investment,” said François Godement, special adviser and resident senior fellow at the Institut Montaigne.</p></p><p> Advertisement <p> <p> </p> </p><p> Advertisement <p> <p> </p> </p><p><p></p>Look what you made me do<p>In Germany, some of whose companies still make good profits in China and have the ear of the country’s politicians, the fear of a trade war prompted Chancellor Olaf Scholz to break ranks and openly question the EU’s electric vehicle subsidy probe.</p><p>Yet despite wide-ranging fears of the car tariffs in Berlin, the view among the majority of EU countries is that Brussels basically had no choice but to react to China’s massive subsidies across the entire EV supply chain, from raw material refining for batteries to finished cars.</p><p>“The Communist party last March ... decided to increase industrial subsidies even more. They also decided not to stimulate domestic consumption and not to revalue the renminbi. If someone takes a decision like that, when there’s already so much capacity, it means: We want to flood you ... it’s a declaration of a trade war,” said a third senior diplomat. </p><p>“We are worried about these developments in our relationship with China. The climate is going to deteriorate. But it’s not really our decision. The decisions are taken in Beijing.”</p><p>And the mood among the EU diplomats and officials that POLITICO spoke to was not one of Trumpian protectionist gloating about the decision to impose tariffs, but rather one of regret and alarm that this may well be a last resort — with European governments’ balance sheets so stretched they simply can’t match China’s subsidies.</p><p>Referring to the EU’s decision to impose anti-subsidy tariffs, Lee-Makiyama added: “It’s the Taylor Swift doctrine, where Brussels tells Beijing: ‘Look what you made me do.’”</p></p><p> Advertisement <p> <p> </p> </p><p> Advertisement <p> <p> </p> </p><p>If you can"t beat them, join them<p>Faced with massive pressure from Berlin to avoid a trade war, the joint venture plan to de-escalate the fight while securing some wins for Europe is quickly gaining traction in Brussels.</p><p>It may also be Europe’s last shot to play a bigger role in the EV supply chain. </p><p>If on traditional cars, European and in particular German companies were the stars of the show, on battery-powered vehicles, they are hoping to get a ticket as China’s plus one.</p><p>Of course, political deals to secure big local investments are nothing new. “Every Asian carmaker had to invest in Europe in order to get tariff concessions. The Japanese built plants in France, Poland and Portugal. The South Koreans went into Central Europe. Also other Chinese firms like Huawei probably invested in France to gain partial access,” said ECIPE’s Lee-Makiyama.</p><p>What is new, however, is that the EU is not just using carrots such as subsidies and trade agreements, but also sticks such as the tariffs to encourage Chinese companies to invest on its soil.</p><p>Even more remarkable are discussions among officials and diplomats to use tools such as the investment screening regulation to cajole Chinese companies into such joint ventures.</p></p><p> Advertisement <p> <p> </p> </p><p><p>“It’s for the Commission to come up with a proposal on that,” said the first senior diplomat when asked whether the EU would go as far as formally imposing local ownership requirements.</p><p>Hungary —now the top recipient of Chinese EV investment into Europe — also wants to make a push for such joint venture requirements in its upcoming presidency of the Council of the EU, said a fourth diplomat, suggesting there could be a deal to remove the EU’s tariffs on those Chinese carmakers that invest locally.</p><p></p>Industrial reality<p>In fact, EU policymakers may not have much of a choice, as the industry is already moving ahead with such joint ventures. After being forced into agreements to gain access to China’s lucrative market in the 1990s, many European car brands have come around to the idea and are signing on to new ventures to produce Chinese cars in Europe of their own accord.</p><p>“It’s a very natural development,” said Jens Eskelund, president of the EU Chamber of Commerce in China. “European companies have been very successful in China ... Europe needs to consider: What are the conditions under which Chinese investment can actually be a positive for Europe?"</p><p>That outreach to Europe may explain why some Chinese carmakers, such as BYD, were hit with much lower tariffs than others such as Volkswagen’s main Chinese partner SAIC — which was hit with the highest EU tariff of 38.1 percent.</p><p>“You may see higher or lower tariff rates depending on willingness to invest,” said Lee-Makiyama. “BYD’s willingness to cooperate also explains the lower tariff,” he added. The EU’s anti-subsidy tariff of 17.4 percent on BYD “is not insurmountable if you also consider that the fluctuation of the yuan against the Euro exceeded that in the last two years.”</p></p><p> Advertisement <p> <p> </p> </p><p><p>Not everyone is eager to join hands and sing kumbaya, though. </p><p>Volkswagen has no plans to produce EVs made by its Chinese partners in its European factories, the company confirmed to POLITICO in March. And BYD, the world’s largest EV-maker, is going it alone in Hungary where it is building a factory of its own.</p><p>More Chinese investments in Europe could follow soon, however. France is keen to attract Chinese battery- and carmakers. “BYD is welcome in France and China’s automotive industry is welcome in France,” Economy Minister Bruno Le Maire said last month.</p><p>Rather than the start of a big trade war, Europe’s tariff decision could instead be the start of another wave of integration. </p><p>In its attempt to catch up, Europe is turning Chinese.</p><p>CORRECTION: This story has been amended to correct details of the Stellantis JV and François Godement’s affiliation. </p></p><p> Advertisement <p> <p> </p> </p><p> <footer> <p> <p> <svg></svg> Related Tags <p> Aid and development Batteries Buildings Business and competition Cars Companies Drones electric cars Electric vehicles Exclusive Industry Innovation Investment Investment screening Markets Medicines Produce Raw materials Regulation Subsidy Supply chains Tanks Tariffs Technology Trade Trade Agreements Trade war War </p> </p> <p> <svg></svg> Related Countries <p> China France Germany Hungary Poland Portugal </p> </p> <p> <svg></svg> Related People <p> Bruno Le Maire Hosuk Lee-Makiyama Olaf Scholz </p> </p> <p> <svg></svg> Related Organizations <p> European Council Huawei Volkswagen </p> </p> </p> </footer> </p> </p> <footer> <p> <p> Our readers read next </p> <p> <p> <p> <p> <img src="https://www.politico.eu/cdn-cgi/image/width=380,height=253,quality=80,onerror=redirect,format=auto/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/07/GettyImages-1415300334-scaled.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer"> </p> <p> Dick Cheney supports Harris, says Trump ‘can never be trusted with power again’ <p> 12 MINS ago 4 mins read</p> </p> </p><p> <p> <img src="https://www.politico.eu/cdn-cgi/image/width=380,height=253,quality=80,onerror=redirect,format=auto/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/06/GettyImages-2156830976.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer"> </p> <p> Trump hush money sentencing delayed until after November election <p> 15 HRS ago 3 mins read</p> </p> </p><p> <p> <img src="https://www.politico.eu/cdn-cgi/image/width=380,height=253,quality=80,onerror=redirect,format=auto/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/06/GettyImages-2169527196-scaled.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer"> </p> <p> Volkswagen’s week from hell risks getting worse <p> 17 HRS ago 4 mins read</p> </p> </p><p> <p> <img src="https://www.politico.eu/cdn-cgi/image/width=380,height=253,quality=80,onerror=redirect,format=auto/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/06/GettyImages-2162507846.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer"> </p> <p> Orbán says ‘it’s necessary’ for Zelenskyy and Putin to meet to end Ukraine war <p> 19 HRS ago 2 mins read</p> </p> </p> </p> </p> </p> <p> <p> More from Jakob Hanke Vela </p> <p> <p> <p> <p> <img src="https://www.politico.eu/cdn-cgi/image/width=380,height=283,quality=80,onerror=redirect,format=auto/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/05/GettyImages-479923886-scaled.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer"> </p> <p> FBI dossier reveals Putin’s secret psychological warfare in Europe <p> <p>Russian information warriors identified Germany as a particularly easy target for Moscow’s influence, U.S. law enforcement said. </p> </p> <p> Sep 5 3 mins read</p> </p> </p><p> <p> <img src="https://www.politico.eu/cdn-cgi/image/width=380,height=253,quality=80,onerror=redirect,format=auto/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/11/Sanchez-PM-Spain.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer"> </p> <p> Spain’s Sánchez outfoxes Puigdemont again <p> <p>Spanish leader will be quietly delighted that the Catalan separatist is far away in Belgium, rather than in jail as a martyr. </p> </p> <p> Aug 11 6 mins read</p> </p> </p><p> <p> <img src="https://www.politico.eu/cdn-cgi/image/width=380,height=253,quality=80,onerror=redirect,format=auto/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/15/GettyImages-2160995328-scaled.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer"> </p> <p> EU to boycott Hungary’s foreign affairs summit <p> <p>Increasingly exasperated by Viktor Orbán’s obstruction of EU foreign policy, Brusselsis contemplating an unprecedented step to boycott Hungary’s foreign affairs summit next month.</p> </p> <p> Jul 15 3 mins read</p> </p> </p><p> <p> <img src="https://www.politico.eu/cdn-cgi/image/width=380,height=253,quality=80,onerror=redirect,format=auto/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/27/GettyImages-2157474838-scaled.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer"> </p> <p> Von der Leyen, Costa and Kallas bag EU top jobs <p> <p>European leaders reach agreement on names of next Commission and Council presidents and EU foreign policy service chief.</p> </p> <p> Jun 27 3 mins read</p> </p> </p> </p> </p> </p> </footer> Europe gives China a taste of its own trade medicine – POLITICO	查看 21142	国际政治经济学欧洲中心	2024-06-18 18:21:57 2024-09-07 17:06:11	word
2706063	有图 <p> <p> <p>Turun Eurooppa-foorumi</p> Eurooppa-foorumi tuo elokuussa Turkuun kansainvälisiä poliitikkoja <p> <p> <p>RONALD WITTEK</p><img src="https://www.ts.fi/static/content/pic_5_6362131_k9493838_1200.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer"> <p>Petteri Orpo puhui Suomen pääministerinä Euroopan parlamentille maaliskuussa Strasbourgissa. Pääministeri saapuu pitämään avajaispuheen Turun Eurooppa-foorumiin.</p> </p> </p> </p> <p> <p> <p> <p>Maksuttomaan tapahtumaan on kaikille kiinnostuneille vapaa pääsy ja foorumiin voi osallistua niin paikan päällä kuin verkossakin. </p> <p> <p>Hanna Kammi-Rahnasto</p> <p>TS Turku </p> </p> </p> <p> <p> <time>19.6.2024 12.07</time> </p> <p> <p> <p> Facebook Twitter Sähköposti Whatsapp LinkedIn </p> </p> </p> </p> </p> </p> <p> <p> <p>Suomen Eurooppa-poliittinen lippulaivatapahtuma järjestetään 28.–30.8. </p><p>Tapahtuma kokoaa yhteen merkittäviä vaikuttajia, asiantuntijoita ja päättäjiä sekä Suomesta että Euroopasta keskustelemaan ajankohtaisista kysymyksistä ja tulevaisuuden haasteista, kertoo Turun kaupunki tiedotteessaan. </p><p>Tapahtuma on kolmipäiväinen ja sen aikana osallistujat saavat kattavan katsauksen turvallisuusteemaan geopoliittisen, kestävän ja taloudellisen turvallisuuden näkökulmista. Pääministeri Petteri Orpo avaa Eurooppa-foorumin ja pitää samalla yhden pääpuheenvuoroista. </p><p>– Olemme palanneet Euroopan yhdentymisen perusteisiin: rauhan edistämiseen ja arvojemme puolustamiseen. Tähän ajatukseen sopii hyvin myös tämän vuoden teema turvallisen tulevaisuuden varmistamisesta, sanoo pääministeri Orpo.</p><p>Jatkuu mainoksen jälkeen </p><noscript><img src="https://www14.smartadserver.com/ac?out=nonrich&nwid=2998&siteid=215701&fmtid=64707&visit=m&tmstp=[timestamp]" rel="noopener noreferrer"></noscript><p> Mainos päättyy</p><p>Turun kaupungin järjestämässä Eurooppa-foorumissa on teemana tänä vuona turvallinen tulevaisuus. Keskusteluissa käsitellään muun muassa EU:n ulko- ja turvallisuuspolitiikkaa, NATO-EU-yhteistyötä sekä Suomen roolia EU:ssa ja NATOssa.</p><p>Turkuun saapuu myös kansainvälisesti merkittäviä poliitikkoja, kun näkökulmaa Italiasta foorumiin tuo maan entinen pääministeri Enrico Letta. Hän toimii myös yhtenä avajaistilaisuuden pääpuhujista. Lettan keväällä julkaisema raportti EU:n sisämarkkinoista on yksi kolmesta tulevan komission työohjelmaa suuntaavista keskeisistä raporteista. Muita paikalle saapuvia kansainvälisiä vieraita ovat muun muassa Euroopan komission tutkimus- ja innovaatiopääosaston pääjohtaja Marc Lemaître, Puolan Eurooppa-asioista vastaava valtiosihteeri Agnieszka Bartol, sekä Euroopan kansainvälisen poliittisen talouden keskuksen johtaja Hosuk Lee-Makiyama.</p><p>Muita vahvistettuja puhujia ovat muun muassa kehitysyhteistyö- ja ulkomaankauppaministeri Ville Tavio, entinen pääministeri ja SDP:n puheenjohtaja Paavo Lipponen, Suomen Pankin pääjohtaja Olli Rehn, Euroopan komission puolustusteollisuusosaston pääjohtaja Timo Pesonen.</p><p>Eurooppa-foorumiin voi osallistua niin paikan päällä kuin verkossakin. Kolme päivää kestävä foorumi on kaikille avoin ja se järjestetään Turun kaupunginteatterissa. </p> </p> </p> <p> <p> </p> <p>Seuraa ja lue uutisia aiheesta</p> Turun Eurooppa-foorumi Eurooppa Pääministeri Petteri Orpo Turku Kansainvälisyys Paikalliset Uutiset </p> Eurooppa-foorumi tuo elokuussa Turkuun kansainvälisiä poliitikkoja - Turun Eurooppa-foorumi - Turun Sanomat	查看 5415	国际政治经济学欧洲中心	2024-06-19 20:23:27 2024-09-07 17:06:11	word
2706062	有图 CPTPP, Latest news, Perspectives, UK trade policy Perspectives: ‘Global Britain’ is dead – long live a realistic UK trade policy <p> <time> 19/06/2024 </time> by David Henig Views: 451 </p> <p> <p><i>The Tory ‘Global Britain’ mantra is likely to disappear with their expected election defeat in early July. Despite some policy successes – most notably their accession Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership – London’s policy was driven by far too much wishful thinking. That is now ending.</i></p><p>In the aftermath of the 2016 Brexit referendum officials inside the United Kingdom government were upbeat about embracing an independent trade policy.</p><p>Freed from the European Union’s internal processes, some thought the UK could be quicker in concluding trade negotiations. Although the UK lacked the EU’s heft to secure concessions, there would also be fewer British asks on its partners.</p><p>A generally supportive population would allow the UK to be a relative free trade beacon.</p><p>What nobody knew in 2016 was how toxic the Brexit debate would become. Demands in the Conservative party for the minimum possible EU relationship corrupted trade policy.</p><p>Government advisers were required to believe that new trade barriers with the EU would have no economic impact.This led to a focus on tariff reduction in trade agreement negotiations.</p><p>There was some success. CPTPPaccession is a significant political achievement – even if its economic value is disputed. It reflects the development of a reasonably functioning trade policy team.</p><p>In general, though, Global Britain failed – given that traditional free trade agreements have not compensated for lost EU trade.</p><p>Gravity won – there is little evidence that UK trade has become more diversified.</p><p>Supply chains also won – given that UK goods exports performed poorly.</p><p>Interestingly, the Conservative’s manifesto abandons the previous target of having 80% of trade covered by FTAs. One major factor was the failure to reach a deal with a United States, which has turned against trade.</p><p>Not surprisingly, the opposition Labour Party, which is expected to form the next government, is also making few commitments to negotiate new agreements.</p><p>In truth, there was a level of innocence right from the start.</p>Undeniable post 2016 trade policy achievements<p>In 2016, the greatest challenge was replicating the existing EU trade agreements to which the UK was a party. This was largely achieved thanks to the eleven-month transition period in the customs union after the UK formally left the EU.</p><p>There was little UK-specific enhancement to these deals. Helpfully, in most cases, third countries allowed for cumulation of origin with the EU, although sometimes with a time limit – thus limiting supply chain trade disruption.</p><p>The deep single market or customs union-based relationships with countries from the European Economic Area and Turkey were replaced by simple new trade agreements.</p><p>New FTAs were agreed with Australia and New Zealand. These were always seen as the likeliest and they paved the way for a successful accession agreement to join the CPTPP.</p><p> Those who feared that CPTPP accession would force the UK to change its food regulations found their concerns to be misplaced. A potential clash on patent rules with membership of the European Patent Convention was also avoided.</p><p>Interestingly, the same senior official led both the FTA replica process and CPTPP accession.</p><p>There have been a handful of other achievements: new digital trade agreements with Singapore and Ukraine, and mutual recognition of financial services with Switzerland.</p><p>Though these were widely derided and not traditional trade deals, memoranda of understanding with US States showed some level of initiative.</p><p>Assembling and training a team of around 700 staff for a brand-new Department for International Trade – now Department for Business and Trade – has also taken a considerable amount of effort.</p>Naivety in the face of complexity<p>After 2016, Conservative Ministers of Trade thought trade deals would be automatically popular in the UK. They gave little thought to preparing stakeholders for the unpopular decisions that might be required to achieve them.</p><p>They also failed to understand the keenness of Australia to be the UK’s first new free trade agreement partner was another. </p><p>Then there was desperation to sign a first FTA – to show a Brexit dividend.</p><p>All of these mistakes came together in a deal widely seen as heavily favouring Australia. Such was the pushback among farmers that the agreement has since in effect been denounced by Cabinet Ministers involved, including now Prime Minster Rishi Sunak.</p><p>Although unlikely to gain power, the Liberal Democrat party pledged to renegotiate the agreement with Australia.</p><p>There were other mistakes.</p><p>Failing to understand the difficulties of negotiating with the US and India led to public statements that were never likely to be met. In particular, ministers struggled to handle US demands to talk about agricultural regulations.</p><p>Hopes that an independent Trade Remedies Authority would depoliticise issues of trade defence were also dashed. There had to be a revision of how this body works with government ministers</p><p>Scepticism of carbon border pricing among advisers led to an unrealistic attempt to avoid following the EU when it launched its carbon border adjustment mechanism. This policy too had to be reversed.</p><p>The UK has not developed a new investor protection policy, as this proved too difficult.</p><p>Before 2016, the UK was one of the governments that adjusted best to the difficulties of trade deals that emerged around the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership negotiations between the EU and the US. Ironically, these lessons were not learnt.</p>Opportunity cost, no discernible benefit<p>All reputable pre-Brexit forecasts suggested that global trade deals would not compensate for the economic loss of erecting barriers to the EU. These have proved to be broadly accurate.</p><p>More surprisingly to those modelling economic impacts is the recent finding that there has been no great increase in the share of trade with non-EU countries.</p><p>A more predictable outcome of post-Brexit trade modelling is that goods exports have suffered more than the traditionally strong British services sector.</p><p>There is as yet little evidence that new trade deals have had any significant impact on trade.</p><p>Reclaiming the UK’s independent seat at the World Trade Organization has proven equally ineffective. Though it has won praise for being well-meaning, the UK operation in Geneva has seemed to have no discernible objective.</p><p>The UK did not join the Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement, the replacement for the appellate body. This decision is seen as a low point with no credible explanation. </p><p>UK trade policy is scheduled for a WTO review next year, which will be a challenge for the new government.</p><p>Neither the Labour or Conservative party are now offering a significant program of trade agreements in their manifestos. </p><p>For Labour – although India is mentioned – the focus is most likely to be on the neighbourhood.</p><p>Ultimately the failure of Global Britain was the lack of recognition that regional and global trade are not opposites.</p><p>Expect a much more modest approach from the next government, though naivety on what can be done realistically has perhaps not completely disappeared.</p><p><img src="https://borderlex.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/2021-01-14-DAVID-HENIG-150x150.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer">David Henig runs the column ‘Perspectives’ on the politics of global trade for Borderlex. He is also a UK director at the think tank ECIPE.</p><p> Related</p> </p> <footer> <p> <img src="https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/cec48e92af5fa22fb7036067c0475bb8?s=70&d=mm&r=g" rel="noopener noreferrer"> <p> Author: David Henig </p> </p> </footer> Perspectives: ‘Global Britain’ is dead – long live a realistic UK trade policy - Borderlex	查看 8426	国际政治经济学欧洲中心	2024-06-19 20:55:06 2024-09-07 17:06:11	word
2706061	无图 Waiting for Draghi-defining Europe’s productivityproblemJudith Arnal MartÌnezSenior Research Fellowwww.realinstitutoelcano.org │ @rielcanoCompetitiveness is a broadly used terms (sometimes wrongly)The nine pillars of competitiveness, according to the Commissionwww.realinstitutoelcano.org │ @rielcanoAccess to private capitalSource: Statista and own elaborationVenture capital investment as % of GDP (2022)United States: more than 0.7%0.00%0.05%0.10%0.15%0.20%0.25%0.30%0.35%0.40%0.45%0.50%0204060801001202010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022UniÛn Europea Estados UnidosShare of private credit granted by the banking sector (% of GDP)Source: World Bank and own elaborationwww.realinstitutoelcano.org │ @rielcanoAccess to private capitalCapital markets’ structureEuropeanUnion United StatesEquity 21% 31%Investment funds 9% 16%Debt securities 2% 4%Pension funds andinsurance 33% 33%Cash and deposits 32% 13%Other financial assets 3% 3%Listing and tradingexchanges Settlement facilitiesEuropeanUnion 41 18UnitedStates 16 1Source: Financial Times and own elaborationFinancial assets of households (average between 2015 and 2021)www.realinstitutoelcano.org │ @rielcanoEnergySource: Statista and own elaborationPrice of natural gas in USD per BTU0.580.500.29 0.280.22 0.210.15 0.150.000.100.200.300.400.500.600.70Italy Poland Germany Japan Mexico France Spain United States0.0010.0020.0030.0040.0050.0060.0070.0080.00Mar '14July '14Nov '14Mar '15July '15Nov '15Mar '16July '16Nov '16Mar '17Jul '17Nov '17Mar '18Aug '18Dec '18Apr '19Aug '19Dec '19Apr '20Aug '20Dec '20Apr '21Aug '21Dec '21Apr '22Aug '22Dec '22Apr '23Aug '23Dec '23United States European UnionPrice of electricity in USD/Kw hour (June 2023)www.realinstitutoelcano.org │ @rielcanoResearch and innovationSource: Eurostat, St. Louis Fed and own elaborationExpenditure in R&D as % of GDP (2022)2.244.933.46 3.342.410123456European Union South Korea United States Japan Chinawww.realinstitutoelcano.org │ @rielcanoDigitalizationLargest global companies by market capitalizationSource: Companies Market Capwww.realinstitutoelcano.org │ @rielcanoTradeEU share in global exportsSource: Statista and own elaboration141516171819202002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021Many thanks for your attention Ten guiding principles to help cover the EU’s investment needs Waiting for Draghi – Defining Europe’s Productivity Problem	查看 2336	国际政治经济学欧洲中心	2024-09-07 17:05:46 2024-09-07 17:06:11	word
2706060	无图 20 June, 2024Waiting for Draghi –Defining Europe’sproductivity problemEU and US ProductivityWaiting for Draghi – Defining Europe’s productivity problemEU and US Productivity GrowthDecompositionWaiting for Draghi – Defining Europe’s productivity problemEU and US Total Factor ProductivityGrowthWaiting for Draghi – Defining Europe’s productivity problemEU GDP per Hour Worked Relative to theUSWaiting for Draghi – Defining Europe’s productivity problemConclusions- EU productivity has increased over time but less thancountries of similar size and economic development like theUS.- EU productivity performance has been slowed down by lowgrowth in Total Factor Productivity.- Some EU countries have managed to achieve higher rates ofproductivity growth.Waiting for Draghi – Defining Europe’s productivity problem Bruxelles, 20th April 2015 Waiting for Draghi – Defining Europe’s Productivity Problem	查看 810	国际政治经济学欧洲中心	2024-09-07 17:05:42 2024-09-07 17:06:11	word
2706059	有图 <p>Opinion</p><p>Chris Bryant, Columnist</p><p>Rich US Tourists Will Make Europeans Feel Poor<p>Europe’s high living standards are at risk unless it does more to boost productivity and wealth creation.</p></p><p><p><time>June 24, 2024 at 1:07 AM EDT</time></p></p><p><img src="https://assets.bwbx.io/images/users/iqjWHBFdfxIU/irapYJsPMpfE/v2/piUjdcePl62Og/160x160.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer"></p><p>By Chris Bryant</p><p>Chris Bryant is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist covering industrial companies in Europe. Previously, he was a reporter for the Financial Times.</p></p></p><p><p><p><svg><title>Facebook</title></svg><svg><title>Twitter</title></svg><svg><title>LinkedIn</title></svg><svg><title>Email</title></svg><svg><title>Link</title></svg></p><svg><title>Gift</title></svg></p><p><p><svg><title>Expand</title><g></g></svg></p><p><img src="https://assets.bwbx.io/images/users/iqjWHBFdfxIU/iDe6gOQe.Qy8/v1/-1x-1.webp" rel="noopener noreferrer"></p><p>Rich US tourists will make Europeans feel like poor cousins.</p><p>Source: White Lotus/HBO</p></p><p><p><p><svg><title>Facebook</title></svg><svg><title>Twitter</title></svg><svg><title>LinkedIn</title></svg><svg><title>Email</title></svg><svg><title>Link</title></svg></p><p><p><svg><title>Gift</title></svg>Gift this article</p></p></p><p><p>Before it’s here, it’s on the BloombergTerminal</p><p><svg><title>Bloomberg Terminal</title></svg> LEARN MORE</p></p><p><p><p><svg><title>Facebook</title></svg><svg><title>Twitter</title></svg><svg><title>LinkedIn</title></svg><svg><title>Email</title></svg><svg><title>Link</title></svg></p><svg><title>Gift</title></svg></p><p><p><p><p><svg><title>Bookmark</title></svg>Save</p></p></p></p><p>Wealthy Americans are again expected to flock to Europe in droves this summer, where they’ll splash out on pricey hotels at the Paris Olympics or in the Mediterranean, vie for Taylor Swift concert tickets and dispense generous restaurant tips. The tourism industry – which contributes 10% of European Union gross domestic product — will be delighted to welcome these big spenders. The locals, though, increasingly look like poor relations, at least in purely financial terms.</p><p>While money isn’t everything, Europe would benefit from some soul-searching: Its high living standards are rightly treasured and help explain why it attracts more than half of the world’s international tourists. But these hard-won achievements are at risk unless politicians do more to boost productivity and maintain prosperity.</p><p></p><p></p></p><p><p>Before it’s here, it’s on the BloombergTerminal</p><p><svg><title>Bloomberg Terminal</title></svg> LEARN MORE</p></p></p><p><p></p><p></p></p> Rich US Tourists Will Make Europeans Feel Poor - Bloomberg	查看 2678	国际政治经济学欧洲中心	2024-06-24 22:22:51 2024-09-07 17:06:11	word
2706058	无图 NEWS – ECIPE PRESS RELEASE – NEW POLICY BRIEFOn the Importance of Placeboand Nocebo Effects inInternational TradeBy Lucian Cernat, Head of Global Regulatory Cooperation and PublicProcurement Negotiations, DG TradeBrussels, 27 June 2024 - Trade agreements are powerful drivers of globaleconomic integration, leading to increased trade flows between countries.Usually, trade agreements are extensive documents with hundreds ofprovisions and different levels of enforceability. Are all these provisionsuseful, even those that are “best endeavours” and do not introduce legallybinding obligations on trading partners?This Policy Brief proposes a new methodological approach to evaluate theseeffects. The basic idea is inspired by the “placebo effect” in medicine: underthe right conditions, one can get positive results, even when the actualintervention is simply a “sugar pill”. Similarly, trade policies may have positiveeffects even when they lack strong, enforceable commitments. A placebotrade policy effect can emerge from “soft provisions” that bring positive tradeeffects, compared to the “do nothing” scenario.The main hypothesis behind this new methodology is that even if tradeinterventions lack the force to solve problems outright, a positive placeboeffect can arise if stakeholders believe that such a policy will generatefavourable market access. Conversely, a negative nocebo effect mightemerge when stakeholders are convinced that certain trade policy initiatives(notably FTAs) have a detrimental impact, despite undeniable evidence tothe contrary.The paper concludes with a few concrete examples illustrating both theplacebo and nocebo effects and identifies factors that may lead to morepositive outcomes from current and future trade policies.1Publication details: On the Importance of Placebo and Nocebo Effects in InternationalTrade, ECIPE Policy Brief No. 13/2024,Media inquiries: info@ecipe.org or +32 2 289 13 50 The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not reflect an official positionby the European Commission2 PR PB 13:2024 New Policy Brief: On the Importance of Placebo and Nocebo Effects in International Trade	查看 2053	国际政治经济学欧洲中心	2024-09-07 17:05:25 2024-09-07 17:06:11	word
2706057	有图 <p> Bremainers Ask… David Henig <p>Jun 28, 2024 \| Bremainers Ask, News</p><img src="http://www.bremaininspain.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/03_Henig.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer"> </p> <p> <p> <p> <p> <p> <p> <p>A leading UK authority on international trade policy, David Henig is Director of the UK Trade Policy Project at the European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE), where he examines the economic and trade implications of Brexit and broader UK policy. He writes regularly for Borderlex, serves as an Expert Adviser to the House of Lords International Agreements Committee and advised the former UK Trade and Business Commission.</p> </p> </p> </p><p> <p> <p></p><p> <p>Until March 2018 David was a trade specialist in the UK Government, including 3 years on TTIP talks, establishing the Department for International Trade after 2016 and coordinating work on major international bodies such as the OECD and G7.</p> </p> </p><p> <p> <img src="http://www.bremaininspain.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/ecipe-pt-100k.png" rel="noopener noreferrer"> </p> </p> </p><p> <p> <p> <p>David Eldridge: What should be the top priorities for the new government?</p><p>Behaving like a normal, competent government would be a good start across a lot of policy areas. Listening to a broad range of experts rather than just those sharing a narrow ideology would be an improvement. There are so many interlinked issues of public services and the economy that need fixing, and upping the rate of growth is so important to tackling them. Regulatory stability would be a great place to start: rather than creating uncertainty in goods, at least we should link to the EU. This would provide an incentive for investment. Removing barriers to trade in the neighbourhood is complementary to this. Then there are the sensitive domestic issues directly linked to growth, of which overseas students is the largest – we really should be taking advantage of being an attractive place to study, not complaining that people want to come to the UK.</p><p>Steven Wilson: How sustainable is the prospective new Labour government’s attitude towards Brexit?</p><p>In the first instance, seeking small steps towards improving the EU relationship isn’t just sustainable, it is essential. Our negotiating legacy since 2016 is toxic in Brussels, and there is a need to build trust that the UK will actually negotiate in good faith and keep commitments. Within Labour’s red lines of not rejoining the single market or customs union there is more that can be done beyond the manifesto commitments of a Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) deal, professional qualification recognition (actually very hard to achieve), and help for touring artists. Joining the pan-Euro-Med convention on rules of origin will help supply chain participation, and the EU wants a youth mobility scheme. A security agreement seems very likely. There’s more to be done on energy. Start to put all this in place first, and then I think there will then be a conversation on whether that is sufficient, or we need to revisit red lines or the referendum. I don’t think there is a way to short-cut this process.</p><p>Anon: Without rejoining the single market, does Labour have any hope of turning around the UK economy?</p><p>All countries have domestic policy choices that affect their trade and therefore economic performance, and the UK deciding to put up barriers to nearby markets is a handicap, but it doesn’t necessarily have to be fatal for economic performance. For example, there are sectors that are less affected, such as financial services, education or defence, and large companies are able to overcome barriers more easily. There is a scenario where we focus more on these to limit the economic damage, but of course there are also issues with these areas. We could also promise investors a level of stability while staying outside the single market, such as on regulation, and combine this with being generally more open to outsiders and neighbours and striking as many deals as we can across Europe. However, in general we are certainly making all of this harder for ourselves by giving our companies higher barriers to overcome than their counterparts in other countries.</p><p>Ruth Woodhouse: In terms of trade deals, to what extent do you believe Keir Starmer will, or should, give greater priority to negotiations with the EU than with the rest of the world?</p><p>Thanks to replicating trade deals that we were a party to as EU members, we have good coverage around the world. The priority therefore has to be to improve what we have in our own neighbourhood, not just with the EU but also Switzerland and Turkey, where we have active negotiations. By and large Free Trade Agreements alone do not significantly shift the economic dial, as they mostly benefit large commodity exporters facing high tariffs, which isn’t where our trade specialisms lie. What we should be looking for is deeper arrangements such as regulatory alignment and mutual recognition, plus whatever we can on services, and this is more likely with others in Europe. We should also stop fixating on a US trade deal, even before they were withdrawing from trade, they did not tend to give other countries many advantages.</p> </p> </p> </p><p> <p> <p> <img src="http://www.bremaininspain.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/‘Manifesto-on-Europe.png" rel="noopener noreferrer"> </p> </p><p> <p></p><p> <p>Lisa Burton: European Movement’s newly released ‘Manifesto on Europe’ asks the government to implement a detailed assessment of the impact of Brexit. What did you think of the document overall?</p> </p> </p> </p><p> <p> <p> <p>With the exception of the commitment on a detailed assessment of Brexit, which I don’t think is best carried out by government, other suggestions in the Manifesto seem broadly sensible and consistent with the general idea of improving relations as the obvious next step. Membership of regulatory agencies is a particularly sensible step, and builds upon the success of the UK remaining within the European standardisation community, an unheralded but really significant achievement for the British Standards Institution (BSI) which required extensive work with the UK government and various EU bodies at a time when relations were not good. I think such bodies will have to decide in the next few years whether to push outright for rejoining the EU, or to seek either a Customs Union or single market as a ‘halfway house’. I think there are drawbacks with all options but, until that debate can be had, then Brexit will continue to be something of a hidden subject.</p><p>Matt Burton: How far could regulatory alignment with the EU go in reducing trade friction at the borders?</p><p>By itself, regulatory alignment does not reduce trade friction at borders, though it has an immediate benefit in that companies trading between the UK and EU do not have to meet two sets of regulations. Committing to similar regulations does open up the possibility of reduced or eliminated barriers subject to negotiations on mutual recognition agreements, which for food and drink products, which are always subject to the greatest level of inspections, could be significant. There isn’t a standardised form of such agreement, and hence it is hard to say exactly what may be included, but in general it should at least be possible to remove some frictions. This isn’t, however, an automatic process, and to even start such a negotiation there needs to be trust that both sides are committed. In general, industrial goods are subject to fewer checks than agricultural ones, but reducing barriers will still be helpful.</p> </p> </p> </p> </p> </p> </p> <p></p> </p> Bremainers Ask... David Henig - Bremain in Spain	查看 8195	国际政治经济学欧洲中心	2024-06-28 22:40:04 2024-09-07 17:06:11	word
2706056	无图 PolicyPaperThis policy brief examines the relationships between the European Union (EU) and its neighbouringcountries in financial services, with a particular focus on trade finance. Historically, European bankshave played a prominent role in this region, providing capital for business investments, and actingas intermediaries for financial services. They have been essential as correspondent banks, facilitatingthe trade finance necessary for international trade. Correspondent banking supports cross-bordertransactions and financial inclusion by enabling banks to access financial services in various juris-dictions.However, following the financial crisis, the EU reformed its financial services regulations, weakeningthese relationships in trade finance. In consequence, the role of EU correspondent banks and theirprovision of trade finance in neighbouring countries has declined. European banks have since with-drawn from the EU’s eastern rim and reduced their exposure in southern neighbouring countries.To better understand developments in financial services integration and the ability of operators inneighbouring countries to utilise financial services in the EU, this policy paper explores their accessto EU correspondent banking and trade finance. Additionally, it reviews current trade agreementsrelated to financial services between the EU and its neighbouring countries, and concludes with pol-icy recommendations for European policymakers to facilitate financial integration with the EU andmitigate risks of neighbouring countries distancing themselves further from the EU.Overcoming Barriers: How the EU Can ImproveTrade Finance Access for Neighbouring CountriesTrade FinanceCorrespondent BankingFinancial and Insurance ServicesSOUTHERN NEIGHBOURHOODEASTERNPARTNERSHIPWESTERN BALKANSTÜRKIYEEnhanced Trade AgreementsMiFIRCapital Markets UnionCRD V/CRR IIMiFID I/IIMicrofinanceAdequacy DecisionsRegulatory CooperationAccess to Funding2PolicyPaper1. How trade finance worksTrade finance is vital for facilitating international tradeby providing financial instruments that mitigate the risksassociated with cross-border transactions. This field iscrucial for managing challenges such as currency fluctu-ations, political instability, and the risk of non-payment,which are inherent in international trade for both import-ing and exporting firms. It is estimated that approximately80% of global trade is supported by trade finance.1Risk mitigation is a primary function of trade finance,protecting sellers from the risk of non-payment. Tradefinance also enhances access to international markets byimproving the creditworthiness of companies throughinsurance or third-party guarantees, making it easier forfirms, especially small and medium-sized enterprises(SMEs), to obtain credit. Furthermore, trade finance facili-tates improvements in cash flow by allowing sellers to re-ceive payments earlier based on agreed-upon credit terms,which is particularly important for businesses requiringsignificant upfront investments due to their productionand sales cycles. Payment assurance is another key aspect,ensuring that payments are made, goods are delivered asexpected, and contractual terms are adhered to.Common instruments used in trade finance include Lettersof Credit, which are commitments by a bank on behalf ofthe buyer to pay the seller, provided the terms specified inthe Letter of Credit are met. Bank Guarantees offer a safetynet, covering losses if a buyer fails to meet the contractterms. Trade Credit Insurance protects sellers from therisk of non-payment by buyers, covering both commercialand political risks. Factoring and forfaiting involve sellingreceivables at a discount, helping companies free up capitaltied up in invoices. The role of government through ExportCredit Agencies is also significant in trade finance. Theseagencies provide substantial support, with the EuropeanCommission reporting €362 billion in aggregate nominalrisk exposure and an ofÏcially supported loan portfolio of€85 billion in 2020.21 World Trade Organization. “Trade finance and SMEs: Bridging the gaps in provision.” Geneva, 2016. OMC \| Online Bookshop (wto.org)2 Schlögl, Lukas, David Pfaffenbichler and Werner Raza . “Aligning European export credit agencies with EU policy goals.” European Parliament, Brussels,2023. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EXPO_IDA(2023)7025903 European Commission. “Capital markets union 2020 action plan: A capital markets union for people and businesses.” Brussels, 2024. https://finance.ec.europa.eu/capital-markets-union-and-financial-markets/capital-markets-union/capital-markets-union-2020-action-plan_en4 Bank for International Settlements. “Basel III: international regulatory framework for banks.” Basel, 2024. https://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3.htm5 EuropeanUnion. Directive (EU) 2019/878 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2019 amending Directive 2013/36/EU as regardsexempted entities, financial holding companies, mixed financial holding companies, remuneration, supervisory measures and powers and capital conser-vation measures. Brussels, 2019. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2019/878/oj/den?locale=en6 European Union. Regulation (EU) 2019/876 Regulation (EU) 2019/876 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2019 amending Reg-ulation (EU) No 575/2013 as regards the leverage ratio, the net stable funding ratio, requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities, counterpartycredit risk, market risk, exposures to central counterparties, exposures to collective investment undertakings, large exposures, reporting and disclosurerequirements, and Regulation (EU) No 648/2012. Brussels, 2019. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2019/876/oj7 European Council. MiFIR and MiFID II: Council adopts new rules to strengthen market data transparency. European Council, 2024. https://www.consil-ium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/02/20/mifir-and-mifid-ii-council-adopts-new-rules-to-strengthen-market-data-transparency/The EU has introduced numerous obligations for financialmarkets and the banking sector, categorised into pruden-tial and transparency requirements. These regulations anddirectives aim at ensuring market stability and safety. Thisframework is part of a broader initiative known as the Cap-ital Markets Union (CMU), which seeks to deepen and fur-ther integrate the capital markets across EU member states.The CMU is an EU policy initiative launched in 2015 aimedat mobilising capital across Europe. Its goal is to strengthenthe connection between savings and economic growth, andto bolster the European economy by making it easier forcompanies, particularly SMEs, to raise capital. The CMU2020 action plan outlines 16 legislative and non-legislativemeasures to deepen the integration of financial services.These measures focus on fostering a resilient economicrecovery, improving access to financing, and integratingnational capital markets within the EU.3Prudential obligations were implemented in response tothe global financial crisis, in line with the Basel III inter-national regulatory framework for banks. The aim was tostrengthen global financial market stability.4 These re-quirements are designed to help banks withstand liquidityshocks and effectively absorb losses, particularly throughconstraints on their leverage capacity relative to equity.Furthermore, environmental, social, and governance risksrequirements , were introduced by the Capital Require-ments Directive in 2020 (CRD V) and the Capital Require-ments Regulation in 2021 (CRR II).5 6To enhance transparency, the EU has implemented di-rectives such as the Markets in Financial InstrumentsDirective (MiFID II) and regulations like the Markets inFinancial Instruments Regulation (MiFIR). These initia-tives standardise, requirements for financial firms, therebyincreasing transparency across financial markets.7 Theyimprove the consolidation and disclosure of trading data,providing investors with comprehensive informationon prices, volumes, and transaction times, and therebystrengthening market data transparency.3PolicyPaperThe European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR)8plays an important role in regulating high-risk productssuch as derivatives. It mandates that detailed informationabout derivative contracts be reported to the EuropeanSecurities and Markets Authority (ESMA).Under MiFID I, the European Commission has the authori-ty to determine whether the regulatory systems of non-EUcountries are equivalent to the EU’s own standards.9 Thisinvolves assessing whether these countries enforce rulesthat are as stringent as the EU’s prudential and businessconduct regulations outlined in MiFID II/MiFIR and CRDIV/CRR. Additionally, the Commission must evaluatewhether these non-EU countries have an effective systemfor recognising EU investment firms according to the EU ́slegal standards.Although Article 15 of MiFID II, which previously allowedthe Commission to restrict or suspend market access fornon-EU firms that did not meet EU standards, has beenremoved, the Commission’s role in making equivalencedecisions remains crucial.10 Failure in doing so could jeop-ardise EU firms’ access to non-EU markets. To pass theequivalence test, non-EU countries must align their regu-latory frameworks with MiFID II standards, which may notalways be suitable due to different local conditions.112. How trade finance impacts tradeEfÏcient trade finance systems boost trade by reducingtransaction costs and ensuring capital availability , whichis especially crucial for SMEs involved in cross-bordertrade. The cornerstone of such a system is the involvementof third-party financial institutions, such as banks or in-surance companies, that facilitate trade finance activities.8 European Union. Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on OTC derivatives, central counterpartiesand trade repositories Text with EEA relevance. Brussels, 2012. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2012/648/oj9 Through this it examines the authorization process, supervision, enforcement, capital requirements, governance, organisational requirements, conductof business rules, and rules on market transparency and integrity.10 Cf. Recital 41 MiFIR (https://www.esma.europa.eu/publications-and-data/interactive-single-rulebook/mifir-cloned/recital), which talks of highly differ-entiated and fragmented regimes, and Commission Staff Working Paper Impact Assessment accompanying the document Proposal for a Directive of theEuropean Parliament and of the Council on Markets in financial instruments (Recast) and the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament andof the Council on Markets in financial instruments, Brussels, 20.10.2011, SEC (2011) 1226, final (Impact Assessment MiFID II), p. 114. https://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/impact/ia_carried_out/docs/ia_2011/sec_2011_1226_en.pdf11 For additional information about EU financial, insurance, sustainability regulations, and investment programs cf. Annex 1.12 Serena Garralda, José Maria and Garima Vasishtha(. “What drives bank-intermediated trade finance? Evidence from cross-country analysis.” InternationalJournal of Central Banking, 2019, vol. 15(3). https://ideas.repec.org/a/ijc/ijcjou/y2019q3a7.html13 European Investment Bank. Ten years of the Vienna Initiative 2009-2019, Publications OfÏce. Luxemburg, 2019. https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2867/19747514 International Chamber of Commerce (2023). ICC Trade Register report. Global risks in trade finance. Executive summary. Paris, 2023. https://iccwbo.org/news-publications/policies-reports/icc-trade-register-report/15 International Chamber of Commerce (2020). ICC Global Survey on Trade Finance. Paris 2020. https://iccwbo.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2020/07/2020-ICC-Global-Trade-Survey-vWeb.pdf16 Bank for International Settlements. Correspondent Banking – final report. Basel, 2016. https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d147.htm17 The analysis focused on Bosnia and Herzegovina and Türkiye from the neighbouring countries’ side, as both of them have witnessed similar declines incorrespondent banking relationships.18 Borchert, Lea, Ralph De Haas, Karolin Kirschenmann, and Alison Schultz. “Broken relationships: De-risking by correspondent banks and internationaltrade.” EBRD Working Paper No. 285. London, 2023. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4658618Research indicates that disruptions to banks and the avail-ability of trade finance significantly impact exports andimports, resulting in decreasing trading activities.12In the EU’s neighbourhood, the availability and sophisti-cation of trade finance tools are unevenly distributed, withCentral and Eastern European Countries serving as a primeexample. Businesses in regions with strong global bankingconnections often have better access to these tools.13 Localand regional banks face significant challenges in adoptingadvanced mechanisms like supply chain financIcce due totechnological constraints and regulatory burdens, as high-lighted in the International Chamber of Commerce 2023report.14 These discrepancies contribute to variations inthe quality, cost, and overall accessibility of trade finance,which in turn affects trade volumes and the economicgrowth potential between the EU and its neighbours.Recent research has found that stricter regulatory enforce-ment under Anti-Money Laundering and Counter TerroristFinancing regulations has led to a surge in compliancecosts.15 This has prompted globally operating banks to re-consider their relationships with correspondent banks. As aresult, correspondent banks have reduced their presence involatile regions and removed certain banks from their net-works, deeming the operations with them inherently riskyor at least not cost effective.16 This resulted in a decline inthe availability of international payment and trade financeservices for local respondent banks and clients. The studyalso noted that correspondent banks experienced difÏcul-ties in “assessing cross border payment transactions, tradefinance and currency clearing.”17 The European Bank forReconstruction and Development (EBRD) partner bankshave lost a substantial number of corresponding bankingrelationships18 impacting their trade finance activities.4PolicyPaperAnother concerning factor is the EU Late Payments Direc-tive, designed to ensure timely payments, which presentschallenges in trade finance, particularly for supply chainfinancing.19 By enforcing stricter payment terms, thedirective restricts the flexibility that buyers and sellershave in managing working capital. This leads to increasedfinancing needs for SMEs, estimated at around EUR 2 tril-lion. Consequently, higher financing costs impact tradefinance by increasing the overall cost of doing businessand dampening trade activity.203. How trade finance impacts trade with theEU’s neighbouring countriesThis section begins with a comprehensive overview ofthe financial trade agreements between EU neighbouringcountries and the EU, highlighting significant gaps andthe lack of specific provisions related to trade finance. Italso outlines the limited scope of EU adequacy decisionsand concludes with an analysis of the decline of EUcorrespondent banks in neighbouring countries, whichnegatively impacts their ability to trade.The notable gaps in financial services provisions inthe EU’s agreements with its neighbourhoodThe EU has concluded Stabilisation and Association Agree-ments or Association Agreements (AAs) of varying depthswith all neighbouring countries. However, these agree-ments either lack dedicated provisions for trade finance orhave significant limitations in their commitments regard-ing financial services. At best, they include only a limitednumber of provisions related to financial services.Thus, the framework is more comprehensive and robustfor countries granted the prospect of EU membership.Regardless of the different stages of the accession process,candidates or potential candidates are expected to adhereto various legal instruments for the progressive adoptionof the acquis communautaire, which binds their commit-ment to establishing a functioning common market.Accordingly, the countries of the Western Balkans, as wellas Eastern Partnership countries, are governed by agree-ments that include a structured framework for financialservices regulation.19 European Commission. “Late Payment Directive.” Brussels, 2024. https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/smes/sme-strategy/late-payment-direc-tive_en20 Trade Finance Global. “The EU’s new tightrope walk on the Late Payments Regulation.” London, 2023. https://www.tradefinanceglobal.com/posts/the-eus-new-tightrope-walk-on-the-late-payments-regulation/21 Memorandum of Cooperation between the European Banking Authority (the ‘EBA’) and the Banking Agency of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovi-na, the Banking Agency of the Republic of Srpska, the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia, the Central Bank of Montenegro, the National Bankof Serbia, and the Bank of Albania. https://www.eba.europa.eu/sites/default/files/document_library/961955/Memorandum%20of%20Cooperation%20-%20EBA%20-%20SSE%20Authorities.pdf22 ibd., p.7.In contrast, financial services trade between the EU and itssouthern neighbourhood, which includes Mediterraneancountries without an accession perspective, is the leaststructured. This is reflected in the weaker provisions in theEuro-Mediterranean agreements.Western BalkansIn the case of the Western Balkans, the EU’s agreementswith Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Monte-negro, North Macedonia, and Serbia include provisionsfor cooperation in banking, insurance, and other finan-cial services. A core element of these agreements is thatboth parties agree to implement specific measures onhow legal entities operate within their respective territo-ries for prudential reasons, such as protecting investors,depositors, policyholders, or individuals to whom financialservice suppliers owe a fiduciary duty. This is to ensurethe integrity and stability of the financial system. Giventhe significant presence of European banking groups intheir territories, Western Balkan countries are particularlyinterested in regulatory and standards convergence withthe EU system.In 2015, Albania, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina,the Republic of Srpska, Montenegro, the Republic of Mace-donia, Serbia signed a Memorandum of Cooperation withthe European Banking Authority (EBA) “to develop concretearrangements for cooperation and exchange of informationbetween [their] authorities and the EBA.”21 Subsequently,in 2016, Kosovo signed a letter of adherence to the Mem-orandum of Cooperation. A key objective of the Memoran-dum is to align regulatory and supervisory standardswith those of the EU within an appropriate timeframe.22Eastern PartnershipWith the exception of Belarus and Azerbaijan, countriesfrom the Eastern Partnership have the largest and mostrobust set of provisions on financial services trade inthe form of AAs. These agreements include chapters onbanking, insurance, and other financial services cooper-ation. Notably, some agreements even include provisionsfor “new financial services.” Although the agreements donot specify what constitutes a new financial service, theyrecognise, both de jure and de facto, the evolving natureof technology. More importantly, these agreements ensurethat new financial services receive no less favourabletreatment than that provided to domestic financial servicesuppliers under the party’s domestic law.5PolicyPaperArmenia, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine have the newestand most advanced provisions on financial services, as allfour nations have taken steps towards further EU integra-tion, with all except Armenia being ofÏcial EU candidatecountries. Before granting candidate status, the EU signedDeep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTAs)with Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. These agreementsaim for the full liberalisation of most financial services.However, EU members were allowed to unilaterally specify,in separate annexes, the economic activities where theyreserve the right to national treatment or most-favourednation treatment. As a result, many reservations to na-tional treatment or most-favoured nation status are stillincluded in these treaties. This has resulted in a situationwhere full liberalisation has not been achieved, hinder-ing the development of a wider range of financial servicesaccessible to EU neighbouring countries (see Annex 2).The cases of Armenia, and particularly Georgia, Moldova,and Ukraine, warrant separate consideration. The EU hassigned AAs with these four countries, which include DCFTAswith Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. The AAs provide theoverall framework for political association and economicintegration, while the DCFTAs focus on the comprehensiveliberalisation of trade and economic integration. Theseagreements aim at fully liberalising most financial ser-vices, allowing EU members unilaterally to specify, inseparate annexes, the economic activities where they re-serve the right to apply national treatment or most-favoured nation treatment. Unlike other countries, thesefour nations have more in-depth and newer agreements,with the oldest being fully adopted in 2016. All four nationshave taken steps towards further EU integration, withall except Armenia being ofÏcial EU candidate countries.Southern NeighbourhoodFor nations signatory to the Euro-Mediterranean Associ-ation Agreements, including Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan,Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, and Tunisia,the commitment levels vary widely. While most of theseagreements include financial cooperation as one of theirobjectives, the majority focus on cooperation in finan-cial services primarily to counter money laundering andprevent criminal activities. Additionally, some agree-ments specify in more detail the areas on which financialcooperation should focus. For example, the agreementswith Algeria, Morocco, Lebanon, and Tunisia aim to fosterfinancial cooperation, facilitate economic reforms, upgradeinfrastructure, encourage private investment, and support23 KPMG International. ̋ EU financial services regulation. A new agenda demands a new approach.” Amstelveen, Netherlands, 2019. https://assets.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/hu/pdf/eu-financial-services-regulation.pdf24 Comunale, Mariarosaria, André Geis, Ioannis Gkrintzalis, Isabella Moder, Eva Katalin Polgar, and Li Savelin. ̋ Financial Stability Assessment for EU Candi-date Countries and Potential Candidates.” SSRN Electronic Journal. Elsevier Inc., New York, N.Y., 2019. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3454510job-creating activities. In the case of Algeria, the agree-ment specifically promotes the development of financialservices with an emphasis on creating SMEs.A significant distinction in the relationship between the EUand its southern neighbours is that, according to the EUtreaty, none of these countries is eligible for EU member-ship. Therefore, these agreements do not encompass com-pliance with the acquis communautaire. However, thereare exceptions with Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia, wherethe agreements with the EU include provisions for the ap-proximation of standards and rules between parties tostrengthen and restructure the financial sector. This mightsuggest the presence of the “Brussels Effect” in these coun-tries, particularly concerning trade in financial services.The limited scope of EU adequacy decisionsThe European Commission can enhance cross-border com-pliance and promote financial services trade by recognisingcertain parts of a third country’s regulatory framework asequivalent to that of the EU. This recognition is based on arisk assessment conducted by European financial authori-ties such as the EBA, ESMA, or the European Insurance andOccupational Pensions Authority. Subsequently, the Com-mission enacts implementing or delegated acts to conferlimited adequacy status.However, critics have pointed out that, in practice, thecurrent approach to adequacy decisions in the EU isfragmented. It consists of isolated provisions evaluatedseparately within different legislative acts. This handlingnot only lacks transparency but also results in a piecemealapproach to granting adequacy.23The Declining Role of EU Correspondent BanksIn the financial landscape of the EU and its neighbours,the banking sector has undergone considerable changesdriven by deleveraging, strategic withdrawals, mergers andacquisitions, and privatisation.24Specifically, in the Western Balkans, these changes weredriven by a reorientation of EU-based banks, which ownedmost shares in banks in EU candidate countries. The shareof assets held by EU banks in this region fell from 66% to57%, while those from other foreign banks rose from 12%to 19% between December 2013 and June 2018. This trendis even more pronounced over a longer span, from 2006 to2018, in Albania, Montenegro, and Serbia, where the shareof EU bank assets fell more sharply.6PolicyPaperThe largest market share losses were recorded among EUbanks in Montenegro (20 percentage points), Albania (14percentage points), Bosnia and Herzegovina (9 percent-age points), and Kosovo (7 percentage points) from 2013through 2018. In contrast, Serbia experienced this devel-opment by the end of 2006 and saw stabilisation fromthat point to 2013. Concurrently, the market share ofnon-EU foreign banks and, to a lesser extent, domesticbanks increased, reflecting a broader reconfiguration ofthe banking landscape in these regions. Non-EU banks inBosnia and Herzegovina increased their market share by13%, in Montenegro by 9%, and in Albania by 6% duringthe same period.This shift in market dynamics is linked to the delever-aging processes forced upon EU banks in the wake of theglobal financial crisis. Over time, this has led to a strategicwithdrawal from several markets, as many of the EU banksubsidiaries were sold off to local or other non-EU enti-ties.25 Between 2009 and 2017, there were nine major bankownership transactions in the Balkans involving EU banks.For instance, the Albanian operations of the National Bankof Greece were acquired by a local entity, and the Republicof Macedonia branches of Greek Alpha Bank were sold to aSwiss investor. Additionally, during the same period, therewere four such transactions in the Balkans involving USinvestors and three involving Turkish investors. Further-more, there were four transactions in the Balkans involv-ing new non-Western foreign entrants, such as investorsfrom the United Arab Emirates in Kosovo and Serbia.This underlines a long-term strategic realignment in thebanking sectors of the region, which was also accompaniedby a decline in EU correspondent banks in neighbouringcountries. In 2013, 75% of correspondent banks were basedin the US and Germany. This number dropped to 54% in2019. Between 2011 and 2018, Eastern Europe experienceda 21.1% decline in correspondent banks.26 To understandthe economic impacts of this reduced availability, a surveyconducted by the OfÏce of the Chief Economist and theTrade Facilitation Programme team at the end of 201925 International Monetary Fund. European Dept. (2017). ”3. Banking Challenges in the Western Balkans: Prospects and Challenges.” In Regional EconomicOutlook. November 2017 International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C., 2017. https://www.elibrary.imf.org/display/book/9781484319611/ch03.xml26 Rice, Tara, Goetz von Peter, G., and Codruta Boar. “On the global retreat of correspondent banks.” BIS Quarterly Review, Basel, 2020. https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt2003g.htm27 Including: Albania, Armenia, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Egypt, Georgia, Greece, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, the KyrgyzRepublic, Lebanon Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, North Macedonia, Romania, Serbia, Tajikistan, Tunisia, Türkiye, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, andthe West Bank and Gaza.28 Bank for International Settlements. “CPMI correspondent banking chartpack.” Basel, 2023. https://www.bis.org/cpmi/paysysinfo/corr_bank_data/chart-pack_2305.pdf29 De Haas, Ralph and Rudolf Putz. “Addressing compliance costs as a barrier to Correspondent Banking and Trade Finance.” Trade Finance Global, London,2023. https://www.tradefinanceglobal.com/posts/addressing-compliance-costs-as-a-barrier-to-correspondent-banking-and-trade-finance/30 World Bank. Withdraw from correspondent banking: where, why, and what to do about it. Working paper. The World Bank, Washington, D.C., 2015.https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/113021467990964789/withdraw-from-correspondent-bank-ing-where-why-and-what-to-do-about-it31 Regarding the following services: trade finance, cross-border payment transactions, and currency clearing.32 Ibid. World Bank, 2015 (FN30).revealed an average 24% reduction in correspondent banksbetween 2012 and 2018 across the EBRD regions.27 How-ever, the impact varied significantly among countries. Forexample, Türkiye saw less than a 15% drop, whereas inEgypt, Tunisia, and Ukraine, many correspondent bankingservices transitioned from smaller private banks to statebanks, likely because of their simpler and less costly com-pliance procedures.This trend continued until 2022, with Eastern Europe ex-periencing a total decline of 34% and Northern Africa see-ing a reduction of 37.4% in correspondent banking from2011 to 2022.28 These reductions have significantly impact-ed local banks’ abilities to access crucial financial services,such as payment transactions and currency clearing.Integrating banks from higher-risk regions into globalfinancial markets remains a challenge due to difÏculties inestablishing or maintaining correspondent banking rela-tionships, particularly for smaller banks. As highlighted bythe EBRD29, this limitation constrains these banks’ accessto necessary trade finance facilities, which are often onlyavailable through specialised international programmes.Additionally, the shift in correspondent banking sourcesis accompanied by higher transaction costs due to longerintermediation chains.30 Shifting correspondent bankingsources, which is a potential solution, incurs significantcosts. Negotiating with existing partners for increased ca-pacity takes time, disrupting business continuity. Findingnew channels is resource-intensive, and the terms maybe less favourable, often leading to higher transactionfees. EBRD research estimates a 35% increase on averagein costs for banks in the EBRD region between 2017 and2019.31This situation further highlights a broader concern: theconcentration of correspondent banking relationships.Smaller banks, particularly reliant on a single partner,become vulnerable to unilaterally imposed terms duringsource shifts.327PolicyPaperFIGURE 1: Change in correspondent banking in the EU neighbourhood, 2011 – 2022Source: Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and EBRD,graphic powered by Bing © GeoNames, Microsoft, OpenStreetMap, TomTom.33 De Haas, Ralph, Karolin Kirschenmann, and Alison Schultz. (2022).“Global payment disruptions and firm-level exports.” ZEW Discussion Paper Nr.22-067. ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, Mannheim, 2022. https://www.zew.de/en/publications/global-payment-disrup-tions-and-firm-level-exports-134 Crozet, MatÝeu, Banu Demir, and Beata Javorcik, “International Trade and Letters of Credit: A Double-Edged Sword in Times of Crises.” Research Article.IMF Economic Review, vol. 70. International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C., 2021. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41308-021-00155-335 Demir, Banuand Beata Javorcik. (2020). “Trade finance matters: evidence from the COVID-19 crisis.” Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 36 (Supple-ment_1). Oxford, 2020. S397-S408. https://academic.oup.com/oxrep/article/36/Supplement_1/S397/589902036 Claessens, Stijn, Omar Hassib, and Neeltje van Horen. “The role of foreign banks in trade.” Bank of England Working Paper No. 656. Bank of England,London, 2017. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2949783The challenges have also increased for local banks, par-ticularly in accessing US dollars and trade finance. In 2013,only 7% of banks reported difÏculties in accessing US dol-lars, but this escalated to 26% by 2019. Similarly, the difÏ-culty in accessing trade finance services increased from11% to 19%, and those reporting challenges in accessingpayment services rose from 5% to 13% during the sameperiod. About 10% of banks reported that their access tothe U.S. market was either critically impaired or fully cutoff due to the withdrawal of correspondent banks.Further analysis reveals that regions experiencing signif-icant reductions in correspondent banking activities haveseen a corresponding decline in their export capacities.33Firms located in towns and cities that have faced largedeclines in correspondent banking relationships are lesslikely to export, underscoring the critical role of corre-spondent banks in facilitating international trade throughessential financial services like letters of credit.Additionally, recent studies indicate that robust trade fi-nance mechanisms not only mitigate the negative impactson exports during economic crises34 but also enhance traderesilience in times of heightened uncertainty.35 The overallpicture suggests that regulatory and compliance obstaclesare increasing for trade finance. Reduced access to financein neighbouring countries lowers their export capabilities(see Annex 3 for more detail on EU neighbouring countries’trade finance systems).In the long term, businesses in neighbouring countries thatrely on trade finance face higher costs or reduced availabil-ity of credit, affecting their ability to engage in internation-al trade. This is particularly significant for neighbouringcountries with lower economic and financial development,where foreign banks facilitate trade through the availabilityof finance and trade finance-related products.36Percentage change in the number of active correspondent banks, 2011 – 2022-86 -37 128PolicyPaperEU banks offering trade finance services in the EU neigh-bourhood also encounter increasing competition fromalternative finance products, particularly as multinationalcorporations increasingly opt for open account transac-tions.37 The higher costs and administrative complexitiesassociated with documentary finance products are ulti-mately passed on to customers, making them less appeal-ing compared to simpler and more flexible alternatives.This situation requires EU banks to explore alternativesolutions for their clients and improve efÏciency.Moreover, EU banks are increasingly facing competitionin EU neighbouring countries from non-Western thirdcountries such as China and others. This adds to the pres-sure on EU banks to adapt and innovate to maintain theirmarket position.4. Which mitigation measures could the EUpursue to alleviate the negative effects ofEU financial regulations?EU policymakers should prioritise efforts to facilitate tradefinance contracts between neighbouring countries and EUbanks, including EU correspondent banks operating in theneighbourhood. This is desirable and important for theEU neighbourhood as limited access to EU correspondentbanking and trade finance hampers neighbouring coun-tries’ ability to maximise their export performance andincreases their dependence on alternative sources fromthird countries. By streamlining processes and reduc-ing barriers, policymakers can foster economic growth,enhance regional stability, and promote mutual prosperitywithin the EU neighbourhood.Our policy recommendations advocate for a broader ap-proach, urging the EU to actively pursue policies aimed atstrengthening the EU banking sector’s competitivenessin the neighbourhood. By offering key trade financingservices to these countries, the EU can support their tradeperformance while advancing its own economic interests.38This approach aligns with the goal of fostering regionaleconomic integration and promoting sustainable develop-ment across the EU neighbourhood.37 Open account transactions simplify the process by bypassing the complexities of document exchanges and banking obligations. However, they mayinvolve higher risks as they depend heavily on the trust between the parties involved.38 In formulating these policy recommendations, it is important to note that, while there is ample evidence of a general disintegration of the financial marketbetween the EU and its neighbourhood in recent years, key financial data on specific EU neighbouring countries is difÏcult to obtain and not alwayspublicly available.POLICY OPTION 1Increase of access to funding in EU neighbouringcountriesAccess to public and private funding plays a crucial role inshaping the availability of financial products and servicesfor businesses, in particular SMEs in the region. By increas-ing funding, more businesses, including those that typical-ly do not qualify for bank financing, could access financialservices, potentially boosting economic activity. It is rec-ommended that EU Free Trade Agreements include pro-visions for guarantee instruments. These instruments canreduce the collateral requirements for SMEs, extend loanterms, and lower borrowing costs, thus facilitating easieraccess to finance. Some successful implementations ofsuch instruments have been observed in the DCFTAs, whichhave also provided incentives to finance higher-risk SMEs.Moreover, there is a growing need for microfinance in theEU neighbourhood, which requires increased attentionfrom the European Investment Bank and the EBRD. Giventhat capital markets in many parts of the EU neighbour-hood are underdeveloped, expanding microfinance opera-tions could serve as a crucial support mechanism for eco-nomic development in these areas. By providing access tosmall-scale financial services, microfinance initiatives canempower entrepreneurs and small businesses, foster localeconomic growth, and contribute to poverty alleviationefforts in the region.POLICY OPTION 2Strengthening regulatory cooperation, informationexchange, and capacity buildingThe complex nature of trade finance, which often involvesnumerous paper-based transactions, presents significantchallenges in the interactions between the EU and neigh-bouring countries. The use of extensive documentation andvarying regulatory standards across borders increases therisk of errors, delays, and fraud, thereby hindering the seam-less flow of trade. Moreover, the complexity of these tradefinance products has resulted in declining interest amongSMEs, who often perceive them as overly complicated.9PolicyPaperTo address these issues, it is essential to enhance coopera-tion and streamline information exchange in cross-bordertransactions. This can be achieved through the followingmeasures:▪ Capacity building for local supervisors: Implementtargeted technical assistance programs to train localsupervisors. This will help align regulatory frameworksand interests of both home and host countries, particu-larly concerning the operations of euro-area banks inthese regions.▪ Establish robust local frameworks for investors:Strengthen the regulatory and supervisory frameworksin neighbourhood countries to create a more secure envi-ronment for investors.▪ Develop financial safety nets: Explore the establish-ment of comprehensive financial safety measuresfor banks operating in the neighbourhood countries,especially those that are subsidiaries of EU banks. Thesemeasures could include enhanced regulation and super-vision, lender of last resort facilities, deposit insurance,and effective bank resolution frameworks.These initiatives aim to reduce the complexity and associ-ated risks of trade finance, making it more accessible andappealing to SMEs, and ensuring a smoother flow of tradebetween the EU and its neighbouring countries.POLICY OPTION 3Expanding adequacy in neighbourhood countriesThrough special provisions included in some EU financialregulations, the European Commission has the authorityto designate parts of a third country’s regulatory frame-work as EU-equivalent. This is intended to facilitate cross-border compliance and increase financial services trade.However, currently, such recognition has been grantedonly in specific regulatory areas and to a limited number ofEU neighbouring countries. These countries include Bosniaand Herzegovina, Israel, the Republic of Macedonia, Serbia,and Türkiye. There is potential for expanding this recogni-tion to more neighbouring countries in the future.Furthermore, the current approach to adequacy decisionsis criticised for being a patchwork of isolated and indi-vidually evaluated adequacy provisions across differentlegislative acts. This fragmented and often opaque way ofgranting partial adequacy could be replaced by a more uni-fied adequacy framework. Such a framework could addressthese issues by streamlining and clarifying the process.To reduce the complexity of adequacy-granting proce-dures and avoid supervisory conflicts with non-EU states,enhancing bi- and multilateral regulatory cooperationcould be beneficial. Such cooperation would help har-monise regulatory standards and prevent frictions betweendifferent regulatory systems, thereby facilitating smootherinternational trade and compliance.POLICY OPTION 4Modernising and enhancing trade agreements withneighbouring countriesOur analysis highlights significant shortcomings in thefinancial services provisions within the EU’s current tradeagreements with neighbouring countries. Notably, thereis a lack of direct references to trade finance. Even in theagreements with Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine,which do specify mutual commitments to liberalise tradein financial services, the annexes to these agreements con-tain reservations from EU member states regarding liber-alisation. Additionally, issues related to national treatmentor most favoured nation status.These limited provisions and extensive reservationsin current EU association agreements may impede thedevelopment of financial services trade between neigh-bouring countries and the EU. Our policy recommendationfocuses on elevating ambitions and reassessing prioritiesin the EU’s trade negotiations with these countries, wherefinancial services have often been overlooked. We suggestenhancing discussions and collaboration, particularly inareas such as commercial establishment and operationalfreedom. Strengthening these aspects of the agreementswill improve access to competitive financial services,including trade finance, for the EU ́s neighbouring region.This approach aims not only to close the current gaps butalso to foster a more robust economic relationship throughimproved and more inclusive financial service provisions.10PolicyPaper5. Concluding remarksRecent EU financial regulations have heightened the riskprofile of trade finance provided by the EU, resulting in sig-nificant cross-border implications, particularly in its neigh-bouring regions. Our research indicates a notable shift, withEuropean banks diminishing their roles as correspondentbanks for trade finance in these neighbouring countries.Consequently, countries in the EU neighbourhood arefacing decreased access to EU correspondent banking andtrade finance, which hinders their ability to maximise ex-port performance. This reduction in access is particularlychallenging for countries with lower economic and finan-cial development, as they rely heavily on trade finance.As a result, they are facing higher costs and reduced avail-ability of credit.To mitigate these negative impacts, EU policymakersshould take several actions:▪ Increase access to funding: Boosting funding in neigh-bouring countries is crucial to support their economicactivities and alleviate financial constraints.▪ Strengthen regulatory cooperation and capacity building: Enhancing regulatory cooperation and informationexchange, along with building local capacities, will facili-tate smoother financial interactions and promote stability.▪ Expand regulatory adequacy: Broadening the scope ofregulatory adequacy will help align standards and simpli-fy compliance procedures across borders, enhancingfinancial integration.▪ Modernise and deepen trade agreements: Updatingand deepening trade agreements, including improvinginstitutional mechanisms, is essential to fostering a morerobust economic relationship and promoting trade andinvestment flows.Moreover, in the face of increasing competition from thirdcountries like China, it is vital for the EU to support its bank-ing sector in becoming more competitive in offering tradefinance services in its neighbourhood. Acting on these rec-ommendations is not only crucial for enhancingthe EU’s economic ties with these countries but also toprevent the risk of these nations drifting further apartfrom the EU politically.EpilogueThis paper is the fourth in a series, following the papers “The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) and Its Border Effects:How Can Europe Become a Better Neighbour?”, “The Extraterritorial Impact of EU Digital Regulations: How Can the EU MinimiseAdverse Effects for the Neighbourhood?” and “Beyond Barriers: Rethinking CAP to Enable Agricultural Export Diversity in the EUNeighbourhood”. It is part of the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s project “Sovereign Europe: Strategic Management of Global Interdepen-dence” under the Europe Programme. The series aims to provide an in-depth analysis of the “Brussels Effect” on the EuropeanUnion’s neighbouring regions during a time of escalating geopolitical tensions.The series focuses on assessing the costs of the EU’s internal market regulations on neighbouring areas engaged in trade with theEU. These regions include the Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, Kosovo),Türkiye, the Eastern Partnership countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine), and the Southern Neighbour-hood (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia).A central aspect of this research is to propose methods to mitigate the regulatory burden on these neighbouring regions. This analy-sis is crucial as the EU seeks to maintain its regional influence amidst growing competition, notably from China. This work builds onthe study “Keeping friends closer: Why the EU should address new geoeconomic realities and get its neighbours back in the fold”on the EU’s economic relationships with its neighbours across various sectors like trade in goods and services, finance, technology,knowledge exchange, infrastructure, and labour mobility. Notably, the foundational study on interconnectivity was recognised byForeign Affairs as one of the top ten books of 2023.This research is conducted in partnership with the European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE), demonstrating ourcommitment to providing insightful and actionable policy recommendations.11PolicyPaperANNEX 1After the 2008 financial crisis, policymakers worldwidecommitted to tightening regulations on financial mar-kets to prevent a recurrence of similar incidents. The EUpursued this objective through a comprehensive set oflegislative and non-legislative acts that affected all partsof the financial services sector.EU Banking RegulationsIn the banking sector, the Basel Committee on BankingSupervision, an international body comprised of majorcentral banks and responsible for establishing widelyfollowed standards on banking regulation, took the leadin defining a new global regulatory framework. In 2010,it released an initial version of the Basel III accord, whichwas finalised in 2017 and included new measures to sta-bilise the global banking sector. The EU has been graduallyimplementing the agreement through its own legislation,a process expected to conclude by 2024.While doing so, the EU has assumed an expansive role withthe Single Rulebook, which aims at harmonising bankingstandards and supervisory practices across member statesin line with the enhanced Basel III framework. This initia-tive also contributes to advancing the completion of theSingle Market in financial services.Two essential components of the Single Rulebook are theCapital Requirements Directive (CRD) and Capital Require-ments Regulation (CRR). The latest iterations, CRD VI andCRR III, will finalise the implementation of Basel III inthe EU from January 1st, 2025. These regulations impose“prudential requirements for capital, liquidity and creditrisk for investment firms and credit institutions” (CRR)as well as “capital buffers, bankers’ remuneration andbonuses, prudential supervision and corporate governance”(CRD). The goal is to improve financial sector stability byincreasing the amount of equity required per asset, therebymaking particularly risky financial instruments less prof-itable. The capital requirements “apply at group, parentand subsidiary levels if the group’s head ofÏce is locatedin the EU.” This could lead to substantial extraterritorialeffects on non-EU subsidiaries of EU groups.The Single Rulebook also serves as the foundation for theBanking Union, a political programme initially proposedin the 2012 Four Presidents’ Report and subsequently en-dorsed by the Euro Area Summit and the European Council.A Commission roadmap set out the Banking Union’s archi-tecture, which today consists of three pillars: (1) strongerprudential requirements for banks, (2) rules for managingfailing banks, and (3) improved protection for depositorsin all member states. So far, only the first two pillars havebeen realised through the Single Supervisory MechanismRegulation (SSM) and Single Resolution Mechanism Reg-ulation (SRM) respectively. The SSM unifies banking su-pervisory approaches across the EU under the auspices ofthe ECB and EBA to better tackle cross-border spill-oversand contagion related to bank crises. The SRM introducesEU-wide rules and institutions for resolving major failingbanks and mandates the creation of a European resolutionfund, financed by the banking sector. The third pillar, theCommission’s European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS),has faced significant legislative delays since its proposal in2015 and was only revived as late as 2023. The EDIS aimsto provide a more uniform and robust deposit insurancescheme across the EU, thereby further safeguarding depos-itors and enhancing financial stability.EU Capital Markets RegulationsSince the 2008 financial crisis, the regulatory landscapegoverning EU capital markets has undergone gradualtightening. Key legislative measures include the Marketsin Financial Instruments Directive II (MiFID II) and theMarkets in Financial Instruments Regulation (MiFIR),initially adopted in 2014. MiFID II underwent amend-ments in 2021, and further modifications were applied toboth MiFID II and MiFIR in 2024. These regulations serveas the cornerstone for ensuring transparency and orderlyexecution of securities trades in the EU. Depending on theinterpretation, MiFID II has varying degrees of extraterri-torial effects concerning reporting obligations.Additional key legislation in the field of derivatives is theEuropean Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR), firstintroduced in 2012 and subsequently twice amended in2019EMIR mandates the reporting of derivative contractsto trade repositories, aiming to enhance transparency inover-the-counter derivative markets for better prudentialoversight. This reporting obligation extends to non-EUbranches of EU contracting counterparties and, in somecases, to transactions between two non-EU entities if thereis a “direct, substantial and foreseeable effect within theUnion or where such an obligation is necessary or appro-priate to prevent the evasion” of the regulation.Following the initial legislative acts, the 2015 Five Pres-idents’ Report highlighted the need for a comprehensiveCapital Markets Union (CMU) to facilitate cross-border ac-cess to capital within the EU. The aim was to broaden safeand unified financing options beyond bank loans for Eu-ropean consumers, companies, and investors. In response,the Commission released an action plan later that year,which was followed by an extensive number of legislativeacts. Together with the Banking Union, this set of mea-sures is intended to contribute to the goal of completingEconomic and Monetary Union in the long-term.12PolicyPaperIn addition to MiFIR/MiFID and EMIR, significant actsrelated to the CMU include the Securitisation Regulationof 2017 and the 2019 Investment Firms Regulation (IFR)/Investment Firms Directive (IFD). The former “introducescommon rules on due diligence, risk retention and trans-parency for all securitisations”. The latter two acts tailorrisk management requirements for investment firms moreprecisely to their business model: originally, all investmentfirms were required to comply with CRD/CRR regulations.The IFR/IFD was introduced in order to address the specificrisk profiles of non-systemic investment firms, in contrastto CRD/CRR-covered credit institutions and systemic in-vestment firms. Similar to CRD/CRR, the capital require-ment provisions of IFR/IFD can have extraterritorialeffects, particularly on offshored subsidiaries belonging togroups headquartered inside the EU.Indeed, several other EU capital markets legislation haveextraterritorial influence. These include the 2011 Alterna-tive Investment Fund Managers Directive, the 2012 ShortSelling Regulation, the 2014 Market Abuse Regulation /Criminal Sanctions for Market Abuse Directive, and the2016 Benchmark Regulation. Each of these regulationsplays a crucial role in ensuring transparency, integrity, andstability in the European financial markets, with implica-tions extending beyond the EU borders.EU Payments RegulationThe Payment Services Directive (PSD), initially introducedin 2007 and later amended in 2015to become PSDII, regu-lates all payments in the EU. Its objective is to set commonstandards to integrate the European payment market andensure that both traditional banks and non-bank providersoperate on equal footing. PSDII also prioritises consumerprotection in financial services. The directive is soon to beamended a second time (PSDIII) and additionally comple-mented by a regulation to address contemporary develop-ments.For cross-border euro credit transfer and direct debit, theSingle European Payment Area (SEPA) regulation sets outdetailed procedures to streamline transactions. SEPA hasextensive extraterritorial implications, as nine non-EUcountries voluntarily take part in facilitating paymentswith euro-using countries. Yet, so far, none of these areneighbourhood countries.EU Insurance RegulationsThe European insurance prudential regime is primarilygoverned by the Solvency II directive, established in 2009and fully implemented in 2016 after several delays due toadjustments. Replacing regulations dating back to 1973,Solvency II was in response to the need for a modern,risk-based approach to mitigate potential risks within theinsurance sector following the 2008 financial crisis. Itsgoal is to safeguard insurance policyholders and benefi-ciaries by imposing comprehensive requirements on insur-ance providers across three main pillars: (1) quantitativestandards for asset/liability valuation and capital adequacy,(2) qualitative requirements related to governance and riskmanagement, and, (3) supervisory reporting and publicdisclosure requirements.In the absence of adequacy status, Solvency II has extra-territorial effects, such as extended requirements (e.g. oncollateral) for non-European Economic Area (EEA) providerscompared to their EEA counterparts, thus potentiallyreducing their competitiveness within the EEA market.Additionally, it requires EEA-based insurance groups toadhere to EU standards for calculating global group sol-vency, even for non-EEA subsidiaries. This imposes addi-tional compliance costs and may require non-EEA sub-sidiaries to maintain extra assets to comply with differingevaluation methods, both within and outside the EEA.EU Sustainability RegulationsAs part of the European Green Deal, the EU has begun tointroduce various legislative acts related to sustainablefinance. These measures, such as the Sustainable FinanceDisclosure Regulation and the Corporate SustainabilityReporting Directive, obligate financial services providers tocollect and publish information on their activities’ sus-tainability. This is intended to spur green investments, butit simultaneously imposes significant compliance costs onfinancial services providers in the EU, hence potentiallyreducing capabilities to expand to (as of now) less-profitabledeveloping markets in the neighbourhood. Additionally,activities designated as unsustainable under these regula-tions can have negative implications for businesses. Thiscould further complicate efforts to engage with companiesin, neighbouring countries that may not meet the samesustainability criteria as EU countries due to their differentdevelopment levels.EU Investment ProgrammesTo enhance financial access in neighbourhood countries,the Commission has launched the Neighbourhood Invest-ment Platform (NIP). This platform is designed to boostfunding for capital-intensive infrastructure projects intransportation, energy, environment, and social develop-ment, while also encouraging investments in SMEs. TheNIP aims at using combined funds from the EU budget andindividual member states to secure loans from Europeanfinancial institutions and investments from the partnercountries to the European Neighbourhood Policy them-selves.13PolicyPaperAdditionally, the European Commission, in partnershipwith several European development banks, introduced theEuropean Union Initiative for Financial Inclusion. Its goalis to tackle the challenge of limited access to financial re-sources encountered by micro-, small-, and medium-sizedenterprises in the southern neighbourhood, a significantbarrier to economic development in the region.ANNEX 2The following section details the various financial servicereservations of each EU member state, providing an over-view of the specific requirements for conducting businesswithin these regions. Notably, the reservations of most EUmember states focus on the necessity for financial serviceproviders to acquire licenses to operate within individualEU member states. In some cases, it is necessary to obtaina license to be legally incorporated within the Europeancountry in question, and in others, founders or directorsmust be residents of specific EU countries.TABLE 1: ArmeniaCountry Requirement/Reservation DetailsEU Investment Fund Depositories Firms must be registered within the EU to act as depositories.Austria Insurance and Management Foreign insurance firms need to be comparable to local entities; two Austrian resi-dents must manage an ofÏce branch.Bulgaria Insurance Foreign insurers need home country authorization and local incorporation; perma-nent residence requirements for key positions.Cyprus Securities Brokerage Only Cyprus Stock Exchange members can undertake securities brokerage, withfirms needing to comply with local law.Germany Insurance Foreign insurers can only engage in certain insurances via a German branch or EU/German subsidiary.Denmark Insurance Foreign insurance companies need a Danish license to operate, with specific require-ments for air transport insurance.Estonia Financial Institutions Head of a firm or subsidiary must be an Estonian resident; foreign managementproportionality in insurance joint stocks.Hungary Insurance and Financial Services Direct insurance must be through a local branch; restrictions on foreign financialentities’ involvement in asset management.Italy Financial Services Specific measures for financial advisors; firms managing central securities must beincorporated in Italy and comply with EU law.Portugal Financial Services Financial services and pension management require Portuguese incorporation andauthorization; foreign insurers need prior experience.Poland Insurance Insurance intermediaries must be locally incorporated; main branch operation andfinancial data transfer requirements.Romania Market Operations Market operators must be Romanian legal entities, with exceptions for authorizedinvestment firms.Slovenia Financial Services and Insurance Restrictions on national and most favoured nation treatment for banks and financialinstitutions in specific insurance sectors.TABLE 2: GeorgiaCountry Requirement/Reservation DetailsEU Investment Fund Depositories Firms must be registered within the EU.Austria Insurance Management Requires two Austrian residents in management; foreign insurance firms must becomparable to local entities.Bulgaria Insurance Authorization and Residency Foreign insurers need authorization and local incorporation; residency requirementsfor key management.Cyprus Securities Brokerage Only Cyprus Stock Exchange members allowed; must comply with Companies Law.Finland Insurance and Banking Residency;LicensesHalf of a pension insurance firm’s board must have EU residency; general agent ofGeorgian firms must have Finnish residency. Licenses for pension insurance notgranted to foreign insurers.Greece Representative OfÏces Firms can only establish ofÏces where they have a physical presence.Ireland Collective Investment Firms Registration Must be incorporated in Ireland or another member state; stock exchange registra-tion requires Irish authorization.↓14PolicyPaperItaly Central Securities Management andUndertakings for Collective Investmentsin Transferable Securities (UCITS)Firms must be incorporated in Italy; several reservations regarding UCITS.Lithuania Asset Management and Pension FundDepositoriesFirms dealing in asset management and pension funds must be incorporated andhave a branch in Lithuania.Portugal Financial Services and Pension Manage-mentRequires incorporation and authorization in Portugal; foreign insurers must demon-strate experience.Poland Insurance Intermediaries Must be locally incorporated.Slovakia Insurance Business Conduct Insurance firms must operate through a local subsidiary; certain investment entitiesmust have a specific legal form.Spain Insurance Authorization Insurers must be previously authorized in their country of origin.Sweden Insurance Broking Firms and SavingsBanksNon-incorporated insurance broking firms must establish a branch; founders ofsavings banks must be EU natural persons.TABLE 3: MoldovaCountry Requirement/Reservation DetailsEU Investment Fund Depositories Firms must be registered within the EU.Austria Insurance Management Requires two Austrian residents in management; foreign insurance firms must becomparable to local entities.Bulgaria Insurance Authorization and Residency Foreign insurers need authorization and local incorporation; residency requirementsfor key management.Cyprus Securities Brokerage Only Cyprus Stock Exchange members allowed; must comply with Companies Law.Finland Insurance and Banking Residency;LicensesHalf of a pension insurance firm’s board must have EU residency; general agent ofMoldovan firms must have Finnish residency. Licenses for pension insurance notgranted to foreign insurers.Greece Representative OfÏces Firms can only establish ofÏces where they have a physical presence.Ireland Collective Investment Firms Registration Must be incorporated in Ireland or another member state; stock exchange registra-tion requires Irish authorization.Italy Central Securities Management andUCITSFirms must be incorporated in Italy; several reservations regarding UCITS.Lithuania Asset Management and Pension FundDepositoriesFirms dealing in asset management and pension funds must be incorporated andhave a branch in Lithuania.Portugal Financial Services and Pension Manage-mentRequires incorporation and authorization in Portugal; foreign insurers must demon-strate experience.Poland Insurance Intermediaries Must be locally incorporated.Slovakia Insurance Business Conduct Insurance firms must operate through a local subsidiary; certain investment entitiesmust have a specific legal form.Spain Insurance Authorization Insurers must be previously authorized in their country of origin.Sweden Insurance Broking Firms and SavingsBanksNon-incorporated insurance broking firms must establish a branch; founders ofsavings banks must be EU natural persons.TABLE 4: UkraineCountry Requirement/Reservation DetailsEU Investment Fund Depositories Firms must be registered within the EU.Bulgaria Insurance Authorization and Residency Foreign insurers need authorization and local incorporation; residency requirementsfor key management.Croatia Settlement and Clearing Services No reservations except for services provided by the Central Depositary Agency(CDA).Finland Insurance Company Board Residency Half of the board of a pension insurance firm must have EU residency; similar require-ment for other insurance companies.Hungary Asset Management to Pension Funds Reserved for firms with seats in an EU member state.Italy Pension Fund Resources Management Firms must harmonize with EU law and have their head ofÏce in the EU; foreignintermediaries restricted from investment services.Lithuania Depositories of Pension Funds Only firms registered in Lithuania can act as depositories.Portugal Financial Services and Pension Manage-mentMust be done by incorporated and authorized Portuguese firms, excluding insur-ance.15PolicyPaperANNEX 3Table 5: Banking Systems in EU neighbouring countries – Latest Research from 2021, ITA, USA3939 ITA. Country Commercial Guides. Available at: https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guidesEU Neighbouring CountryOverview ContextBosnia andHerzegovina(BiH)1. At present, there are 21 commercial banks, with 13 operating in the Federation ofBosnia and Herzegovina and 8 in the Republika Srpska (RS) entity.2. Despite the sector’s stability, banks in BiH face challenges in adequately meetingthe financing needs of the private sector. This is primarily attributed to higher riskaversion, conservative policies and lending preferences where consumer credittends to go to government-owned enterprises.The conservative lending policies drivenby EU parent companies can significant-ly limit the availability of trade finance.This restrictiveness can stifle the growthof enterprises that need funding toexpand into international markets, thusimpeding overall trade development.Georgia 1. Both foreign investors and domestic clients in Georgia have access to credit fromcommercial banks. However, interest rates tend to be high, which may pose achallenge to borrowers.2. Several international development agencies, such as the International FinanceCorporation (IFC), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD),U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), and Asian Develop-ment Bank (ADB), have lending programs aimed at providing credit to both largeand small businesses in Georgia.3. Georgia’s financial landscape also includes microfinance organisations, with 38such organisations operating in the country as of the beginning of 2021. Theseorganisations specialise in providing small credit to businesses, particularly tothose in need of micro-financing solutions.The high interest rates charged by banksmake borrowing costly, which can deterbusinesses, especially smaller ones, fromtaking up loans to finance internationaltrade. This reduces the overall tradevolume and the economic benefits thatcome with an active trade sector.Moldova 1. Moldova hosts four foreign banks, with OTP Bank (Hungary), Banca Transilvania(Romania), and Erste Bank (Austria) being the most prominent among them.2. Unlike in western countries, banks in Moldova play a minor role in the country’seconomic development and business activity.3. Moldovan banks are well-capitalised; however, they offer limited consumer andbusiness financing options. This contrasts with their high capitalisation levels.4. Interest rates in Moldova remain elevated compared to the region, potentiallyposing a challenge for borrowers seeking affordable credit.5. Banks in Moldova typically require collateral to issue credit, which may hinderaccess to financing for individuals and businesses without sufÏcient assets.6. Moldova’s securities market is underdeveloped, limiting investment opportunitiesfor banks. The underdevelopment of the stock market restricts options for long-term investments, leading to limited diversification of bank assets.The minor role that banks play in eco-nomic development and the restrictivecredit issuing practices can be particu-larly detrimental for trade finance. Busi-nesses may find it difÏcult to secure thenecessary funding for trade transactions,leading to missed opportunities andslower economic growth. And the needfor substantial collateral to securefinancing is a significant barrier forbusinesses without large asset bases,potentially excluding them from enga-ging in trade.Algeria 1. Six state-owned banks hold a commanding 90 percent share of the commercialmarket in Algeria, indicating a significant presence of government-controlledinstitutions in the banking sector.2. Algeria also hosts international banking entities such as Citibank, HSBC, BNPParibas, Société Générale, and other French and Arab banks, which contribute tothe diversity of banking services available in the country.3. Services like Western Union provide international money transfer facilities inAlgeria, offering convenience for individuals and businesses engaged in cross-border transactions.4. Despite the availability of international money transfer services, barriers tooutward transfers and an outdated domestic transfer system pose challenges forinvestors, potentially hindering the efÏciency of financial transactions.5. The central bank has introduced a system allowing payments via checks andcredit cards, but its adoption is still nascent. Few vendors have integrated thesepayment methods into their operations, limiting their widespread use.6. Checks and credit cards are not common forms of payment in Algeria, with lim-ited acceptance among vendors. Additionally, the presence of ATMs is sparse andmainly found in select locations such as five-star hotels.7. In late 2010, the Algerian government retroactively banned commercial loansfrom foreign shareholders made after July 2009, indicating regulatory measuresaffecting foreign investment and financial activities in the country.Strict regulations from the possibilityof EU-imposed policy and an outdatedfinancial infrastructure in Algeria createinefÏciencies in financial transactions,complicating the trade finance process.This can delay trade operations andincrease transaction costs, makingtrade less competitive. The dominanceof state-owned banks and the sparsepresence of EU-afÏliated banks can leadto a lack of diverse and innovative finan-cial products tailored for trade finance.This limits the ability of businesses toutilize effective and competitive tradefinancing options.PolicyPaperJune 2024© Bertelsmann Stiftung, GüterslohBertelsmann StiftungCarl-Bertelsmann-Straße 256 \| D-33311 GüterslohPhone +49 5241 81-0www.bertelsmann-stiftung.orghttps://globaleurope.euResponsibleStefani WeissAuthorsFredrik ErixonPhilipp LamprechtDyuti PandyaOscar du RoyElena SistoRenata ZilliStefani Weiss*Authors are afÏliatedwith ECIPE.The authors are thankful forresearch assistance providedby Lars Vandelaar, University ofMünster, and Caden Umansky,American University.EditingGabriele Schöler, GevelsbergDesignInes Meyer, GüterslohPrintingHans Gieselmann Druck und Medienhaus,BielefeldCover© ii-graphics - stock.adobe.comDOI 10.11586/2024087 _ Overcoming Barriers: How the EU Can Improve Trade Finance Access for Neighbouring Countries	查看 71677	国际政治经济学欧洲中心	2024-09-07 17:05:15 2024-09-07 17:06:11	word
2706055	有图 <p><p><p><svg></svg><p>Share this post</p><p><p><source srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/w_120,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fdea8e774-5671-4add-b3e5-646a30dc2e43_1600x902.png"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/w_120,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fdea8e774-5671-4add-b3e5-646a30dc2e43_1600x902.png" rel="noopener noreferrer"></p><p>Agreement on Top Jobs<p>whatsupeuenglish.substack.com</p></p><p><svg><g></g></svg></p><p>Copy link</p><p><svg><g></g></svg></p><p>Facebook</p><p><svg><g></g></svg></p><p>Email</p><p><svg><g></g></svg></p><p>Note</p><p><svg><g><circle></circle><circle></circle><circle></circle></g></svg></p><p>Other</p></p></p></p><p>Agreement on Top JobsBut also — New alliance in the EP, Competition, Ukraine<p><p><p>Jul 02, 2024</p></p></p><p><p><svg><g><svg></svg></g></svg><p><p><p><svg></svg><p>Share this post</p><p><p><source srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/w_120,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fdea8e774-5671-4add-b3e5-646a30dc2e43_1600x902.png"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/w_120,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fdea8e774-5671-4add-b3e5-646a30dc2e43_1600x902.png" rel="noopener noreferrer"></p><p>Agreement on Top Jobs<p>whatsupeuenglish.substack.com</p></p><p><svg><g></g></svg></p><p>Copy link</p><p><svg><g></g></svg></p><p>Facebook</p><p><svg><g></g></svg></p><p>Email</p><p><svg><g></g></svg></p><p>Note</p><p><svg><g><circle></circle><circle></circle><circle></circle></g></svg></p><p>Other</p></p></p></p></p><svg><g><svg></svg></g></svg></p><p>Share</p></p></p><p><p></p><p><p>Hi! Today is 2 July, and here is your EU news summary for the week. Feel free to share this newsletter with friends and colleagues, and follow us on Twitter and LinkedIn.</p><p>The Briefing<p><svg></svg></p><p>It"s a deal. During the European Council meeting on June 27-28, EU heads of state and government reached an agreement on the allocation of top jobs within European institutions.</p><p><p><source srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fdea8e774-5671-4add-b3e5-646a30dc2e43_1600x902.png><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fdea8e774-5671-4add-b3e5-646a30dc2e43_1600x902.png" rel="noopener noreferrer"></p><p><svg></svg></p>The cast: António Costa, Ursula von der Leyen, and Kaja Kallas © European Council</p><p>TRIO • In a shorter-than-expected European Council meeting on 27-28 June, the three expected candidates for the EU’s top jobs were nominated. In all likelihood, the agreement had been sealed before the summit even began thanks to the work of negotiators.</p><p>Former Portuguese Socialist Prime Minister (2015-2023) António Costa was selected to become the next European Council president after Charles Michel. The main obstacle to his nomination was a corruption scandal that forced him to resign in November 2023. Investigations are still ongoing, but Costa has not been formally charged with any crime, unlike many former Portuguese government members. This investigation was used by the European People"s Party (EPP, center-right) to question Costa’s nomination. Costa is a social-democrat of the conservative kind with an orthodox economic policy stance.</p><p>Ursula von der Leyen was nominated for a second term at the helm of the European Commission. By choosing her, European leaders opt for stability.</p><p>Current Estonian liberal Prime Minister Kaja Kallas was appointed as the EU’s top diplomat (High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, if you like long titles). Little known outside Estonia until 2022, the outbreak of the war in Ukraine propelled Kallas to the forefront of European politics. Her appointment sends a powerful signal to Russia — where she is persona non grata — and to Ukraine — "unwavering" is the adjective used by Volodymyr Zelensky to describe Estonia’s support to Ukraine under Kaja Kallas.</p><p>While this allocation of jobs in this way was deemed the most likely outcome, it was not clear at all times that it would pan out like this. Italian Prime Minister Georgia Meloni was determined to grab one of the posts for her political group, the far-right ECR. The result, as it stands now, reflects that she has not been unable to assert herself.</p><p>Even the EPP had to backtrack on its aspirations. In a burst of self-confidence bolstered by its electoral win, EPP leaders had demanded to split up the position of the Council president between the EPP and S&D, with a candidate of each party taking up the role for half of the five-year term of the Council presidency.</p><p>NOT SO FAST • For António Costa, the matter is already settled: other institutions have no say in choosing the European Council President. His nomination is therefore equivalent to his election. Costa will take office on December 1 for a two-and-a-half-year term that will likely be renewed.</p><p>However, Ursula von der Leyen and Kaja Kallas will need approval from the European Parliament.</p><p>Ursula von der Leyen must obtain the Parliament’s approval (simple majority) in a vote expected to take place on July 18. Things are still very uncertain for her: the newly elected European Parliament is more hostile to her than the previous one. The coalition between the EPP, Social Democrats (S&D, center-left), and liberals (Renew Europe) that supported her in 2019 has weakened. This requires her to team up with either the Greens or the ECR. In 2019, the vote was decided by just 9 votes.</p><p>The entire College of Commissioners (including Kaja Kallas) will be approved in a single vote (simple majority) after hearings in the European Parliament.</p><p>If Ursula von der Leyen does not get approved in Parliament and a new candidate for Commission president has to be put forward, there could be repercussions on the whole top jobs package, meaning the other candidates as well.</p><p>MELONI • The trio did not obtain unanimous approval within the European Council — the three candidates only needed a qualified majority to be nominated.</p><p>Giorgia Meloni abstained from voting for Ursula von der Leyen and voted against the nominations of António Costa and Kaja Kallas.</p><p>Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán voted against von der Leyen, in favor of Costa, and abstained for Kallas.</p><p>This is very much a protest vote from the Italian Prime Minister, who is dissatisfied that her political group"s impressive performance in the European elections does not translate into any ability to claim a top job. Unlike Viktor Orbán, whose support is not vital, Ursula von der Leyen cannot ignore the warning sent to her by Giorgia Meloni.</p><p>It is also possible that Meloni"s abstention is actually a staged move that allows her to not lose face. It is not unlikely that Giorgia Meloni will gradually align herself behind von der Leyen.</p><p>In Case You Missed It<p><svg></svg></p><p>NEW ALLIANCE • On 30 June, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán announced a new political alliance in the European Parliament between his party, Fidesz, the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) and the Czech Action of Dissatisfied Citizens (ANO) movement (which left Renew a few days ago). Its name? The Patriots of Europe.</p><p>The three parties reach the threshold of 23 members required to form a new parliamentary group within the Parliament. However, they still need to gather MEPs from at least 4 other countries if they want to have the right to form a proper political group (which will allow them to obtain additional funding and claim positions of chairs of parliamentary committees, among other things).</p><p>COMPETITION • DG Competition has been working overtime. On 24 and 25 June, Margrethe Vestager’s teams launched proceedings against Apple and Microsoft.</p><p>DG COMP has sent preliminary findings to Apple, accusing it of preventing app developers from freely steering users to third-party channels on the App Store.</p><p>This is a first under the Digital Markets Act (DMA). Preliminary findings are a preparatory step before the opening of a formal procedure.</p><p>The Digital Markets Act (DMA) requires gatekeepers like Apple to allow app developers to freely promote (on Apple"s App Store) purchase options other than via the App Store.</p><p>The Commission preliminarily considers that Apple is not complying with this obligation under the DMA. As it stands, developers face many barriers to promote third-party offerings, and Apple charges a commission that is deemed excessive on sales generated through this channel.</p><p>Still regarding Apple, the Commission has opened an investigation for non-compliance with the DMA concerning Apple"s new contractual conditions for developers. DG Competition’s objections concern:</p><p>The 50-cent commission per download charged by Apple on downloads of apps from 1 million users</p><p>The many steps required to install app stores competing with Apple"s App Store on iPhone devices</p><p>The eligibility conditions applicable to developers to be allowed to offer alternative app distribution channels</p><p>Finally, the Commission has sent a statement of objections to Microsoft, which could lead to the adoption of a formal decision.</p><p>The Commission considers that the tied sales of Teams and Office 365/Microsoft 365 could constitute an abuse of dominant position.</p><p>After the Commission opened the procedure in July 2023, Microsoft changed its distribution model for Teams, offering Windows suites without Teams. The Commission considers that these changes are not sufficient.</p><p>This procedure is not based on the DMA but on classic competition law.</p><p>UKRAINE • Ukraine and Moldova have officially started their EU accession negotiations, nearly two and a half years after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The EU’s foreign ministers met on 25 June with Ukrainian and Moldovan officials to launch the process.</p><p>However, Ukraine"s path to accession is likely to be arduous:</p><p>According to the FT, the EU is preparing to reintroduce customs duties on certain Ukrainian agricultural products by using the "emergency brake" for the second time, which allows the EU to limit imports of certain agricultural products from Ukraine when they exceed certain thresholds. After oats, sugar and eggs are targeted. These measures — which aim to appease European farmers — suggest a difficult integration of Ukraine into the single market.</p><p>Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán also represents an obstacle. As Hungary takes over the rotating EU Council presidency, European leaders are looking for ways to bypass the Hungarian prime minister, who is currently blocking 7 EU decisions that could provide €6.6 billion to Ukraine.</p><p>Despite these obstacles, Ukrainian minister Olha Stefanishyna remains optimistic and hopes for "a dynamic accession process as early as 2025", when the Polish presidency of the Council of the EU starts.</p><p>What We’ve Been Reading<p><svg></svg></p><p>In an ECIPE Policy Brief, Matthias Bauer, Dyuti Pandya, Vanika Sharma and Elena Sisto advocate prioritising legal harmonization to deepen the single market.</p><p>In Transitions, Lelde Luika reflects on Latvia, twenty years after the Baltic country became a member of the EU.</p><p>This edition was prepared by the What’s up EU team, including Paul Healy, Lidia Bilali, Marwan Ben Moussa and Maxence de La Rochère. See you next week!</p></p><p><p><svg><g><svg></svg></g></svg><p><p><p><svg></svg><p>Share this post</p><p><p><source srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/w_120,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fdea8e774-5671-4add-b3e5-646a30dc2e43_1600x902.png"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/w_120,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fdea8e774-5671-4add-b3e5-646a30dc2e43_1600x902.png" rel="noopener noreferrer"></p><p>Agreement on Top Jobs<p>whatsupeuenglish.substack.com</p></p><p><svg><g></g></svg></p><p>Copy link</p><p><svg><g></g></svg></p><p>Facebook</p><p><svg><g></g></svg></p><p>Email</p><p><svg><g></g></svg></p><p>Note</p><p><svg><g><circle></circle><circle></circle><circle></circle></g></svg></p><p>Other</p></p></p></p></p><svg><g><svg></svg></g></svg></p><p>Share</p></p><p><svg></svg>PreviousNext<svg></svg></p></p> Agreement on Top Jobs - What's up EU	查看 12944	国际政治经济学欧洲中心	2024-07-02 23:28:38 2024-09-07 17:06:11	word
2706054	有图 <p> <p> <p> News </p> <p> Explainer: When will the FTC call time on Big Tech’s talent-gutting of AI start-ups? <p>When is hiring a start-up’s co-founders, licensing its technology and absorbing its intellectual property not an acquisition? When Big Tech is trying to avoid regulators. </p> <p> Lara Williams July 2, 2024 </p> <p> <p> Share Copy Link Share on X Share on Linkedin Share on Facebook </p> </p> <p> <p> <p> <img src="https://www.verdict.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/saudi-shutterstock_2288078367.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer"> For Chinese AI start-ups, foreign investments such as these are crucial for accessing new markets. Credit: GamePixel/Shutterstock.com. </p> <p>On Monday (1 July), reports emerged of Amazon’s ‘acquihire’ of Adept AI co-founders and team members, in another example of a Big Tech company choosing talent-gutting an AI start-up over a straightforward acquisition. The question remains to what extent this type of investment can be considered a type of backdoor merger with significant impact on market competition?</p><p>In March 2024, Inflection AI and Google Deepmind co-founder Mustafa Suleyman was hired to lead Microsoft‘s consumer AI division, Microsoft AI, along with most of the start-up’s staff. It was reported that Microsoft paid around $650m for access to the start-up’s models and legal protections. At the time, Inflection had a $4bn valuation.</p><p> <p>Go deeper with GlobalData<p><img src="https://pr-fr-json-b2b-gdm-figaro1.pantheonsite.io/pharmaceutical-technology/wp-content/themes/goodlife-wp-B2B/assets/img/report.png" rel="noopener noreferrer"></p><p>Reports</p>Innovation in Artificial Intelligence: AI-assisted coding platforms <p>GlobalData</p> <p><img src="https://pr-fr-json-b2b-gdm-figaro1.pantheonsite.io/pharmaceutical-technology/wp-content/themes/goodlife-wp-B2B/assets/img/report.png" rel="noopener noreferrer"></p><p>Reports</p>Future Artificial Intelligence (AI) Unicorns <p>GlobalData</p> <p> <svg> </svg> Data Insights <p> The gold standard of business intelligence. </p> <p> Find out more <svg> </svg> </p> </p> </p><p>Related Company Profiles<p>Amazon.com IncMicrosoft CorpAlphabet IncNVIDIA CorpView all</p></p><p>Acquihiring in the tech industry is nothing new, but the implications of these practices have become especially relevant today with the significant investments in AI from Big Tech companies, according to GlobalData principal thematic analyst Laura Petrone.</p><p>“Acquihiring on AI will be closely watched by antitrust regulators, as it is part of Big Tech’s strategy to bolster its position in AI while avoiding antitrust scrutiny,” said Petrone. While Amazon‘s move on Adept AI can be viewed as a way to avoid this scrutiny, Petrone said it remains to be seen whether it will succeed.</p><p>The EU has taken the lead in holding Big Tech to account. In April, a European Commission review of Microsoft’s $10bn investment in OpenAI cleared the company of charges of acquisition by stealth. Nevertheless, the Commission’s executive vice-president, Margrethe Vestager, warned that Big Tech will remain under the close watch of EU regulators.</p><p>Vestager’s US counterpart, Federal Trade Commission (FTC) chair Lina Khan, has long been on a crusade to use her influence to enact similar business reform in the US. In January, the FTC issued orders to Microsoft, OpenAI, Amazon, Anthropic and Alphabet requiring them to provide information on recent GenAI investments and partnerships for “better internal understanding of these relationships and their impact on the competitive landscape”.</p><p> How well do you really know your competitors? <p>Access the most comprehensive Company Profiles on the market, powered by GlobalData. Save hours of research. Gain competitive edge.</p> View profiles in store <p> <p> <img src="https://www.verdict.co.uk/wp-content/themes/goodlife-wp-B2B/assets/images/company-profile-unit.png" rel="noopener noreferrer"> </p> <p> Company Profile – free sample <p> Thank you! <p>Your download email will arrive shortly</p> </p> <p> Not ready to buy yet? Download a free sample <p>We are confident about the unique quality of our Company Profiles. 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Our services are intended for corporate subscribers and you warrant that the email address submitted is your corporate email address. </p> </form> </p> </p> </p> </p>Will the FTC stop backdoor acquisitions? <p>The FTC inquiry only covers GenAI, and it is only an order to provide information so far, notes Hosuk-Lee Makiyama, director of the European Centre for International Political Economy. “US antitrust law has quite a low and imprecise threshold for triggering antitrust action, but I doubt FTC can prove that Amazon’s Bedrock AWS [Amazon’s cloud GenAI offering] has such a degree of market control that it has effective control over market prices or is able to bar new market entrants,” said Makiyama.</p><p>“The AI market is also quite complex since many minor actors build their models on OpenAI… so if Microsoft and OpenAI begin to go after smaller downstream players that build upon their models, I think the FTC might react,” he added.</p><p>Microsoft’s Inflection AI acquihire coupled with its OpenAI partnership – the latter having already yielded clear revenue-boosting advances across its product line – means that Microsoft CEO Satya Nadella now has what is arguably the world’s most high-powered single AI cohort to hand, enabling him to potentially dominate huge AI-driven global markets, according to senior GlobalData analyst Mike Orme.</p><p>Amazon’s Adept AI acquihire is small by comparison and simply demonstrates Amazon’s efforts to claw back ground lost to its peers on AI. “Inflection managed to raise over $400m capital funding on a valuation of $1bn from Amazon itself, NVIDIA and Microsoft among others – this will not be the case at Amazon, which has seemingly ‘acquihired’ the Adept top team to boost its AGI R&D operation as it struggles to catch up in GenAI,” said Orme.</p><p>Under the deal, Amazon is to ‘non-exclusively’ license some of Adept’s ‘agent’ technology used to automate enterprise workflows, but little else is known about details of the deal it has struck with what’s left over at Adept.</p><p>What remains of Inflection after Microsoft’s talent-gutting of the AI start-up will cease to work on what was its core product, a high EQ co-pilot, and will have to work on developing lines in customised commercial applications instead, according to Orme. “Whether Microsoft will subsidise this is unknown, but it is obvious why it wanted the Inflection top team in-house,” he added.</p><p>Orme agrees that Lina Khan’s FTC is unlikely to pursue Amazon over its Adept acquihire, while it might well go for Microsoft over Inflection and OpenAI. “Microsoft has been very careful to install a non-voting board member at OpenAI with peripheral threats from the regulators,” said Orme.</p><p> <p> <p> <p> <p> <img src="https://www.verdict.co.uk/wp-content/themes/goodlife-wp-B2B/assets/images/newsletter-new.svg" rel="noopener noreferrer"> </p> <p> Sign up for our daily news round-up! <p>Give your business an edge with our leading industry insights.</p> </p> </p> <p> Sign up </p> </p> </p> <footer> <p> <p> Share Copy Link Share on X Share on Linkedin Share on Facebook </p> </p> </footer> </p> </p> </p> <p> <p> Go deeper with GlobalData <p> <img src="https://pr-fr-json-b2b-gdm-figaro1.pantheonsite.io/pharmaceutical-technology/wp-content/themes/goodlife-wp-B2B/assets/img/report.png" rel="noopener noreferrer"> </p> <p> <p>Reports</p> Innovation in Artificial Intelligence: AI-assisted coding platforms <p>GlobalData</p> </p> <p> <img src="https://pr-fr-json-b2b-gdm-figaro1.pantheonsite.io/pharmaceutical-technology/wp-content/themes/goodlife-wp-B2B/assets/img/report.png" rel="noopener noreferrer"> </p> <p> <p>Reports</p> Future Artificial Intelligence (AI) Unicorns <p>GlobalData</p> </p> <p> <svg> </svg> Data Insights <p> The gold standard of business intelligence. </p> <p> Find out more <svg> </svg> </p> </p> </p> <p> Related Company Profiles<p> Amazon.com Inc Microsoft Corp Alphabet Inc NVIDIA Corp View all </p> </p> </p> <p> More Relevant View More <p> <p> <img src="https://www.verdict.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/chipban-shutterstock_2200286089-1024x576.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer"> <p> Industry news </p> US tightens export controls on chipmaking and quantum tech </p> <p> <img src="https://www.verdict.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/shutterstock_2388175837.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer"> <p> Analyst Comment </p> AI is transforming mobile gaming </p> <p> <img src="https://www.verdict.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/shutterstock_2175440909-2.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer"> <p> Analyst Comment </p> AI role in education is increasing </p> <p> <img src="https://www.verdict.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Lunchables_A.I._vs_K.I._Campaign_HERO_Image-1024x576.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer"> <p> Features </p> Food marketing: Can AI connect with humans? </p> </p> </p> </p> Big Tech is talent-gutting AI startups	查看 37155	国际政治经济学欧洲中心	2024-07-02 23:36:23 2024-09-07 17:06:11	word
2706053	无图 NEWS – ECIPE PRESS RELEASE – NEW POLICY BRIEFA Strategy for a CompetitiveEurope: Boosting R&D,Unleashing Investment, andReducing Regulatory BurdensBy Andrea Dugo and Fredrik Erixon, Research Associate and Directorat ECIPEBrussels, 4 July 2024 - The EU stands at a crucial economic juncture.Economic growth in Europe's mature economies has stagnated, withproductivity and other indicators of economic vitality showing poor results.Public debt is alarmingly high in several countries, and the region faces newfiscal demands due to an ageing population, conflicts and war, and the energytransition. To reverse its economic decline, Europe must adopt a new strategyfor improved competitiveness.As part of this strategy which allows to close the productivity gap with the US,this Policy Brief identifies three key areas which could boost growth in Europe:1. Expansion of R&D Expenditure: Governments should increase funding foruniversities and improve conditions for private R&D investments. Meetingthe EU’s R&D target of 3% of GDP and achieving parity with the USexpenditure requires an additional €200 billion annually.2. Mobilisation of European Savings for Investment: Europe’s highersavings rate contrasts with its underdeveloped capital markets, which hindereconomic growth and investment in new enterprises. Policies are needed tochannel savings into a vibrant corporate market. Expanding the Europeanbond market is crucial.3. Regulatory Reform: The EU’s restrictive regulations increase businesscosts and stifle innovation. Regulatory shifts, especially in the bankingsector, could unlock €4.5 trillion annually, providing essential capital for1innovation, especially small and medium-sized enterprises, to financeinnovation during the green and digital transition.Addressing these areas can foster business growth, innovation, and long-termeconomic stability in Europe.Publication details: A Strategy for a Competitive Europe: Boosting R&D,Unleashing Investment, and Reducing Regulatory Burdens, ECIPE Policy Brief No.14/2024,Contact the corresponding author: Fredrik Erixon, fredrik.erixon@ecipe.orgMedia inquiries: info@ecipe.org or +32 2 289 13 502 PR PB 14:2024 New Policy Brief: A Strategy for a Competitive Europe: Boosting R&D, Unleashing Investment, and Reducing Regulatory Burdens	查看 2155	国际政治经济学欧洲中心	2024-09-07 17:04:49 2024-09-07 17:06:11	word
2706052	有图 Internal EU politics, Latest news, Perspectives Perspectives – Wanted: A European trade commissioner <p> <time> 05/07/2024 </time> by David Henig Views: 909 </p> <p> <p>As EU institutions return to life after the elections, there is a need to rethink how trade policy is handled. With fewer new FTAs the role of the European Commission’s directorate-general for trade has become unclear. But the EU would best be served by restoring a commissioner dedicated to openness and rules-based trade.</p><p>Phil Hogan resigned as the European trade commissioner four years ago, in August 2020. The European Commission’s executive vice president Valdis Dombrovskis took over his portfolio.</p><p>There is a growing view in Brussels that the commission’s directorate-general for trade – aka DG Trade – has lost considerable power since then.</p><p>To some degree this trend was predictable regardless of who runs the trade portfolio.</p><p>‘Open strategic autonomy’ had become the direction of travel from 2019. New free trade agreement negotiations became a victim of their own success, with Brussels making ever greater demands on ever fewer willing partners.</p><p>A new emphasis on trade rule and agreement enforcement with a dedicated deputy director general since 2020 was bound to change the nature of EU trade policy.</p><p>DG Trade has lost its identity as the entity in the commission arguing for open trade. Other DGs gained more power to block openness as the new EU regulatory agenda affecting trade was rolled out. Balance has been lost.</p><p>Concern from trade liberal member states and businesses about the EU closing to competition are justified. If Europe is to be globally competitive, it has to be open.</p><p>At least one commissioner needs to be making the openness case internally. Logically, that should be a dedicated head of DG Trade.</p>EU trade in a new context<p>Many stakeholders just want to turn the clock back. For the EU that would be to the pre-2019 situation where negotiation of new free trade agreements dominated activity. Renegotiating existing deals is considered nothing like as important.</p><p>That constituency must recognise that this world has passed.</p><p>A more pertinent starting point is to recognise that multi-functional trade policy is now a reality.</p><p>For many countries trade is expected to help deliver economic growth, support the fight against climate change, deliver manufacturing jobs, and much more.</p><p>International negotiations are becoming more difficult in this environment. Domestic demands on trade policy are increasing across the world, whether it is to protect agriculture or to prevent other countries from engaging in what is perceived as unfair behaviour. ‘Open strategic autonomy’ was an inevitable reaction to these domestic politics.</p><p>The institutional consequence is that as trade policy covers ever more issues, so is responsibility spread further across the EU’s commission. Increasingly powers relating to trade are also held by those responsible for the internal market, data and digital, relations with neighbours, and climate, mechanically weakening DG Trade’s role.</p>A more negative narrative around trade<p>As well as substance, there was also great symbolism to the trade commissioner in negotiating FTAs. This was at the heart of encouraging the EU to be a global trade player.</p><p>Trade defence was of course always a part of the trade policy work. Stopping others from breaching rules has long been seen as essential for maintaining support for trade.</p><p>But the emphasis has now changed. There seems to be a broader EU assumption that other countries will cheat and fail to enforce commitments, and that preventing this happening should be a priority of DG Trade.</p><p>Similarly, FTAs are too often also couched in negative terms first, as protecting the EU market.</p><p>If no EU commissioner now unequivocally makes the case for open trade, then progress is unlikely.</p><p>This is when one can be sympathetic with Chancellor Scholz of Germany recently saying “I am not satisfied with the results of the European Union’s trade policy – something has to change dramatically.”</p><p>Arguably Germany has not made a sufficient case for open trade either. But Scholz’s point is fair.</p><p>What needs to change is that DG Trade must return to being the part of the EU that stands for trade openness, a DG which sometimes works with and sometimes opposes other directorates to make this happen.</p>Economic security demands effective balance of trade and other issues<p>Back in the early 2010s there were finely balanced discussions on engagement with China involving security and economic interests above all. Those of us on the trade side recognised the importance of seeking a balance.</p><p>Such issues are obviously now much more important in the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.</p><p>Indeed, there is an active debate in Brussels as to whether there should be a commissioner who has ‘economic security’ in their job title.</p><p>There may be a good case for this. Thinking about how supply chains affect economies and their potential vulnerabilities is indeed important work.</p><p>Economic security and trade have many overlaps. They should not however be confused.</p><p>Rather, there have to be discussions as to whether open trade is helpful or not to economic security challenges such as pandemics and future prosperity.</p><p>Someone needs to put the case that trade has been essential to beating the pandemic and finding alternate sources of energy to Russia.</p><p>Of course, a stand-alone commissioner for trade openness will be outnumbered. Many of their colleagues will be arguing for a Europe whose walls are built higher, as we have recently seen. This is indeed a natural response to security challenges.</p><p>Defending international trade norms is similarly essential but fraught. There will be those arguing security requires rules must be ignored. The contrary view, that they are essential for security, also needs to be put forward.</p><p>In a different political environment one could talk about mainstreaming support for trade openness and rules throughout institutions. Realistically though, this is not possible at the moment. Even to try is to risk further turning away from trade, as we have seen in the last five years.</p><p>As trade policy becomes more complex, clarity is ever more important. A simple message is needed, with an EU trade commissioner unambiguously seeing their job as arguing for openness.</p><p><img src="https://borderlex.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/2021-01-14-DAVID-HENIG-150x150.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer">David Henig runs the column ‘Perspectives’ on the politics of global trade for Borderlex. He is also a UK director at the think tank ECIPE.</p><p> Related</p> </p> <footer> <p> <img src="https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/cec48e92af5fa22fb7036067c0475bb8?s=70&d=mm&r=g" rel="noopener noreferrer"> <p> Author: David Henig </p> </p> </footer> Perspectives - Wanted: A European trade commissioner - Borderlex	查看 7354	国际政治经济学欧洲中心	2024-07-05 23:47:02 2024-09-07 17:06:11	word
2706051	有图 <p> <p> <p></p> </p> <p> Abi Kay 05 July 2024 https://www.fwi.co.uk </p> <p> More in Farm policyNews </p> <p> <p> New government set to shake up political landscape <p> </p> <p> <p> <p> Abi Kay 05 July 2024 </p> <p> <p></p> </p> <p> >More in Farm policyNews </p> </p> <p> <img src="https://stmaaprodfwsite.blob.core.windows.net/assets/sites/1/2024/06/Keir-Starmer-at-farm-2NH7KC4_C_-PA-Images_Alamy-Stock-Photo-1024x577.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer">© PA Images/Alamy Stock </p> <p> <p>Farming organisations are preparing for the biggest government shake-up in almost 15 years following the general election.</p><p>Labour has set out five missions to “rebuild Britain” that include kickstarting economic growth, boosting clean energy supply and clamping down on crime.</p><p>See also: Badger Trust slams Labour’s backpedalling on badger cull</p><p>As a result of the party’s focus on “mission-driven government”, NFU director of strategy Nick von Westenholz said he expected significant changes to decision-making structures, with the introduction of several “mission boards” and possible departmental reforms.</p><p>Mr von Westenholz said: “From our conversations with Labour, it is clear that where they see policies as contributing to these missions, there will be a much higher likelihood that they will be prioritised.</p><p>“So farming’s ability to demonstrate how it can contribute to jobs and growth in rural areas, and also in other parts of the UK by boosting the wider domestic food sector, will be critical.”</p>Opposition<p>At the Countryside Alliance, chief executive Tim Bonner is contemplating how to handle the new make-up of the House of Commons, noting that if there is a huge Labour majority, the combined opposition will be effectively powerless.</p><p>“The battles that matter won’t be between Labour and the Conservatives or Liberal Democrats, but between different sections of the Labour Party, and we all have to get our heads around that,” he said.</p><p>“In 2019, Labour was largely wiped out of rural constituencies, but that is about to change.</p><p>“It would be very helpful to have a group of rural MPs for whom farming and rural issues are important and who are able to lobby ministers and Number 10.”</p>Policy ‘light’<p>On specific farming policies, the Labour manifesto was – by design – very light.</p><p>But Vicki Hird, strategic lead on agriculture at the Wildlife Trusts, told Farmers Weekly the Labour team had expressed “strong interest” in issues around supply chain fairness.</p><p>“There is always a risk that government will fear noise about food prices, which is not a necessary outcome if fair dealing regulations are done well, but we have had good chats,” she said.</p><p>“I would add that on building local food supply chains and on local and environmental procurement for schools, they have been very positive, too.”</p>Tenancy reform<p>On tenancy reform, which was not mentioned in the manifesto, Tenant Farmers Association chief executive George Dunn was also hopeful.</p><p>“We’ve been given assurances that Labour is very much in favour of what was in the Rock Review and will want to ensure the agenda is taken forward,” he said.</p><p>He also noted that the Labour team had listened to arguments against scrapping agricultural property relief and was optimistic that a future government would take a “more intelligent” approach.</p>Core standards<p>On trade, David Henig, UK director of the European Centre for International Political Economy, said he “would not be surprised” to see Labour introduce the “core standards” farm groups have been asking for.</p><p>The party could also seek a closer relationship with the EU, which may have an impact on regulation of plant protection products.</p><p>The King’s Speech, where the new government will set out its initial priorities, will take place on 17 July.</p> </p> <p> </p> <p> <p> See more Farm policyNews </p> <p> <p> Share this <p></p> </p> </p> </p> </p> </p> </p> </p> <p> <p><form><p></p> </form></p> <p> </p> </p> New government set to shake up political landscape - Farmers Weekly	查看 6012	国际政治经济学欧洲中心	2024-07-05 23:52:29 2024-09-07 17:06:10	word
2706050	有图 How Starmer risks being ignored by world leaders <p> The rise of right-wing parties on the international stage could spell trouble for the new Labour government </p> <p> <p> Gordon Rayner, Associate Editor ; Tony Diver, US Editor ; Nick Squires ; James Crisp, Europe Editor and Henry Samuel <time> 6 July 2024 • 4:15pm </time> </p> <p> <p> <p>Related Topics</p> Keir Starmer, Labour Party, Donald Trump, European Union, David Lammy, Joe Biden </p> </p> <p> <svg> <title>X Icon</title> </svg> <svg> <title>Facebook Icon</title> </svg> <svg> <title>WhatsApp Icon</title> </svg> <svg> <title>Email Icon</title> </svg> <p> <svg> <title>Save</title> </svg> <p> <svg> <title>Comment speech bubble icon</title> <g> </g></svg> </p> </p> </p> <p> <meta> <meta> <meta> <meta> <p> <p> <source srcset="/content/dam/news/2024/07/06/TELEMMGLPICT000384643975_17202759141040_trans_NvBQzQNjv4Bq-IWLY18X4-CzgyIcjLEAj0k9u7HhRJvuo-ZLenGRumA.jpeg?imwidth=1280"> <source srcset="/content/dam/news/2024/07/06/TELEMMGLPICT000384643975_17202759141040_trans_NvBQzQNjv4Bq-IWLY18X4-CzgyIcjLEAj0k9u7HhRJvuo-ZLenGRumA.jpeg?imwidth=960"> <source srcset="/content/dam/news/2024/07/06/TELEMMGLPICT000384643975_17202759141040_trans_NvBQzQNjv4Bq-IWLY18X4-CzgyIcjLEAj0k9u7HhRJvuo-ZLenGRumA.jpeg?imwidth=680"> <source srcset="/content/dam/news/2024/07/06/TELEMMGLPICT000384643975_17202759141040_trans_NvBQzQNjv4Bq-IWLY18X4-CzgyIcjLEAj0k9u7HhRJvuo-ZLenGRumA.jpeg?imwidth=350&imdensity=2"> <source srcset="/content/dam/news/2024/07/06/TELEMMGLPICT000384643975_17202759141040_trans_NvBQzQNjv4Bq-IWLY18X4-CzgyIcjLEAj0k9u7HhRJvuo-ZLenGRumA.jpeg?imwidth=350"> <img src="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/content/dam/news/2024/07/06/TELEMMGLPICT000384643975_17202759141040_trans_NvBQzQNjv4Bq-IWLY18X4-CzgyIcjLEAj0k9u7HhRJvuo-ZLenGRumA.jpeg?imwidth=680" rel="noopener noreferrer"> </p> <svg> </svg> </p> The new Labour government puts Britain on the left in a world that"s increasingly swerving right </p> <p> <p> <p> <p>When it comes to international affairs, relationships matter. Would the Iraq war have played out differently if Tony Blair had not stood “shoulder to shoulder” with George W. Bush?Would the Berlin Wall have come down in 1989 without Margaret Thatcher charming Mikhail Gorbachev?</p><p>In a world that appears to be veering to the right, Britain has just swerved to the left, meaning Sir Keir Starmer may quickly find himself out of step with the country’s most important allies.</p><p>Italy is already governed by Giorgia Meloni, the host of the most recent G7 summit and leader of the populist right-wing Brothers of Italy party. France appears to be going down a similar route with the surge in support for Marine Le Pen’s National Rally. Donald Trump could be back in the White House by January.</p><p>Sir Keir’s ability to find common ground, if not friendship, with leaders so diametrically opposed to him, will have real-world consequences for UK security and trade.</p> </p> <meta> <meta> <meta> <p> <p> <source srcset="/content/dam/news/2024/07/06/TELEMMGLPICT000382925626_17202720744100_trans_NvBQzQNjv4BqA7N2CxnJWnYI3tCbVBgu9T0aesusvN1TE7a0ddd_esI.jpeg?imwidth=960"> <source srcset="/content/dam/news/2024/07/06/TELEMMGLPICT000382925626_17202720744100_trans_NvBQzQNjv4BqA7N2CxnJWnYI3tCbVBgu9T0aesusvN1TE7a0ddd_esI.jpeg?imwidth=680"> <source srcset="/content/dam/news/2024/07/06/TELEMMGLPICT000382925626_17202720744100_trans_NvBQzQNjv4BqA7N2CxnJWnYI3tCbVBgu9T0aesusvN1TE7a0ddd_esI.jpeg?imwidth=480&imdensity=2"> <source srcset="/content/dam/news/2024/07/06/TELEMMGLPICT000382925626_17202720744100_trans_NvBQzQNjv4BqA7N2CxnJWnYI3tCbVBgu9T0aesusvN1TE7a0ddd_esI.jpeg?imwidth=480"> <img src="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/content/dam/news/2024/07/06/TELEMMGLPICT000382925626_17202720744100_trans_NvBQzQNjv4BqA7N2CxnJWnYI3tCbVBgu9T0aesusvN1TE7a0ddd_esI.jpeg?imwidth=350" rel="noopener noreferrer"> </p> </p> Donald Trump"s potential re-election could cause issues for Keir Starmer Credit: AP <p> <p>How, for example, will he solve the problem of small boats crossing the Channel if he has a contretemps with the French? How will he influence Donald Trump’s thinking on Ukraine if Mr Trump regards him with contempt? How will he fulfil his wish of renegotiating the Brexit deal if he cannot win over?</p><p>Sir Keir has wheeled out the inevitable platitudes about how he will work with whoever is in power in any given country, but those with first-hand experience of international diplomacy say he will have his work cut out to build the sort of relationships he hopes for.</p><p>The most special of those relationships, of course, will be with America, Britain’s most powerful ally and its biggest export market by far.</p><p>If Donald Trump becomes president again, Sir Keir will have to navigate his “extraordinary” way of doing business, according to those who have been there before. One former Whitehall staffer who saw Mr Trump’s dealings with Theresa May and Boris Johnson at close quarters said: “The way Trump operates is unlike any other world leader and he and Starmer will not be natural bedfellows. Trump is incredibly blunt and forthright, he is unpredictable, and he can be extremely thin-skinned if he feels he has been slighted.” They continued : “Theresa May didn’t have any idea how to deal with him. The only one who understood how to deal with Trump was Boris Johnson. He portrayed himself as a junior partner, playing on Trump’s ego and vanity, but still a partner, and knew when to stand up to him, like when he persuaded him to stay out of the 2019 election campaign.”</p><p>“The problem for Starmer will be that his party won’t want to see him trying to woo Trump and he will be under pressure internally to keep him at arm’s length, but the deep state will be making it clear to him that his responsibility is to hug Trump close. It’s easy to pontificate when you’re in opposition but it’s much more difficult when you are responsible for national security and defence.”</p><p>The source said that on one occasion Mr Trump was on the phone to Mrs May from Air Force One, trying to railroad her over Brexit, while she “clutched her pearls” and responded with evasion. At one point Mr Trump could not hear Mrs May, and thought the connection had been lost, but Mrs May and her staff on the call could still hear the former president loud and clear as he said: “Someone get that stupid British bitch back on the line.” The Telegraph asked Trump’s staff about the incident, but they had not responded at the time of publication.</p><p>Unlike Sir Tony Blair, Ed Miliband and Gordon Brown, all of whom visited the incumbent president before general elections, Sir Keir has not made a recent trip to Washington, instead leaving the diplomacy to his new Foreign Secretary David Lammy, who has in the past described Mr Trump as a “neo-Nazi-sympathising sociopath.”</p> </p> <meta> <meta> <meta> <p> <p> <source srcset="/content/dam/news/2024/07/06/TELEMMGLPICT000377488578_17202725509330_trans_NvBQzQNjv4BqqVzuuqpFlyLIwiB6NTmJwSX5rhseiWKOo9p9OQ-ymek.jpeg?imwidth=960"> <source srcset="/content/dam/news/2024/07/06/TELEMMGLPICT000377488578_17202725509330_trans_NvBQzQNjv4BqqVzuuqpFlyLIwiB6NTmJwSX5rhseiWKOo9p9OQ-ymek.jpeg?imwidth=680"> <source srcset="/content/dam/news/2024/07/06/TELEMMGLPICT000377488578_17202725509330_trans_NvBQzQNjv4BqqVzuuqpFlyLIwiB6NTmJwSX5rhseiWKOo9p9OQ-ymek.jpeg?imwidth=480&imdensity=2"> <source srcset="/content/dam/news/2024/07/06/TELEMMGLPICT000377488578_17202725509330_trans_NvBQzQNjv4BqqVzuuqpFlyLIwiB6NTmJwSX5rhseiWKOo9p9OQ-ymek.jpeg?imwidth=480"> <img src="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/content/dam/news/2024/07/06/TELEMMGLPICT000377488578_17202725509330_trans_NvBQzQNjv4BqqVzuuqpFlyLIwiB6NTmJwSX5rhseiWKOo9p9OQ-ymek.jpeg?imwidth=350" rel="noopener noreferrer"> </p> </p> Foreign Secretary David Lammy has publicaly criticised Trump in the past Credit: Reuters <p> <p>Mr Lammy has described his approach to foreign policy as “progressive realism,” without actually explaining what that phrase means. Labour sources say Mr Lammy’s team is in contact on a near-daily basis with both Joe Biden’s National Security Council and Donald Trump’s campaign team. Trump’s campaign team denies this. Chris LaCivita, a senior adviser to the former president, said earlier this week that conversations had so far been “perfunctory.”</p> </p><p> <p></p><p> <p>Mr Biden’s domestic agenda has much in common with Sir Keir’s, and much of Labour’s economic strategy has been borrowed from the Democrats. Both men have expensive green industry investment and labour market reform high on their list of priorities.</p><p>However, Trump is sceptical of Western aid for Ukraine, while Labour’s John Healey has described the party’s support for Kyiv as “iron clad”.” Sir Keir has said he would eventually like to recognise a Palestinian state, while Trump is even more strongly pro-Israel than Mr Biden.</p><p>There would also likely be differences on China, which Mr Trump has long held as America’s natural enemy and promised to impose fresh tariffs, while taking a hawkish approach to imports he says could pose a threat to national security.</p><p>“They will find themselves in a dilemma,” said Klaus Larres, a Kissinger China Institute Fellow at the Wilson Center in Washington. They have to appease the United States for obvious reasons, but also don’t want to give up on China. The UK’s economic relations with China are very intense.”</p><p>There are also major differences between the two leaders on climate policies. While Trump has pledged to “drill, baby, drill” and reduce US investment in clean energy, Labour has said it will do the opposite.</p><p>If Trump wins power again, London and Washington’s positions on a free trade deal will be reversed. While Mr Biden has blocked a deal during his presidency, Trump has suggested he would be open to striking one.</p><p>Labour, meanwhile, is more interested in reaching agreement on “sector specific” deals on tech, pharmaceuticals and other key industries, while avoiding rows about imports of American chlorinated chicken and other agrifoods.</p><p>The presumptive Republican nominee, who is facing three further criminal trials after his convictions in the Stormy Daniels “hush money” case, is also sceptical of federal prosecutors who dabble in politics – the exact career path taken by Sir Keir.</p><p>Closer to home, Sir Keir must find a way of stopping illegal Channel crossings by migrants if he is to have any credibility over border security. He has said he will work with other countries to find a solution, but has already ditched Rishi Sunak’s plans to send asylum seekers to Rwanda, which was popular with right-wing parties on the continent.</p><p>France could look very different next week after it goes to the polls for the second round of its parliamentary elections on Sunday. President Macron has already let it be known he is impressed with Mr Starmer, who last year said had the “moral authority” to become prime minister after a bilateral meeting considered a break in protocol for an opposition leader. But Mr Macron might not be calling the shots if Marine Le Pen’s National Rally wins an absolute majority, which would mean 28-year-old Jordan Bardella becoming prime minister. Ms Le Pen has already indicated that she sees Macron’s role as foreign and defence chief largely “honorific,” meaning she intends with Bardella to muscle in. While Macron has deferred to the EU over immigration, she said she would go further in bilateral, rather than EU-wide, cooperation.</p><p>“Britain wants to protect its borders and therefore prevent illegal immigrants from entering the UK. They happen to come from France,” she said.</p><p>Bardella is in favour of creating a joint task force in the Channel that would “deport migrants directly to their home countries via charters”. That is unlikely to be on Starmer’s agenda.</p> </p> <meta> <meta> <meta> <p> <p> <source srcset="/content/dam/news/2024/07/06/TELEMMGLPICT000383185926_17202721812930_trans_NvBQzQNjv4BqpVlberWd9EgFPZtcLiMQf0Rf_Wk3V23H2268P_XkPxc.jpeg?imwidth=960"> <source srcset="/content/dam/news/2024/07/06/TELEMMGLPICT000383185926_17202721812930_trans_NvBQzQNjv4BqpVlberWd9EgFPZtcLiMQf0Rf_Wk3V23H2268P_XkPxc.jpeg?imwidth=680"> <source srcset="/content/dam/news/2024/07/06/TELEMMGLPICT000383185926_17202721812930_trans_NvBQzQNjv4BqpVlberWd9EgFPZtcLiMQf0Rf_Wk3V23H2268P_XkPxc.jpeg?imwidth=480&imdensity=2"> <source srcset="/content/dam/news/2024/07/06/TELEMMGLPICT000383185926_17202721812930_trans_NvBQzQNjv4BqpVlberWd9EgFPZtcLiMQf0Rf_Wk3V23H2268P_XkPxc.jpeg?imwidth=480"> <img src="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/content/dam/news/2024/07/06/TELEMMGLPICT000383185926_17202721812930_trans_NvBQzQNjv4BqpVlberWd9EgFPZtcLiMQf0Rf_Wk3V23H2268P_XkPxc.jpeg?imwidth=350" rel="noopener noreferrer"> </p> </p> Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni had a strong relationship with Rishi Sunak"s government Credit: AFP <p> <p>Sunak forged a particularly strong relationship with Italy’s Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, and Italian analysts are doubtful that Sir Keir will be able to replicate that personal rapport. “It will not be the same relationship at all,” said Roberto D’Alimonte, professor of politics at Luiss University in Rome. “It won’t be adversarial, but I don’t think it will be very warm.”</p><p>Francesco Galietti, the founder of Rome-based political risk consultancy Policy Sonar, said: “At the individual level, the chemistry is just not there. My guess is that it won’t be an easy match. Starmer is meticulous, almost Germanic, he looks like someone who does all his homework. That’s a nightmare for any Italian politician. On the other hand, geopolitical imperatives will force them to keep the bilateral relationship in good shape.”</p><p>He cited the example of the Global Combat Air Programme, a joint initiative between the UK, Italy and Japan to build a sixth-generation fighter by 2035. “Whether you like or dislike one another, you have to work together on things like this,” he said. “And the Brits want to have a counterbalance to the France-German axis in Europe, so that is another reason to cultivate relations with Italy.”</p><p>Perhaps the trickiest game of 3D chess Sir Keir will have to play on the international stage will be with Brussels.Labour has been explicit about its desire to forge closer post-Brexit ties with the EU, and Sir Keir’s shopping list for Brussels is long.</p><p>It includes a veterinary deal to smooth out British trade with Northern Ireland and the EU, a revamp of the Brexit trade deal and an agreement on chemicals regulation.</p><p>Labour also wants to formalise foreign policy and security cooperation, potentially link the EU and UK carbon trading markets, get a better deal for British touring artists and recognition of qualifications for UK financial services workers and strike an EU-wide migrant return deal allowing Britain to return Channel migrants.</p><p>At the same time, Labour insists on its red lines that there will be no return to the EU’s Single Market and Customs Union or freedom of movement and that Britain won’t be a rule-taker.</p><p>That, according to former UK ambassador to the EU Sir Ivan Rogers, will risk being seen as “just the latest glorious version of British cherry picking,” by Brussels.</p><p>The EU and UK have agreed to review the EU–UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement in 2026 but there is no agreement on how ambitious that will be. Brussels insists it is a chance for some tweaks to a deal that is working to its advantage rather than the major overhaul Labour had hoped for. When it comes to the veterinary deal, all the signs are that it will demand Britain align with EU rules, which are governed by the European Court of Justice.</p> </p> <meta> <meta> <meta> <p> <p> <source srcset="/content/dam/news/2024/07/06/TELEMMGLPICT000383873907_17202731388840_trans_NvBQzQNjv4BqCXAvR7tM18OW-dipkJ3WlcmyOotKlIqKAcZIl8tChZw.jpeg?imwidth=960"> <source srcset="/content/dam/news/2024/07/06/TELEMMGLPICT000383873907_17202731388840_trans_NvBQzQNjv4BqCXAvR7tM18OW-dipkJ3WlcmyOotKlIqKAcZIl8tChZw.jpeg?imwidth=680"> <source srcset="/content/dam/news/2024/07/06/TELEMMGLPICT000383873907_17202731388840_trans_NvBQzQNjv4BqCXAvR7tM18OW-dipkJ3WlcmyOotKlIqKAcZIl8tChZw.jpeg?imwidth=480&imdensity=2"> <source srcset="/content/dam/news/2024/07/06/TELEMMGLPICT000383873907_17202731388840_trans_NvBQzQNjv4BqCXAvR7tM18OW-dipkJ3WlcmyOotKlIqKAcZIl8tChZw.jpeg?imwidth=480"> <img src="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/content/dam/news/2024/07/06/TELEMMGLPICT000383873907_17202731388840_trans_NvBQzQNjv4BqCXAvR7tM18OW-dipkJ3WlcmyOotKlIqKAcZIl8tChZw.jpeg?imwidth=350" rel="noopener noreferrer"> </p> </p> Starmer"s relationship with the EU remains to be seen Credit: PA <p> <p>Labour’s recent rejection of the EU call for improved youth mobility and a return to the Erasmus student exchange programme may also harden attitudes in the European Commission.</p><p>It is the Commission that will be Sir Keir’s contact for the negotiations and it drives a hard bargain and will only make a deal it sees to be in the bloc’s interest.</p><p>“They put their best people on trade negotiations. And they have the weight of 27 countries and a single market of 450 million people behind them, which gives them formidable negotiating power,” said Kim Darroch, a former UK ambassador to the EU and US.</p><p>Sunak has already pocketed the benefits of normalising relations after signing his new Brexit deal for Northern Ireland with the EU, which means Sir Keir can’t simply rely on being a fresh face after 14 years of difficult Tories to secure some wins.</p><p>Right-wing parties dominated the European Parliament elections and hard-Right governments are in power in Italy, the Netherlands and Hungary and could soon be dominant in France and Austria. That will make an EU-wide migrant return deal even more difficult.</p><p>“The absence of member state governments from Labour’s sister parties around the EU is going to make it harder for them to create the sort of relationships to help negotiations,” said David Henig, UK director of The European Centre for International Political Economy think tank.</p><p>“There’s willingness to talk to a new UK government about their priorities, but no desire to give anything away - so any negotiations will be tough.”</p><p>Welcome to international relations, Sir Keir.</p> </p><p> <p></p> </p> <p> <p> <p> <p>Related Topics</p> Keir Starmer, Labour Party, Donald Trump, European Union, David Lammy, Joe Biden </p> </p> <p> <p> <svg> <title>X Icon</title> </svg> <svg> <title>Facebook Icon</title> </svg> <svg> <title>WhatsApp Icon</title> </svg> <svg> <title>Email Icon</title> </svg> </p> <p> <svg> <title>Comment speech bubble icon</title> <g> </g></svg> </p> </p> </p> License this content <p> <p> Join the conversation </p> <p> <p> The Telegraph values your comments but kindly requests all posts are on topic, constructive and respectful. Please review our commenting policy. </p> </p> <p> <p> <p> You need to be a subscriber to join the conversation. Find out more here. </p> <p> Log In Subscribe </p> </p> </p> <p>Show comments</p> <svg> <g> </g> </svg> <p> <vf-conversations></vf-conversations> </p> </p> </p> <p> <p> <p> <p>Advertisement</p> </p> </p> <p> More stories </p> </p> How Starmer risks being ignored by world leaders	查看 23102	国际政治经济学欧洲中心	2024-07-07 00:04:28 2024-09-07 17:06:10	word

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